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EDITORIAL

CONSIDERABLE SPACE HAS ALREADY BEEN DEVOTED by the religious press to the problem which the returning soldier brings to the church. There seems to be a certain apprehension lest our army of valiant and victorious soldiers may return to revolutionize theological and ecclesiastical affairs generally. Some would seem to fear that these young men may almost determine the fate of the church by declining to endorse it. When great masses of youth, in the alert and formative years, are suddenly wrested from their customary lives of peace at home and flung into the abnormal conditions and activities of war abroad, old ideas and estimates of things are inevitably going to change. Life suddenly becomes larger in all dimensions, and minds tend to become impatient of tradition; hence increasing tact is called for in dealing with them. This should stimulate the church to hasten the correction of her real faults, and to make all proper and essential adjustments to meet new emergencies, but she must avoid giving the impression of catering to popular notions rather than of meeting fundamental needs. The soldiers return with new views that will contribute their proportion to the present impulse to better conditions of life. Still, it must be remembered that all minds do not react alike; some will have a higher appreciation of old truths; others will be confused, suspicious or hostile; while a

large number will remain merely indifferent. We believe that Mr. Wyckoff, writing under the heading, *The Pup Tent and the Pulpit*, rightly places the emphasis of the whole problem. We are fortunate in having here the conclusions of a writer who not only possesses seasoned powers of discrimination, but who speaks after some six months' intimate study of the boys at the front, where he was frequently under fire with them, lived their lives, and enjoyed their confidences amid conditions that impel men to reveal their inmost hearts.

IN THE JULY AND OCTOBER NUMBERS OF 1917 WE published in this quarterly a masterly article upon *The Personality of God*, by Dr. Snowden. While that discussion was complete in itself, the author has prepared a supplementary paper, given herein, which is an examination of the subject in the light of modern science, of modern philosophy, and of the Great War. Of course, a belief in the divine Creator and Ruler of the universe does not necessarily mean Christian faith in its full sense. But it is important to note that atheism, the utter denial of God, is no longer a formidable antagonist to faith. Even agnostics, the professedly indifferent ones, give evidence of having a more definite idea of God than they themselves suspect, as this paper shows. Of particular value is the discussion of the effect of the war on our ideas of God. The point that this conflict discloses no new principle is especially important. From some current opinions one might suspect that this crisis had somehow revealed God in an entirely new light. Rather, the war has revealed the strength and the possibilities of genuine faith, and also the weaknesses of its coun-

terfeits. Larger conceptions of Christian obligations and problems, and important readjustments of method may be looked for, but to anticipate a revised theology as a result of the war is to become the victim of a passing intellectual epidemic. Individuals indeed will be changing their own views, but in so doing they will simply be shifting their positions to new places on the old lines. The eternal things remain. "The firm foundation of God standeth."

PROBABLY MANY A BELIEVER HAS BEEN SECRETLY troubled in spirit over the question of a possible necessity of readjusting his views of some portion of Scripture because of the very fact that it is so persistently assailed by learned men. The authorship, the date, and the contents of the book of Daniel have been more or less constantly under fire since radical scholarship arose to attack traditional views of the Bible. Because of the great amount of discussion on the subject, pro and con, a review of the results from time to time becomes almost a necessity, if the Old Testament student is to measure with any accuracy the amount of ground gained—or lost—in the drive against the position anciently held by the prophet. Writing this quarter under the heading, *The Present State of the Daniel Controversy*, Dr. Wilson seeks to provide a survey of the situation as it now stands. This writer recently contributed a noteworthy volume on the subject, reviewed in July, 1918, but the salient points in the controversy are here presented in a compass sufficiently small to be covered at a single reading. The questions of the origin and date of the book, its doctrines, predictive prophecy, and

miracles, its language and relation to other historical sources and records, its use of the words "king" and "kingdom," are all concisely treated. The reader does not require a special knowledge of Old Testament criticism to appreciate the force of the author's reasoning or the soundness of his conclusions.

THE THIRD AND LAST ARTICLE IN THE SERIES upon The Unbelieving Intellectuals and the Christian Faith is given in the present number by Professor Johnson, who writes of The Unbelieving Philosophers. His discussion falls under three heads of naturally close relationship: The Philosophers and Christian Theism, The Philosophers and Christian Ethics, and Unbelief and the World War. It is shown that it is not enough that philosophy avoid outright atheism; it falls into error when it offers an inadequate theism. An impersonal God will not suffice to meet the demands made by the mind upon the very principle of deity. "The two poles of theistic thought are the personality of God and man; and the strength of theism is in the fact of intercommunion between them." A true system of morals cannot be maintained apart from the Christian conception of God and His relation to the universe. Quoting Thornton, our writer agrees with him that "the revolt against the Christian ethic is due to the previous repudiation of the doctrine upon which it is founded." He also traces the descent of Germany, through unbelief, to a lust for world dominion and oppression, and the relation of Christian principles to democracy is clearly brought out. As a philosophical study, this paper is unusually clear, direct, and easy to follow, and in general character it is well suited to close the series.

DR. SIHLER'S SERIES OF CLASSICAL STUDIES ALREADY published in these pages makes any word of commendation appear superfluous when introducing another paper from his pen. It is worth while, however, to call attention to his study of Tertullian of Carthage, since he here takes up a character in Christian history somewhat neglected by English-speaking scholars. A well known professor of church history, anticipating the present contribution, wrote to the author: "I shall await your article on Tertullian with impatience. Since the learned Bishop of Lincoln (Kaye) we have had no monograph on him in English." We therefore feel that what Dr. Sihler writes this quarter will be of somewhat unique interest to students of the history of Christianity.

R. M. K.

THE PUP TENT AND THE PULPIT

By REV. A. C. WYCKOFF, Pastor of the Reformed Church, Spring Valley,
New York

THEY are coming home! The great war at last is over, and our boys are coming home. This fact alone is enough to justify the unusual agitation which stirs, to its lowest depths, the very life of the nation. For these boys have become our heroes. They have met the supreme test of patriotism and left a superb record of military achievement in every branch of the service. Enthusiastic preparations are everywhere under way to provide for them a worthy and fitting welcome. In home circles, in business circles, in university circles, in community circles, feverish excitement quickens the pulse and raises the temperature of active interest to higher than normal. Thus a new zest seems to be imparted to all life.

It is to be regretted that, in the midst of such universal rejoicing, the church has been singled out and held conspicuously before the public as the one institution for which the return of the soldiers forebodes nothing but ill. Many prophets have returned from overseas to predict this melancholy fact. They do not hesitate to proclaim that the return of the soldiers will be like the "crack of doom" to the church. Thus the day everywhere else looked forward to as the great day of jubilee is held up to the church as its great day of judgment.

And as though it were not enough for the church to be compelled to face its nemesis at the hands of the returning soldiers, friends and foes alike are hastening to the assistance of nemesis. Consequently we find most

dramatic and sweeping indictments drawn up and placed in the hands of the soldiers for their use in that great day when they sit in judgment and pass their final sentence upon the church. If the soldiers do not take up and prosecute this ready-to-hand indictment it will be because they are far more disposed to be fair-minded in their attitude toward the church than is the average civilian.

These prophets of doom remind us of their predecessors who were so numerous at the beginning of the war, and who announced with great assurance that it was the death-knell of Christianity. Mr. Galsworthy presents this type of prediction representatively in this prophecy: "After this monstrous mockery beneath this grinning skull of irony, how shall there remain faith in a religion preached and practiced to such ends? When this war is over and reason resumes its sway, our dogmas will be found to have been scored through forever. Whatever else may be the outcome of this business, let us at least realize the truth: it is the death of mystic Christianity. Yes, mystic Christianity was dying before this war began, when it is over it will be dead."¹ After four long years the war is now over, and mystic Christianity is not dead but more alive than when the war broke out. So also most of these drastic and sweeping predictions concerning the fate of the church at the hands of the soldiers will turn out to be greatly exaggerated. For the truth is, nothing very much out of the ordinary is going to happen to the church. The returning soldiers are neither going to criticize very severely, nor revolutionize very radically its life. For the majority of them are not sufficiently interested in it to concern themselves one way or the other with its problems.

¹Scribner's, November, 1914.

In this same connection it may be well to divest our minds of some of the unwarranted expectations which have a tendency to unbalance the equilibrium of the church's spirit and activity. Great disappointment is sure to follow if there is any widespread expectation that the church is going to be able to stampede these soldiers, in any great numbers, into its fold. This cannot be done. No amount of amiable camouflaging of its ethical or religious ideals is going to trick them unsuspectingly into its fellowship. For that matter, the church which for years has not touched their lives to any perceptible degree has no legitimate right to expect to rush in at this opportune moment and reap a harvest which it has not sown. This might have been done as they were going overseas, moving up to the front for the first time, or returning to hospitals seriously wounded—not knowing what fate was before them. But it is no longer possible with the robust, healthy, happy-hearted boys who are coming home.

The church faces a real problem in its desire to win them, and there is only one way in which this can be done. That is, to demonstrate that she possesses something unique and distinctive to offer them, something which they need more than they need any other one thing in the world, and something the world needs more than it needs any other one thing. If upon this ground it can base its appeal, it has hope for its future; if not, its chance is lost. There are plenty of other organizations ready and waiting to meet all their other needs. If at this critical time, when judgment is elemental and instinctive, the church makes the fatal mistake of seeming too anxious, if it intimate that it needs them more than they need it, if it create the suspicion that its fundamental polity, ethic or message can be altered to

suit their pleasure, it will thereby instantly surrender its historic right to claim their allegiance. For these boys have come to admire more than any other one thing steadfast adherence to principles and ideals. These are the things for which men are willing to fight and die, but which they never surrender.

The one supreme thing which these boys will expect of the church is, that it give incontrovertible evidence of the fact that it whole-heartedly believes in itself and in its mission. Then that it frankly, clearly, courageously, loyally, stand up for and proclaim its principles, ideals, and beliefs. If, when this has been fairly done, its cause grips, they are won and everything else is secondary. For it is always a cause which enlists a life. It was the cause for which America entered the war which kindled the fire of their patriotism and made irresistible the call to arms. They were ready for any summons, any hardship, any duty, any fate, because they believed the cause was worth it all. Jesus seems to have believed just the same way in His cause. He never sought to win disciples by modifying or letting down the conditions of discipleship. On the contrary, He unhesitatingly laid down His call as a ringing challenge, and believed enough both in it and in humanity to stake everything upon its being worthy of being met. The centuries still echo it in these terms: "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me."

This change of emphasis transforms the entire character of our present problem. The most important concern does not revolve about what the boys think of the church. As we shall see later, what they think of it depends upon many contingencies besides the church. The supreme concern of the church is, whether it is

successfully presenting its heroic challenge. These boys have demonstrated that they have the innate stuff to respond when they are reached. Can the heroic challenge of Jesus Christ, which calls for life enlistment, be so presented that it will win them?

It may be well to add that this shift in emphasis is not made to palliate the faults and failings of the church or to encourage indifference in the present crisis. It has just the opposite objective in view. No one who has had opportunity to do service among the boys overseas can remain ignorant of the tragic failure of the church before these boys sailed away. To be suddenly lifted out of the pulpit of an average American Protestant church, transported to France, and there set down in the midst of a cross section of the entire young life of this nation; to have the privilege of living day in and day out for months with these boys, not as a preacher or parson, but simply as one of them, a friend with whom they become as natural and free in their confidences as in their use of language, is to get an eye-opening experience which nothing else can duplicate. All delusions are swept away, and one is compelled to settle down to the unvarnished truth that the average soldier, while he has nothing particularly against the church, has nothing particularly for it. Its very existence falls just outside of the normal range of his concern.

After painstaking investigation, we were forced to the conclusion that fully eighty per cent. of the soldiers overseas have no vital interest in the church. Since our return we find this estimate confirmed over and over again by chaplains and other religious workers who have given particular study to it. Visualize this situation. Notwithstanding the number of stars proudly decorating the service flags upon the walls of our

churches, the staggering fact confronts us that fully eighty per cent. of the young men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five are entirely outside of the active life of the church. The presence of the younger and older groups in the church seems to have blinded our eyes to this paralyzing fact. Undoubtedly this statement will be challenged by many who have remained at home and thought it all so different. But it must be remembered that large elements in this group are never accessible to the Protestant minister. Perhaps no other situation save the army could ever bring them together for study. When one lives in the midst of this segregated group and receives without concealment or disguise the full impact of their point of view, it is impossible to escape this startling conclusion. So ominous for the future of the church is this discovery that we can no longer afford to content ourselves with spasmodic attempts at doctoring symptoms, but we must set ourselves with new determination to locate the real cause of the trouble and speedily remedy it.

Sitting one day in the consulting room of a hospital, the writer was much interested in watching an expert diagnostician examine a patient anxious to learn the nature of his ailment, which had so completely baffled his local physicians. With the patient had come his young wife, who had already made up her mind as to what she believed the trouble was. While the physician was skillfully examining the patient, the wife would constantly break in with additional information directly bearing upon her idea. For some reason the physician did not seem to pay the slightest attention to her valuable and enlightening suggestions. When the examination was over and the patient had retired, the writer asked the physician why he treated with such

scant courtesy the evidence which the wife contributed, remarking that she certainly had succeeded in winning his lay mind to her point of view. Smilingly the physician replied: "Well, you see, an experienced diagnostician always has to be careful not to be misled by surface symptoms, which may come from many different causes. When a case is baffling, the outstanding symptoms are generally secondary or superinduced, while the real cause of the trouble is not revealed by them. The restoration of the patient's health depends upon one's ability to penetrate beneath these surface symptoms and locate the real source of trouble."

Perhaps the method of the expert diagnostician may help us in our attempt to clear up some of the confusion which is making it so hard to discover the real source of trouble between the soldiers and the church. That something is wrong there can be no doubt. But just as soon as we attempt to decide what the trouble is there is grave danger lest, in reaching our conclusion, we fall a prey to the diagnostic tactics of the wife rather than the physician. May it not be possible that much of the popular criticism which passes current among the soldiers about the church should be diagnosed simply as misleading secondary or superinduced symptoms of a far more deeply seated ailment?

Analytical psychology comes forward at this very juncture and increases the probability of this conclusion by warning us that, if we are seriously endeavoring to ascertain the real cause of trouble, we must be particularly careful to guard against the deceptions of crowd psychology and the instinctive habit of finessing in psychological self-defense. Both of which factors have marked tendencies to obscure the real issues. The misleading character of crowd psychology is so

familiar that it needs only the caution of having attention called to it. But finessing in psychological self-defense may need a word of explanation. The instinct of self-defense operates not only in the physical realm but also in the moral and religious realm. And the weak spot we have a tendency to protect most jealously. Criticism is the most easily wielded of all self-defensive weapons. It is often employed as a means of throwing the inquirer off the real scent. By its strategy every attempt to get at the truth is skillfully shifted from the trouble with the individual to trouble with the church. In heading off an embarrassing lead, the soldier grasps any weapon of criticism which effectively silences the inquisitive one.

Experience has shown the type of criticism which most readily foils the religious worker. This naturally becomes the stock criticism which is universally employed for the purpose. And these weapons of criticism are the ones most frequently encountered by religious workers, and they are for this reason brought back to America and exhibited as those with which the soldiers attack the church. They are all this. But it is a far stretch to invest them with the dignity of reasons why the soldiers have little to do with the church. Let us examine a few of these popular criticisms, with the above safeguards in mind, and see whether they can meet the test of this two-fold demand. For this purpose we can do no better than select the three main criticisms so well presented by Dr. Fosdick in his article on *The Trenches and the Church at Home*.²

First, Petty Sectarianism. This is the most obvious of all criticism. And it instantly touches a very tender spot in the heart of the sincere religious worker. Everyone interested in the church universal deplores the

²The Atlantic Monthly, January, 1919.

unnecessary splitting up of the forces of the church of Christ into little rival divisions. Sherwood Eddy gives us this criticism from the lips of a soldier in this form: "Perhaps it would be well if we out here could get up a committee of inquiry on, 'Civilians and Religion' and arrive at some decision as to what is the matter with you at home. * * * Are we to return to a country in which, in spite of all the community of suffering and sorrow, the Christian churches have still their differences simmering instead of being regiments in one common army?"³

Now this is a question which rises in the minds of many, both within and without the church. And there is a growing desire that some movement may soon be launched to overcome this state of affairs. But it must be borne in mind that this question is not characteristic of the average soldier. Denominationalism is the very last thing that is disturbing him. And the argument, that if the churches were regiments in the same army all differences would immediately cease to simmer, does not have as much weight with him as with the civilian. For every soldier knows only too well that divisions in one common army corps, regiments in the same division, battalions in the same regiment, and companies in the same battalion all have their differences simmering, and sometimes they do more than simmer. This observation is not an attempt to justify the situation, but simply to point out that from the standpoint of the soldier the remedy does not promise to remove all of the trouble.

Denominations are religious luxuries. There is nothing inherently wrong in the great historic religious communions finding a place side by side in Christendom. Each appeals to a perfectly natural and dis-

³With our Soldiers in France, p. 155.

tinctive psychological difference in temperament. And all these differences of temperament and taste are present in society. To indulge these preferences when the religious life of the community is rich enough to afford such luxuries, without materially hindering the efficient work of the Kingdom, is perfectly legitimate. The mistake of the church in the past has been that it has insisted upon luxuries first, and necessities second. Religious luxuries, like all other kinds, should always be the last to be indulged and, when the good of the cause requires, the first to be sacrificed. As soon as some such attitude toward denominationalism is adopted and a satisfactory scheme for co-operation and comity has been devised, the surviving denominations will fall into their respective places and their difficulties will automatically settle themselves. While this question remains a pressing problem for the church to solve, it cannot by any stretch of the imagination be magnified into a vital one in the minds of the average soldier, nor acknowledged as a real reason for his aloofness.

Right in this connection it might be added that it is very misleading to stress the argument, that, after experience at the front where all religious faiths sink their differences and unite in common service, the soldier will never again be willing to stand for a revival of those differences at home. In fact, experience in the army is liable to lead to just the opposite reaction. Soldiers are forced to be helpless victims of an all-inclusive uniformity. They dress alike, they eat at the same mess, they sleep in the same kinds of bunks, they drill together, and perform the same kinds of details. Religion confronted by the same conditions naturally fell under the power of the same requirements of uniformity. The pressure of an overwhelming common cause

made this necessary. Yet no one recognizes as well as the soldier that this uniformity is but temporary. The moment the war ends and they receive their discharges, it will all break up into its natural elements. These same boys will then eat different food, sleep in different homes, dress according to varying tastes, and work at different jobs. And, as in all other lines, the soldier anticipates that religion will experience very much the same reaction, and its respective faiths slip into their natural and accustomed channels of operation. And in many instances this change will be welcomed rather than regretted.

Second, The Selfishness of Religion's Motif. A critical examination of this popular weapon of criticism raises the puzzling query as to how it comes to be resurrected at this time and pressed into service against the church. For a hasty glance shows it to be rusty with age, and its curious archaic character bears the impress of another generation. Its typical form is well given in these words of an English officer: "The reason I don't like religion, padre, is that it's such a selfish thing. It simply threatens the sinner with hell and promises comforts to the good."⁴ After reading this criticism, one cannot help wondering how many years have passed since this observing officer has had any intimate acquaintance with the church and its message of religion. The whole criticism is such a dead give-away on the officer's knowledge or intelligence that it is difficult to give it serious consideration. As a weapon of criticism it was forged away back in the fires of ancient religious controversy. An exhaustive search fails to reveal its presence to any noticeable degree in the pulpits of the great leading Protestant denominations. It is interesting only as a relic of previous wars.

⁴Fosdick, *Ibid.*

Even the phase of this criticism which emphasizes first the salvation of one's own soul cannot be interpreted in essence as selfish. For out of the response of that very appeal has sprung the fountain source of some of the most unselfish characters that human history records. Our fathers who were reared in their religious life upon this very appeal, will yet stand comparison from the standpoint of unselfishness with their sons reared upon a different religious motif. As Richard Watson Gilder says:

Despise not thou thy father's ancient creed;
Of his pure life it was the golden thread
Whereon bright days were gathered, bead by bead,
Till death laid low that dear and reverend head.
From olden faith how many a glorious deed
Hath lit the world.

Just stop and think through this criticism of the selfishness of religion. It implies that the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as presented by the church, is "such a selfish thing" that the average person outside of the church feels above its spirit. Experience demonstrates that just the opposite of this claim is true. For the religion of the Christian church has always been too unselfish, or too unselfing, for the natural man. The average soldier boy in France will have considerable difficulty in recalling any serious complaints from father over the too great selfishness of the appeal of religion. But the chances are that he may readily recall father coming home from church grumbling because the minister preaches too much on foreign missions. The unselfish appeal of every pulpit far outstrips the generosity of the average parishioner. And when this appeal becomes the "saved to serve" summons of Protestantism, it falls into perfect harmony with the military

emphasis to which the soldier is accustomed. For the saving of himself first by good habits, training, discipline, drilling, to be fine and fit for the battlefield is the emphasis of the army. And until rigid examinations and tests have shown these personal factors up to the standard, the soldier is not permitted to leave the camp for field service.

Making all the concessions possible in favor of this criticism, it still reflects more upon the one who makes it than upon the church. And one wonders why it has been permitted to survive so long.

Third, The Negative Ethic of the Church. When the question of ethics is raised it must be frankly confessed that we are face to face with the very essence of our problem. This is indeed the sensitive spot, not, however, in the life of the church, but in the life of the soldier. And the pulpit habitually inflames and irritates it. For here we touch upon private conduct and personal liberty. And the temper of the soldier is such that in these matters he will brook no interference.

Sherwood Eddy puts this point as follows: "There is a general feeling that the churches do not understand them or sympathize with the social and industrial disabilities of the men. They feel that the ideals of life for which the church stands are dull, dim, and altogether unnatural." Dr. Fosdick presses the sharp point of this weapon of criticism still deeper into the heart of the church in this arraignment: "The righteousness of the saints, in the general estimation of the army, is little more than *anti—anti* dance, theatre, cards, drink, smoke, profanity, and all fun on Sundays." And in another place he adds: "It is a shocking experience therefore to discover that our most virile manhood strenuously objects to our whole idea of what

*With Our Soldiers in France, p. 153.

righteousness is. The soldiers seriously think that the character which the churches seek consists of little more than abstinence from a multitude of pleasurable things. In the midst of a tremendous generation, when men are rising to superhuman heights of positive character in the service of gigantic aims, the churches often stand, in the imagination of the soldiers, insisting on a list of prohibitions, which the army as a whole regards with sheer contempt; thinks it narrow, negative, piffing; passes it up as unworthy of a real man's ambition to observe."⁶

After reading these quotations we again find ourselves in a quandary as to where the soldiers get their support for seriously thinking "that the character which the churches seek consists of little more than abstinence from a multitude of pleasurable things." Certainly not from any of her creeds or confessions of faith, or from historical evidence, or from the messages which characteristically sound forth from her pulpits Sunday after Sunday. It is claimed that "the churches often stand in the imagination of the soldiers" for these things. But why are the soldiers permitted to indulge their "imagination" so freely when forming their opinions about the church? Why are they not compelled to ascertain the facts with regard to such an important matter? When one sits down calmly to think it all over, how this subject of "*antis*" is magnified out of all proportion to its relative place in the life of the modern pulpit. Check them up—"anti dance, theatre, cards, drink, smoke, profanity, and all fun on Sundays." It may seem to some that this indictment ought to hold against the church. But in the interests of honesty, it must be confessed that almost all of these things are

⁶The Trenches and the Church at Home

habitually indulged in by large numbers of church members from all the leading denominations, and very little protest is ever raised against most of them.

This feature of the indictment against the church also bears all the marks of a survival from the past. This impression Dr. Fosdick confirms by the following confession: "The whole programme of negative ethics, which the churches have so insistently proclaimed, came up out of the limbo to which years of forgetfulness had consigned it."⁷ And for pertinent illustrations he is compelled to go back to the days of his childhood. It is to be regretted that, inasmuch as it was all so well buried, away back in the limbo of the past under years of forgetfulness, it should not have been left peacefully to slumber there. For it cannot be fairly presented as representative of the leading denominations in the present day. Nor can it be dealt with as an obstacle in the way of the boys coming into the church. For there have always been many churches and pulpits which have dealt with these questions as sanely as it is possible for Christians to handle them. And yet the boys have remained outside of these churches. Further evidence right along this same line is to be gained from the experience of the Y. M. C. A. in France. Certainly none of these "antis" could be charged against its conduct of religion there. And yet it does not seem to have won the boys to its religion, or freed itself from criticism at their hands. No institution has ever been more severely criticized than has the Y. M. C. A. The truth of the matter is, the trouble goes much deeper.

When we turn, from the specific items, to the general form of this indictment as expressed in these words: "Our most virile manhood strenuously objects to our whole idea of what righteousness is," we strike the rock

⁷*Ibid.*

upon which the churches and the soldiers split. This is where the rub comes. But instead of assuming that the church is the party in the wrong, so far as its "whole idea of what righteousness is," we are disposed to take the other horn of the dilemma and turn the charge back upon the soldiers. For we believe that, without any injustice to them, it can readily be proven that in the main they, rather than the church, are in the wrong so far as this question is concerned. This truth can be established, not by accusation, but by confession. And the only official confessional which the army possesses is the pup tent.

The pup tent, as most know, is the little dog-kennel-like tent formed by buttoning together the two shelter halves, carried by two soldiers. It is so small that one has to get down on hands and knees to crawl into it, but it makes comfortable quarters for two, when they are once inside. When one crawls into a little pup tent at six o'clock night after night, because no lights are allowed and it is dangerous to be prowling about in the dark on the edges of slippery shell holes, and remains there through the long hours of the night with a soldier by one's side, one gets very near to the heart of that boy. And that heart discloses itself when its spirit and its thoughts are perceptibly influenced by the swish, swish, swish, of the big naval gun shells as they plow through the air overhead toward the German lines, and joining in the chorus are the thunderous reverberations of the larger field guns all about, while antiphonal responses break in constantly from German shells seeking their desired mark, and every now and then above the volume of this full chorus there can be distinctly heard the rhythmic hum of a Hun airplane motor over your camp and tent seeking

the proper spot to drop its bomb, all of this din occasionally interspersed by the strident notes of klaxons upon klaxons, pistol shot after pistol shot, resounding throughout the entire forest or camp to alarm all sleepers of a gas attack. When one spends nights under such conditions of imminent peril by the side of a soldier boy, one is with him at the time when his thoughts are long, long thoughts, and when he lays bare the secrets of his heart of hearts.

For six months the writer was attached to one of the military units of the Rainbow, or 42d, Division, and was with them on five battle fronts in France. During all of this time he bunked with officers or men, and often under conditions as above described. It is this pup tent experience which has convinced him that there is a deeper side to this problem of the soldiers and the churches. Inasmuch as the subject has been presented from the side of the trenches, the Y. M. C. A. hut, and the hospitals, all of which have valuable data to contribute, it may be of interest to take a look at the question from the angle of the pup tent.

The value of this angle of study lies in the fact that in the pup tent all the equipment and weapons of self-defense are taken off and laid aside. This is not only true with regard to the physical equipment for battle, but also as to moral and religious self-defensive weapons, so that both the perils of crowd psychology and finessing are eliminated. The boy with whom you deal in the pup tent is in a very different mood from that of the same boy outside. It is here that one is enabled to get down to the real trouble between the pup tent and the pulpit. The whole problem is well summed-up in this sentence: "Our most virile manhood strenuously objects to our whole idea of what righteousness is." It

might be more accurate to say that the soldiers object, not so much to *our* whole idea of righteousness, but simply to the idea of righteousness proposed for controlling them. The difference is not incidental, but fundamental. There is a great gulf fixed between the two ideas, and there is no possible way in which they can be reconciled. This might just as well be recognized first as last. In an article which appeared in the New York Times, January 19, 1919, entitled, What is the Matter with the Y. M. C. A.? the author puts the case as follows:

In brief, is not the average soldier's creed, or religion, or theology, whatever it may be termed, directly and irrevocably at variance with that of the Y. M. C. A. worker, and is not this fact, however much it has been ignored, the basic cause of much, if not all, of the otherwise unexplained friction between the two? This leads to the inquiry as to just what is the creed of the average fighting man, of the soldier in the trenches. * * * To form a true composite view of the religious belief of millions of fighting men might seem a hopeless task, but there is much evidence to the effect that however much such beliefs may vary in detail and in complexity they almost invariably will be found to possess upon analysis, one common factor, and that is the belief that the soldier who dies fighting for his country or for his King has nothing to fear after death. And all but professed atheists and agnostics would put this belief in a positive form—that the soldier will after death have his full share of the joys of the hereafter. * * * It is thus evident that much of the undefined and otherwise unexplainable friction existing between the soldier and the Y. M. C. A. worker is directly traceable to their different religious views. If the association worker looks upon all unchurched soldiers primarily as material to be "saved" no matter how much he may also try to minister to their wants of body and mind, he will naturally, be he ever so tactful, be more or less insistent upon matters of faith and conduct in which the average soldier takes but little interest. The typical red-blooded fighting man who unconsciously but instinctively subscribes to the soldier's creed mentioned does not worry about the hereafter or the

condition of his soul, certain published abstruse introspections by the exceptional soldier to the contrary notwithstanding, and, consequently, does not take over-kindly to much admonition, especially from one who may be relatively safe from the perils of battle. The typical soldier in fact is prone to excuse his faults and vices by his soldier's creed, and consequently, even although living in the constant presence of death, is not easily "converted" or brought to profess the faith of evangelical Christianity as represented by the Y.M.C.A.

Although the above explanation may not satisfactorily account for the friction between the Y. M. C. A. worker and the soldiers, yet it throws valuable light upon the religion of the average soldier. The pup tent experience confirms the point that there exists a fundamental difference between the religious view, creed or standard of righteousness, whichever one cares to term it, of the church and of the average soldier. And no possible adjustment of externals can hope to eradicate it. Evidence to the contrary can be obtained in abundance. For there are twenty per cent. of the soldiers of whom it is not true, and that is a large number of men. But of the eighty per cent. of the remaining to a very great degree it will be found to embody an important truth. Here the problem centers. Upon close inspection it assumes a perfectly familiar historic form. Put into old-time language, which has its modern significance, it represents the problem of the unconverted, or the problem of Nicodemus—and Nicodemus was a good man. Yet it was to him that Jesus said: "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."

In dealing with this whole problem we are in danger of assuming too much. Consequently we are bending all of our efforts to win the boys to the church instead of to the Christ. We would make them church-men first

and Christ-men afterwards. In doing this we have simply reversed the process, and it will not work. The average boy can never be won to the church until he has first been won to Christ. It does not appeal to him. As yet he has the wrong master enthroned, and that master is self. Just so long as self is recognized as supreme and appealed to, self will respond. Not until Jesus Christ is accepted as his Lord and Master will he be interested in seeking "first the kingdom of God and his righteousness." Even the soldier boy cannot be expected to serve two masters. "For either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other."

This brings us to our conclusion. The primary thing which Christianity has to offer the returning soldiers is not the church, but the Christ. No lesser offering will be able to attract them. But Jesus says: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." When the boys have been won to Him, and not until then, will they enthusiastically bring their loyalty, strength, and young life to the support of His church. To fulfill this mission, and to proclaim this message is the supreme task of the church in the present crisis. For the salvation of the soldiers, the salvation of the church, the salvation of the nation, the salvation of democracy, and so the salvation of the world, hangs breathless on its fate. As Dr. Gordon has well said:

"The question must arise, whether the grand historic faith in Jesus as the Incarnate Son of God can cover this new world,—whether his sovereignty may be extended over it, whether its one great need is not the acknowledgment of his eternal authority. * * * Mankind have been brought out into a large place, and the daily vision is of broad rivers and streams. But unless Christ

shall be installed over this new world, it will simply be a larger and more splendid corpse than the old. Over the total worlds of space, and time, and present humanity, and the spirit, he must be recognized as supreme; and these kingdoms with all their glory, if that glory is not to fade into a dream and the highest hope of mankind is not to be blasted, must become the kingdoms of our Lord and his Christ."⁸

Whittier gathers it all up in this verse:

Alone, O Love ineffable!
Thy saving name is given;
To turn aside from Thee is hell,
To walk with Thee is heaven!

⁸The Christ of To-day, p. 29.

THE PERSONALITY OF GOD IN THE LIGHT OF OUR MODERN WORLD

By JAMES H. SNOWDEN, D. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in the
Western Theological Seminary.

OUTLINE

I. IN THE LIGHT OF SCIENCE.

1. The vastness of the universe.
2. The universality of law.
3. The theory of evolution.

II. IN THE LIGHT OF PHILOSOPHY.

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2. The *Pluralistic Universe* of William James.
3. The *God the Invisible King* of H. G. Wells.
4. The profound religiousness of agnostic thinkers.
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ALL the great problems of religion, however they are rooted in the divine and eternal, are also affected by the special conditions of each passing age. They grow up out of its environment and experience and reflect its light, and thus present aspects that vary with the changing science and philosophy and social conditions of the time. The doctrine of the personality of God is peculiarly subject and sensitive to such changes and is continually readjusting itself to their demands.

I. IN THE LIGHT OF SCIENCE

Science has wrought Copernican revolutions and continental and climatic changes in our modern world, shifting its center and lifting or depressing its continents and mountain ranges and thus producing changes of climate that have caused some forms of thought to grow into bloom and fruitage and others to wither and become obsolete or extinct. It has given life and power to some religious doctrines and left others embedded as fossils in the mental strata of our modern world. How has the personality of God been affected by these changes? There are three scientific doctrines that specially bear upon this problem.

1. The first of these is the vastness of the universe. The former conceptions of the expanse of the heavens, great as they were, have been enormously extended by the revelations of our modern instruments. The microscope, telescope, and spectroscope are three magic machines which are in effect immense eyes that enable us to peer into the world of matter in both directions, the microscope opening up vistas into the infinitesimally small, the telescope into the unspeakably distant and great, and the spectroscope, more marvelous still, reports the chemical composition, motion, direction, and speed of distant stars and nebulae.

These enormous eyes have disclosed a universe which is an inconceivably vast whirling snow of stars of such sizes, distances, and speeds as bewilder and appall us. There are huge solar monsters, such as Sirius and Rigel, which in size and splendor throw our sun into the shade. Mighty Canopus, as far as

known the largest star in the heavens, next to Sirius in brightness and twelve times as distant, is more than two and a half millions of times larger than our sun; so that the sun could be dropped into one of its spots or yawning chasms as a pebble is dropped into a well. The light-year, which is the distance traveled in a year by a ray of light moving at the rate of 186,000 miles a second, is the yardstick with which the astronomer measures the distances of the heavenly bodies, and some stars are thousands of such light-years away. There are also star clusters and nebulae which are thought to be universes outside of our galaxy, and these are conceived to be hundreds of thousands of light-years distant.

The first effect of such conceptions of the heavens is to dwarf our earth into a mere mote floating in this vast sea of splendor and then still farther to dwarf man into this "fretful midget," the human race itself being a mere "trouble of ants in the gleam of a million million suns." And the second effect is to seem to overtop God and crowd Him out and crush Him under the immeasurable weight of this blazing mass of suns. Can the personality of God stand up under this intolerable burden?

The case, however, is not so alarming as it seems, for the first appearance of things is often deceptive, and the difficulty rapidly dissolves under reflection. On any theory of philosophy matter cannot overtop and crush mind, whatever its mass and might. Man himself thinks the universe, and thereby rises above it and puts it under his feet. However vast he discovers it to be, it is his own mind that perceives and reconstructs its star-fretted dome, he sets it all up in his own brain, and thereby subordinates it to himself.

The greatest star is still at the little end of the telescope, the star that is looking, not the star that is being looked at.

But, on the idealistic conception of the world, mind is the only kind of reality and the universe is a spiritual system that has its origin and abiding seat in an infinite consciousness. On this view the physical universe is the thought and action, the eternal employment and enjoyment of God, and His personality, so far from being lost in the vastness of the heavens, is reflected from this shining mirror, and the universe is the sublime appeal of Spirit to spirit. The vaster is the creation the greater is the creative God. The heaven of heavens cannot contain Him and the constellations are but the dew on the fringe of His garment. "Lo, these are but the outskirts of his ways: and how small a whisper do we hear of him!"

2. Another scientific doctrine bearing on the personality of God is the universality of law. Science is the search for order and harmony and final unity, and it finds these as it extends the reign of law. Nature at first sight presents the appearance of confusion and chaos, and men have slowly threaded their way through its jungle and cleared it up into law and order. The physical world has been widely brought under this principle, and now it is believed, though this belief is an immense exercise of faith, that law reigns down to the last atom and vibration of the universe. The same principle has been extended to the mental and moral and spiritual world, and human souls are found to be not capricious beings forming a chaotic social order, but law-saturated organisms cohering in an orderly system. It is true that some spiritual laws may be violated in ways in which physi-

cal and metaphysical laws are not violable, but all spiritual laws hold as obligations and are the necessary conditions of moral and spiritual welfare.

This extension of the reign of law, until it has become coterminous with the whole field of being, at first seems to reduce personality to mechanism and thereby to imprison and destroy its essential nature of moral freedom and responsibility. As law was extended over each additional area it seemed that both man, considered as a free being, and God were driven out of that field and were shut up in a narrower sphere in which to act and exist, and that finally they were crowded out of the law-ruled universe altogether. God, according to this view, has thus become imprisoned in His own world, and His personality has been rendered impotent and has been destroyed. Undoubtedly the reign of law has made it difficult for the modern mind to believe in either the freedom of man or the personality of God.

But again the difficulty is greatest at first view, and abates and disappears under reflection. In the case of man he clearly exercises his conscious freedom in a world of physical laws. He does not and cannot violate them, but he combines and turns them to his own ends, and this is what he is doing in all his mastery of nature. Physical energies have increasingly become his nimble servants, so that he hitches his wagon to the great golden driving wheel of the sun and rides in ease and comfort. He is wholly environed in these physical energies, and yet they no more fetter and impede him than does his own skin which constantly adapts itself without friction to all his activities and aids him in them.

Man is not imprisoned in nature, but is its master and lord. The universe with all its laws is his servant, and all its power bows to his personality at every step. Man is a supernatural being and moves through nature in the full possession and exercise of his personality and freedom. Laws are the means of liberty, the grooves and guides in which liberty moves with smoothness in speed and safety. The steel track does not limit the liberty of the locomotive but gives it all the liberty it has. Law and liberty are not antagonistic but are mutually complementary and harmonious. It is because man lives in a world of law that he can have liberty and life.

Lotze wrote his monumental work, *Microcosmus*, to show "how absolutely universal is the extent and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world." And Mr. A. J. Balfour, in his Gifford Lectures on Theism and Humanism, speaking of the difficulties in connection with natural law and prayer, says: "These difficulties are difficulties of theory, not of practice. They never disturb the ordinary man—nor the extraordinary man in his ordinary moments. Human intercourse is not embarrassed by the second, nor simple piety by the first. And perhaps the enlightened loungeur, requesting a club waiter to shut the window, brushes aside, or ignores, as many philosophical puzzles as a mother passionately praying for the safety of her child."

God, then, moves through His universe and its laws are not weights but wings to His freedom and personality; and equally the inviolable laws of His character are an expression and means of His liberty and life. Personality finds its proper expression, not

in caprice, but in plan and purpose; and thus the reign of law in the universe, instead of being an objection to the personality of God, is an argument in its favor.

3. The third scientific doctrine that bears upon our problem is the theory of evolution. This now dominates the whole field of thought and is applied to physical nature from the ether to atoms and molecules, and from nebulae to suns and systems, and in the world of life from single-celled organisms up to man. Its central principle is that of genetic connection and continuity as the simpler forms unfold into the more complex, and it also includes a reversal of the process in devolution. This central principle is universally accepted in the scientific world, though the mechanism or factors of the process are still an unsolved problem. Darwin's theory of natural selection is now generally held to be an insufficient account of evolution, and efforts are being made to find the determining cause of the process in the secret of heredity.

So revolutionary and dominant an idea was bound to be attended with mistaken views in its interpretation and application, and at first sight it seemed to many to be destructive of all ideas of creation and Providence and of human immortality and Divine Personality. But continued reflection has cleared up such views and showed that the theory leaves all these problems unaffected in their essential nature, though throwing new light upon them. The fundamental fact as to evolution is that it is a method and not a cause. It only shows how causes work, but does not account for the causes themselves. It cannot bring out explicitly in the result anything that was not

either implicit in the beginning or was put into the course of the process. If any increment comes out in the product that was not put into the process, such an increment would be an event or effect without a cause and this would contradict one of the most fundamental of our axiomatic intuitions. That every event has a cause is a necessary belief that lies at the basis of all our thought and action and applies to the whole creation from the beginning to the end.

Evolution, then, is only a method and is a description of the way all causes work, back and up to the First Cause, or God. It is the divine program of creation, written broadly over the first chapter of Genesis and expressed in all the processes of the world. Being the plan and program of God, it does not in the least impair His freedom and hamper His presence and purpose and providence in the world. So far from destroying or crippling His personality, it gives full and free expression to it. All that evolves out of the creation was by Him involved in it, either at the beginning or during the course of the process, so that the creation grows out of Him as the mechanism out of the mechanician or as the flower out of the seed or the body out of the spirit.

God in His personality still stands central and sovereign in His universe, and all this infinite snow-storm of stars came out of Him as snowflakes come out of the invisible air, or as our evolving plans and purposes, thoughts and deeds come out of us. The production of new species of plants and animals by evolution no more shuts God out of the process than does the production of individual plants and animals by growth exclude Him from this process. Any new increment that emerges in the course of evolution

draws its heredity from God, as when "Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." The theist, holding to the personality of God as his central principle, has no difficulty in holding in fullest harmony with it the modern doctrine of evolution, and such acceptance on the part of theistic thinkers is practically universal and unquestioned.

Not only does evolution not stand in the way of the personality of God, but, as in the case of the vastness of the universe and the reign of law, it turns out to be an argument in its favor. For evolution ever leads up to higher forms and finally culminates in personality in man, and this fact points on up to personality in the Cause of man. Personality in man is only a pale copy of a perfect Pattern, a gleam of light that shoots from the central Splendor of the universe, and its perfection and source is the personality of God.

II. IN THE LIGHT OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy, which seeks to penetrate behind the proximate causes of science to final causes and ultimate reality, cuts deeper into the substance of the world and the tissues of the soul than science, and therefore bears more intimately and vitally upon the problem of the personality of God. Recent renewed interest in philosophy has been specially concerned with our subject, for the personality of God is the central supreme question that determines the solution of all vital human questions and cosmic problems.

1. The Creative Evolution of Bergson. The French philosopher Bergson has arisen on our horizon

as a star of sparkling brilliance, though probably not of the first magnitude. He has invested his speculations in the vivacity and charm of French thought and style, and they have attained a popular currency that surpasses their popular intelligibility.

Bergson presents us with the picture of a growing universe which consists of a stream of life flowing through resistant matter and breaking into all its myriad forms. This stream of life, or *élan vital*, is described as consciousness, but not "the narrowed consciousness that functions in us;" it is "rather super-consciousness." Matter is the refractory element or realm of mechanical necessity which this life-force seeks "to penetrate with contingency." For a central principle in Bergson's system is the creative freedom of his life-force which is always initiating new forms of thought and action which are unforeseeable. Past existence is constantly summed up and contained within present existence, so that the present always conserves the whole of the past and carries it along with it; and then it gives birth to its own free actions by which life "seizes upon matter * * * and strives to introduce into it the largest amount of indetermination and liberty." The freedom that is so strongly emphasized contains "properly speaking neither project nor plan," and is so released from reasoned motives and ends that it looks like blind impulse or irrational caprice.

This invites and justifies the criticism by Mr. Balfour, found in *The Hibbert Journal* for October, 1911, in which he says: "Creation, freedom, will—these doubtless are great things; but we cannot lastingly admire them unless we know their drift. We cannot, I submit, rest satisfied with what differs so

little from the haphazard; joy is no fitting consequence of efforts which are so nearly aimless. If values are to be taken into account, it is surely better to invoke God with a purpose than a supra-consciousness with none."

At this point Bergson leaves us in the dark as to what is behind his "life" and "matter" and whence they come. He might be a theist or an agnostic as to ultimate reality, and he has even been accused of "atheistic monism." However, Professor Pringle-Pattison, in his recent work on *The Idea of God*, is able to quote a letter written in 1912 by Bergson in which he says that the arguments of his books should leave us with "a clear idea of a free and creating God, producing matter and life at once, whose creative effort is continued, in a vital direction, by the evolution of species and the construction of human personalities." He is further quoted as having said, in his Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh in 1914, that he did "not profess to have a metaphysical system," and "he appeared prepared to regard as the rationale of a phenomenal process the idea of a Creator, the end of whose action was the creation of creators." It would thus appear that Bergson's views of ultimate reality are undergoing evolution along with his growing universe, and more light may be expected from this interesting but inconclusive thinker.

2. The "Pluralistic Universe" of William James. Mr. James, having done notable and enduring work in psychology, in his later years set sail upon the sea of metaphysics, but can hardly be said to have discovered any new land or even to have found a solid shore on which to set his foot. His speculations have

the penetrating insight and unconventional freshness of thought and style that characterize all his work, but they give the impression that he had not thought his way through. This unfinishedness, however, is part of his pragmatic, anti-intellectualist system, and he would suspect and repudiate any thinking, even his own, if it swept a full circle and found a complete solution of a world problem.

James is enamored of Bergson and finds his book "like the breath of the morning and the song of birds. It tells us of reality itself, instead of merely reiterating what dusty-minded professors have written about what other previous professors have thought. Nothing in Bergson is shop-worn or at second hand." James follows Bergson, but has his own point of view. Both of these thinkers are greatly opposed to "a block-universe," or "closed system" or monism, but find all things in a state of free flux, an unfinished and growing world. "What really exists is not things but things in the making." James' universe is an aggregate. He will not have an organic unity, but strings out his world in a row or pitches it together as a heap. "Pluralism means only that the sundry parts of reality may be externally related. Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but nothing includes anything, or dominates over everything. The word 'and' trails along after every sentence. * * * The pluralistic world is thus more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom. However much may be collected, however much may report itself as present at any effective center of consciousness or action,

something else is self-governed and absent and un-reduced to unity."

As to the ultimate nature of his pluralistic universe, Mr. James reaches super-human intelligences and a finite God. "The absolute," he says, "is not the impossible being I once thought it. Mental facts do function both singly and together, at once, and we finite minds may simultaneously be co-conscious with one another in a super-human intelligence. * * * The outlines of the super-human intelligence thus made probable must remain, however, very vague, and the number of functionally distinct 'selves' it comports and carries has to be left entirely problematic. It may be polytheistically or it may be monotheistically conceived of. * * * The line of least resistance, then, as it seems to me, both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the super-human consciousness, the notion that it is all-embracing, the notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once. * * * Yet because God is not the absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically, his functions can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other smaller parts—as similar to our functions consequently."

God is thus one in the midst of the many and is of like powers and passions with them, differing only in degree and not in kind. Mr. James has strong sympathy with religion and thinks that philosophy must meet its practical demands; and he is so hopeful as to believe that his empirical philosophy contains the vital breath of a religious revival; let it "once become associated with religion, * * * and

I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin."

3. *The God the Invisible King* of H. G. Wells. Mr. H. G. Wells, scientific romancer, novelist, socialist, and agnostic, has also assumed the rôle of a philosopher and theologian. Though his books in this field show his lack of training in and acquaintance with this region of thought, yet they display the interesting workings of a remarkably inventive and fertile mind. In his first war novel, entitled *Mr. Britling Sees It Through*, he introduced God in quite orthodox fashion and almost led his readers to believe that he had been converted to belief in a theistic God, if not in Christianity. His later book, however, entitled *God the Invisible King*, dispelled this impression and set forth his views in unmistakable terms.

Mr. Wells is singularly frank. In the first two sentences of his Preface he says: "This book sets out as forcibly and exactly as possible the religious belief of the writer. That belief is not orthodox Christianity; it is not, indeed, Christianity at all; its core nevertheless is a profound belief in a personal and intimate God." A book that begins with such expression of "profound belief in a personal and intimate God," and ends with the declaration, "It is the Kingdom of God at hand," promises much to the religious soul, but we fear that the contents of the book, despite its eloquence and hopeful as it is from some points of view, will yet prove a disappointment to many readers.

Notwithstanding this belief in a personal and intimate God, the book at once plants agnosticism of the densest and darkest kind behind the universe. "At the back of all known things," we read, "there is an

impenetrable curtain; the ultimate existence is a Veiled Being, which seems to know nothing of life or death or good or ill. Of that Being, whether it is simple or complex or divine, we know nothing; to us it is no more than the limit of understanding, the unknown beyond." Like Herbert Spencer, to whom Frederic Harrison said: "You know too much about your Unknowable," Mr. Wells has peeped behind the Veil and reports to us much about his Veiled Being, which seems to correspond closely with Spencer's Unknowable Power.

Out of this abyss behind or at the bottom of the universe pours a flood of Life, which corresponds with Bergson's *élan vital*. "And coming out of this veiled being, proceeding out of it in a manner altogether inconceivable, is another lesser being, an impulse thrusting through matter and clothing itself in continually changing material forms, the maker of our world, Life, the Will to Be. It comes out of the inscrutable being as a wave comes rolling to us from beyond the horizon. It is as it were a great wave rushing through matter and possessed by a spirit. It is a breeding, fighting thing; it pants through the jungle track as a tiger and lifts itself toward heaven as a tree; it is a rabbit bolting for its life and the dove calling its mate; it crawls, it flies, it dives, it lusts and devours, it pursues and eats itself in order to live still more eagerly and hastily; it is every living thing, of it are our passions and desires and fears."

Out of Life comes God, and again we are introduced to a finite growing God, but this time to one incarnated in humanity. We are told much about this God, such as that he is "courage," "youth," and "love." But the essential thing is the nature of God

as contrasted with orthodox views of the Divine Being. "Modern religion," says Mr. Wells—and this is the very heart of his creed—"declares that though he does not exist in matter or space, he exists in time just as a current of thought may do; that he changes and becomes more even as a man's purpose gathers itself together; that somewhere in the dawning of mankind he had a beginning, an awakening, and that as mankind grows he grows. With our eyes he looks out upon the universe he invades; with our hands, he lays hands upon it. All our truth, all our intentions and achievements, he gathers to himself. He is the undying human memory, the increasing human will."

Mr. Wells denies that this God is only the sum of humanity, but he is constantly using language that implies this and will admit of no other clear meaning. "It comes as no great shock," he says again, "to those who have grasped the full implications of the statement that God is Finite, to hear it asserted that the first purpose of God is the attainment of clear knowledge, of knowledge as a means to more knowledge, and of knowledge as a means to power. For that he must use human eyes and hands and brains."

"The Kingdom of God" fills a large space in Mr. Wells's book, and much is said about it that is true and good and beautiful. Mr. Wells is as orthodox and insistent as Paul in turning all life into religion and bidding us: "Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." Provision or at least allowance is made for organized religion: "There is no reason why one should not organize or join associations for the criticism of religious ideas," and "many people feel the need of prayer," though "the writer does not understand this

desire or need for collective prayer very well." As to immortality, Mr. Wells thinks it is not "one of the essentials of religion," but he says he has "no appetite for a separate immortality. God is my immortality; what, of me, is identified with God, is God; what is not me is of no more permanent value than the snows of yester-year." As Mr. James was enthusiastic about the future of his religion, so is Mr. Wells. "I foresee," he says, "a wave of religious revival and religious clarification," and declares: "In quite a little while the whole world may be alive with this renascent faith."

4. The Profound Religiousness of Agnostic Thinkers. Bergson, James, and Wells are three striking figures in the present field of philosophy. They are free lances in philosophical discussion and have small respect for the traditional rules of the game. No views or methods are sacrosanct to them. The orthodox philosopher receives as irreverent and rough treatment at their hands as the orthodox theologian. It was a keen thrust of his sharp blade that James gave them when he spoke of philosophers as "merely reiterating what dusty-minded professors have written about what other previous professors have thought." It might be retorted that he and some of his compeers would come off better in this field if they did know and respect the rules of the game, which, like all rules, are the product of long experience; but they are incorrigible and impervious to any such lance thrust.

The contributions of these thinkers to philosophy are fresh and pertinent and important. As regards our subject they are all three witnesses to the personality of God. They fall short of historic orthodoxy at this point, but they see that the logic of reality

runs in this direction. They judge that the universe shows its essential nature at the top, in the blossom and fruit rather than in the root, and that the final expression of reality is some form and degree of personality. As against blind materialism and impersonal pantheism their witness has weight. And they are profoundly and practically religious and tremendously emphasize and apply the truth that "in him we live and move and have our being." Mr. Wells at times writes as though, like Spinoza, he were "a God-intoxicated man." Mr. James comes out of his philosophical discussion of religion with these two results: "1. An uneasiness; and 2. Its solution." The "uneasiness" being "a sense that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand," and the "solution" being "a sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers." These are broadly orthodox results, and yet Mr. James studiously avoids the orthodox terms "sin" and "salvation," which are the equivalent of his "uneasiness" and "solution," possibly because he did not want it to be thought that he had been converted and joined the church.

In reading these thinkers we often feel that the orthodoxy that has been politely bowed out or unceremoniously thrust out through the front door has been quietly taken in again, under another name, through the back door. Psychologists and philosophers are "incorrigibly religious," and even some modern agnostics would be classed by Paul among the Athenian agnostics whom he addressed as "very religious."

5. The Doctrine of a Finite and Growing God. These results of these thinkers are steps in the right direction and are hopeful philosophical and religious

signs of the times. But their doctrine of a finite and growing God gives us pause. This doctrine, of course, is not new or peculiar to them but is as old as Oriental dualism and Plato's theodicy. It is resurgent in much of our modern philosophy. Hume took refuge in it, and John Stuart Mill gave powerful expression to it as the only explanation of this world torn asunder by the struggle between good and evil. These thinkers say that this disjointed world proves that God cannot be omnipotent but must be limited in knowledge and power, or else He is not good.

But, desperate as is the situation and intolerable as it sometimes seems, the proposed solution is more intolerable still. All our thinking and experience, science and philosophy, theology and religious demands, drive us in spite of these appearances back and up to unity as the Source of all the streams of the universe. Two Gods are intolerable to us because they would not tolerate each other. They would both necessarily be finite and dependent and would thereby drive us back to some deeper and final reality, which would be the one and only true God. Spencer and Wells recognize this logic in their Unknowable Power and Veiled Being.

One omnipotent eternal God is an infinite mystery, but it is a mystery that swallows up and digests all other mysteries. A God that had His birth in the dawn of humanity will never satisfy humanity. A "pluralistic universe" is a contradiction in its very terms. Mr. James has a veritable obsession against thin "intellectualism" as a world-builder, but his own "pluralistic universe" is itself an intellectual construction, the product of his pragmatic logic, and is itself undermined and overthrown by a deeper logic of

mind and heart. We accept the testimony of these thinkers to the personal and spiritual elements in the universe, yet cannot stop at their half-way station of a finite God, but must go on toward the logical limit and fulfilment of their own principles in the one infinite, eternal, personal God, Creator of the world and Father of our spirits.

6. The Doctrine of a Creative, Struggling, and Suffering God. The doctrine of a finite and growing God is aimed at an error that needs to be repudiated and contains a truth that should be brought out. The error is that of an absentee God who at some remote period in the past created the world and set it agoing, and then left it to itself, something after the manner in which an engineer makes and starts an engine which then goes of itself with only an occasional interference on his part. It is needless to say that this deistic conception has wholly passed out of our philosophic and religious thought and has been superseded by the doctrine of the divine immanence.

God is immanent in the world in continuous creation. It is true that "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," but this statement need refer only to the heavens of which our solar system and earth are a part. Other universes appear to be in process of creation in the spiral nebulae whose enormous arms, studded with stars, may be condensing into other galaxies like our own. But, however this may be, our own universe is still on the anvil of creation in the mighty workshop of God in which we see suns flying off like sparks of fire. Our solar system is undergoing constant changes, and our earth is still in the factory and is being hammered and carved into shape and use. God is carrying on the

work of creation in every star and planet and root and leaf as certainly and intimately as He ever did and is immanent in every atom and vibration. "My Father worketh hitherto," said Jesus, meaning that God is ever at work.

But is God present and active and struggling and suffering in our human world as it slowly and painfully fights its way up from the slime of savagery and the ethics of the jungle to the heights of our moral and spiritual civilization? Or is He only a spectator of the scene, sitting upon His throne in ease and splendor, while His human children are involved in this awful strife and carnage? This is the point that pinches and pains modern thought. At this point, also, there has been a climactic change in our modern views. Ancient thought and medieval art represented God as resting, the Greek and Roman gods revelled in eternal dissipation, and the Italian painters pictured God as reclining on a luxurious throne or floating in gorgeous clouds. The impression has not yet been wholly eliminated from our minds that God has nothing to do. It is pleasant to think of Him as an eternal idler always having a good time. Labor is a disagreeable thought to us and seems a degradation to God. But the Bible boldly represents God as a laborer, and this is an infinitely higher and nobler view of Him than that of pagan thought and medieval art.

The Scriptural doctrine of providence puts God right down in the midst of our human world, appointing unto us the bounds of our habitation and numbering the very hairs of our heads. And the doctrine of redemption puts the Son of God under the burden of all the world's wounds and woes where He is

struggling and suffering with us to overcome it as one who "hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows," and is "wounded for our transgressions, bruised for our iniquities." In all our affliction He is afflicted, and while we "work out our salvation," He works in us "both to will and to do of his good pleasure." Christ is the Captain of our salvation, no dress-parade officer but a soldier down in the ranks and in the trench, bearing the brunt of the fight.

The notion of an inactive and impassive God is gone. He toils with the toiler, weeps with them that weep, and rejoices with them that rejoice. He is energizing in all the forces of the world that are struggling up through visions of better things to victory. He is in the spirit of widening goodwill that is drawing all men into a new sense of unity and brotherhood and preparing the way for the Republic of God on earth. God is indeed struggling and suffering with us that He may help bear our infirmities, overcome our enemies, and bring many sons to glory.

If it be asked: Why does not God in His omnipotence cut the struggle short and bring instant victory? the answer must be that moral results cannot be effected by mere power, however great, but can be achieved only by moral means and processes. Truth and persuasion, sympathy and love, are the only proper means to this end. God having endowed us with personality must respect our moral free agency and deal with us as persons; and He can win us only as He struggles and suffers with us.

And if it be said, again, that omnipotence cannot struggle as it must attain its ends at an instant effortless stroke and that any language implying

divine endeavor must be illusory, the answer is that omnipotence can do only possible things and that the fact that Divine Personality cannot invade and annul human personality is no limitation upon the Divine Omnipotence. God is limited in His omnipotence, not by any lack of power on His part, but by the lack of capacity on our part; and this is the solution of the problem that embarrassed so sincere a seeker after religious truth as John Stuart Mill and forced him into the belief in a finite God. God is helping us and we are helping God, and this enables us, in the language of Mill, to cherish "the feeling of helping God," "inasmuch as a battle is constantly going on, in which the humblest human creature is not incapable of taking some part, between the powers of good and those of evil, and in which every, even the smallest, help to the right side has its value in promoting the very slow and often almost insensible progress by which good is gradually gaining ground on evil, yet gaining it so visibly at considerable intervals as to promise the very distant but not uncertain final victory of Good."

The idea of a God, then, who stands aloof from the world, His work of creation done and His part in human affairs involving Him in none of our conflict and sufferings, has been outgrown in both religion and philosophy. "God is a very present help in trouble" is an assurance that is the very heart of the Bible, and the same principle emerges in our philosophic thought. "In him we live and move and have our being," and "he is not far from each one of us," for His "word is nigh thee and in thine heart."

7. This leads us into the deep problem in religion and philosophy of the relation of the divine trans-

cendence and the divine immanence, and it may be briefly referred to in this connection. The relation of the One to the many, of the Infinite to the finite, is a fundamental and central problem of philosophy that has exercised the greatest thinkers in all ages. The tendency of human thought is to relapse into the one or the other of these extremes. When all things merge into the divine transcendence we have the Absolute of pantheism; then all tracks lead into the lion's den and none come out; and when the One breaks up into and disappears in the many, we have a pluralistic universe with no center and throne of unity, a mere collocation of things, which is practical atheism. Either of these views is intolerable to our thought, and we must find some mode of combining them into unity.

In the idealistic conception of the world, the total universe, excluding finite spirits, is a spiritual system which is the life of God, His eternal employment and enjoyment. It is therefore immanent in Him somewhat as our thoughts and feelings and volitions are immanent in our consciousness and constitute our life; and yet He is also transcendent over it as our consciousness controls our inner life. Finite spirits are personalities that are the offspring of God and have their own internal life of responsible thought and action. They are in God and God is in them, so that both they and He have their own life. Each soul is intuitively and ineradicably conscious and certain of its own freedom and personality, which cannot be erased or overridden by any doctrine of pantheistic determinism, and to deny which is to degrade the soul into a mere thing and cancel all

its worth. And yet God also includes all human souls and wills in His own plan and life.

"There is a spirit in man: and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." The prophet and poet and man of genius whose lofty and sensitive souls are quick to catch heaven's light are specially open to divine influences, but the same light "lighteth every man that cometh into the world." The infinite Spirit of God is ever endeavoring to penetrate and fill the human spirit, to free it from error and evil, to purify and deepen and ennoble it, and thus to develop it into larger and richer life. And yet through all these processes the Infinite respects the limitations and freedom and responsibility of the finite. The whole organism of humanity is environed and saturated with the Spirit of God, and under this divine immanence humanity develops and advances into fuller and nobler life. God is in all creatures, and all creatures are in God. God and His world are reciprocally immanent throughout and constitute the total sum of being. This mutual indwelling and interworking of the human and divine eludes our power to trace its boundaries and operations, but it is a fundamental fact in our religious and philosophical conceptions of the personality of God and in our religious experience.

Draw if thou canst the mystic line
Severing rightly His from thine,
Which is human, which Divine.

—EMERSON.

III. IN THE LIGHT OF THE GREAT WAR

The Great War has been convulsing the world to its core, crumpling up the whole crust of its civilization,

apparently engulfing all things, even the most solid realities and precious gains and faiths and hopes of humanity, in its fiery crater, and bringing up from the great deeps of its subconscious life elemental instincts and passions as submarine upheavals bring to the surface strange monsters from the bottom of the sea. It has been a testing time, when all things human and divine were being tried as by fire, and all hay, wood, and stubble were being burned to ashes, and only pure gold could survive. How has the doctrine of the personality of God stood this trial?

1. There was really nothing new in this crisis. War is as old as the race, and a thousand times has it ripped up the earth and saturated it with blood. Time and again has civilization been thrown into its molten melting pot and fused into its primal elements. It is true this war was the most gigantic and appalling in all the history of the world, but its magnitude involved no new principle. Other wars in their day seemed as destructive of the most precious possessions of the world. When the Babylonians fell with their furious brute power upon the Jews and destroyed Jerusalem and wiped out for the time being all their religious hopes, it was as dark an hour morally and spiritually for the world as it ever saw. When the Roman Empire fell and broke to pieces under the invasions and assaults of the northern barbarians, the Dark Ages settled down upon devastated and chaotic Europe. In a later century it seemed that Europe was again being trampled to pieces under the heavy boots of Napoleon, and there were dark days for us in our Revolutionary War and in our Civil War. Every war is a terrible tragedy and may seem to be the end of all things to those who are in the midst of it.

Yet faith in God as a personal Ruler has survived all these wars and all the catastrophes of human history. If war could kill faith it would have been dead long ago. The human heart has reasons for its faith that are deeper than all earthly vicissitudes and survive through all the storms and earthquakes of time. The present war surpassed all others in its appalling magnitude and destruction, but it introduced no new difficulty to our faith in the personality of God, and the human heart will not fail in its faith, or fear though the earth be removed, and though the mountains be carried into the midst of the sea.

2. The present war put a heavy but no new strain on our doctrines of the divine Providence and the divine immanence. The world has always been in a state of eruption, and yet men have always maintained their faith in the ruling presence and power of God. His plan necessarily runs through and controls the thunder and lightning and storm of war as certainly and surely as through the sunshine and prosperity of peace. His sovereignty is able, in ways too deep for us to understand, to turn the wrath of man to His praise and the remainder of wrath will He restrain, however tremendous and violent may be its sudden outburst. Gravitation lets no atom slip out of its grasp in the explosion of a volcano or a cosmic collision of stars, and much less does divine Providence let any strand of our human world slip out of divine control.

In a similar way the divine immanence persisted through the convulsion of the war unaffected by its unprecedented violence. Electricity and chemical affinity and all physical forces operate with as absolute certainty and as irresistible exactitude in the

throes of an earthquake as they do on the calmest and brightest day. The sunlight, always pouring forth from the sun and beating upon the earth, diffusing itself through the whole atmosphere, penetrating the soil and quickening every root and leaf, is not stopped by cloud and storm and is unsullied by the murky air through which it shines and the slime on which it falls. So God is in His world, in sunshine and storm, peace and war, on the bloodiest battle field as on the most fruitful harvest field, and is ever the immanent God,

Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.

Yet He maintains His own sovereignty without infringing on human personality and responsibility, and keeps His own purity unstained by all the sin and crime of the world in which He is immanent as Sovereign and Saviour.

3. At this point we may well inquire what effect the world war was having upon men's faith in a personal God. Was it crushing this faith with its intolerable weight of woe, or was it stimulating it to its highest and most heroic endeavor and mastery? The general experience of men has been that great trials and even the greatest disasters confirm rather than destroy faith. Job in the midst of His accumulated and unspeakable losses and sorrows rose to the occasion and exclaimed: "Though he slay me, yet will I trust him." Men often meet appalling calamities in this

spirit. In the deepest night of despair the stars of faith flash out. Great crises call forth the deepest and most primal needs and powers of men, and then they rise to their supremest heights of faith and achievement. A great battle is a challenge to win a great victory. The war has been the greatest call to faith and courage man has ever heard. If there be no God to give meaning to it all and lead men to some worthy victory, then the world is only a crazy ant hill disturbed by the thrust of a sword and is the wildest absurdity of a disordered dream. Men fly to God in such an hour as their refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble.

This is the effect the war has had on the faith of men. This effect was greatest in the trenches, where the need was most terrible and most intensely realized. It was commonly said that there were no atheists in the trenches and that one had to go far back to where it was safe before he could find skeptics. The evidence on this point is abundant and is accumulating in countless private letters and personal testimonies and published articles and volumes.

In his vivid book, *The Glory of the Trenches*, in the remarkable chapter entitled: *God as We See Him*, Lieutenant Coningsby Dawson writes: "A big sacrifice, which bankrupts one's life, is always more bearable than the little inevitable annoyances of sickness, disappointment and dying in a bed. It's easier for Christ to go to Calvary than for an onlooker to lose a night's sleep in the garden. When the world went well with us before the war, we were doubters. Nearly all the fiction of the past fifteen years is a proof of that—it records our fear of failure, sex, old age, and particularly of a God who refuses to explain

Himself. Now, when we have thrust the world, affections, life itself behind us and gaze hourly into the eyes of Death, belief comes as simply and clearly as it did when we were children. Curious and extraordinary! The burden of our fears has slipped from our shoulders in our attempt to do something for others; the unbelievable and long coveted miracle has happened—at last to every soul who has grasped his chance of heroism quick-coming death has become a fifth-rate calamity.”

In a notable article in *The Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1917, Maurice Barrès, a member of the French Academy, gave extracts from private letters written to their friends by thirteen young French soldiers, all of whom afterward perished in battle. “Every one of these biographies,” writes Mr. Barrès, “would tell of the deepening of the soul, and in the inner sanctuary of these different souls there burns the same fire. Have you noticed that they speak constantly of God—that they pray?” “In this war,” says the writer of one of these letters, “the spiritual element dominates all.” These young Frenchmen probably did not differ religiously from others of their class before the war, but this fiery baptism had cleansed their souls and endued them with power from on high and turned them into flaming apostles of faith and heroism and sacrifice. “This spirit of religion,” said Mr. Barrès, “pervades this whole generation.” France with all its reputation for skepticism and frivolity has found its soul in this war and profoundly believes in God.

It may have been, as some reports indicated, that the churches in France and England were not as well attended as before the war, which can be at least partly accounted for by proper causes, but the spirit of

religion is broader and deeper and is saturating these nations with faith and prayer. God was very real in the thick of this terrible cataclysm, and men instinctively fled to Him for refuge and help.

For the belief of men is that God was in this war as a struggling and suffering God. He was no mere spectator of it, but had His shoulder under this burden also. It is true that we are confronted with the fact that the Germans, while inflicting their most infernal frightfulness and atrocities, also claimed God as being on their side, and the German Emperor spoke of God as his private partner. But we believe there was a right side to this war that stood for justice and liberty, democracy and brotherhood, and that God is ever on the side of right. Jesus Christ fought our Civil War, as the event has proved, and we believe that the Son of God went forth to win this war. God was in the camp and down in the trench to give efficiency and spirit to munitions and men. It is true He gave equal efficiency to German shells, but this war was not won in the long run by munitions but by morale, not by shells but by souls. The spirit of men was to decide, human ideals were to win, and God was in this spirit and these ideals. That God was struggling with us in this awful strife was a fundamental element in our faith and the most inspiring fact in our courage and confidence. The war enveloping the world in smoke did not obscure the personality of God, but through the murky mist He has loomed up in greater certainty and power.

4. Let us, however, before leaving the subject, take a broader view of the world war and see if we can set it in a larger framework that will help to sustain our faith in God. The first view of the terrifying spectacle

was that all things human were being consumed in one vast and final conflagration; it would not have been hard to believe that the apocalyptic days had come, when "the sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven."

But a deeper and longer view restores the sanity and serenity of our judgment and reminds us that destruction is usually in order to construction. The fiery volcano, belching forth far-flung destruction and death, spreads lava that presently crumbles into fertile soil, and soon its very scorched, scarred slopes are covered with richly burdened vineyards and orchards. The storm that sweeps in destructive fury over the earth leaves fuller streams and greener fields and bluer skies. A fire in a city burns down old buildings that are soon replaced by imposing modern structures. Many a church or college has gone down into ashes, to rise in a more capacious and beautiful building. Into the glowing blast furnace go raw materials of ore and coal and coke, to come out as molten streams of iron that is tempered into steel and fabricated into all the structures of our material civilization. Into the melting pot of the goldsmith are cast all manner of outworn jewelry to be melted and refashioned into new and more beautiful forms.

The huge melting pot of the world at war was no exception to this general principle, but was only its vastest and most beneficent application. It may have been hard to see and believe this amidst all the blinding smoke and flame and confusion of the hour, but the day will reveal it, and we shall know in time that all things worked together for good and shall wonder at what God hath wrought. The fearful destruction of our Civil War was the construction of a more solid

and glorious republic, with a flag saved from the rent of disunion and cleansed from the blot of slavery, and God is now building a better Europe and a better world.

The fundamental meaning of the war, at first obscured in the smoke of its outbreak, is now shining out clear. It was not all a mad welter of insanity about nothing, but it was a tremendous struggle of democracy with autocracy, and all nations were being cast into the melting pot of freedom. Russia collapsed as one huge continental mass into this crater and almost in a day was melted into democracy. Its elements are more or less dissociated in the initial stages of the process, but they are sure in time to be recast in the moulds of law and liberty. The old Russia is gone forever, and the new Russia, it is hoped, will take its place, it may be after long trial and travail, among democratic governments. Autocratic Germany itself has been undermined and shaken by the very war it started. The German people are at present seething with the spirit of self-government, and the Kaiser's throne and crown have crumbled down in the rising sea of democracy.

Out of the ruins of the old world we already see the promise and potency of the new world that is to be. Potentates are growing smaller, and the people are growing larger. Thrones and crowns will be replaced by parliaments and presidents. The war turned into a gigantic and determined war against war in which it wrote its own doom. All these old and new engines of destruction have been making war more difficult and finally impossible in the future. The world is at last drawing nigh to the realization of the vision so long beheld afar by prophets and

poets, when nations shall beat their swords into ploughshares and shall build the parliament of man and the federation of the world. Out of such warfare will come the new heavens and new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness and peace.

This view saves our faith in God and strengthens it. He still sitteth upon the circle of the heavens and ruleth amongst the children of men. Faith in the personality of God will have no difficulty in maintaining its life and power in such a world. These lives that flamed up and burned out as fuel in this awful world conflagration were not vainly wasted, but were the sacrificial price and means of a new world. Their blood will be the blessing of a thousand generations to come and will ever keep the world green and beautiful.

Our faith in the personality of God in these trying times, as in all times, will be vigorous and fruitful as we turn it into fact. Obedience is ever the convincing organ of knowledge and sweeps doubts from the field as it presses on to victory. Belief in God accepted as a mere creed and as a result of logic and controversy, the personality of God maintained as a proposition, is likely to be pale and impotent; it is ever resting on an insecure footing and at any step may slip and fall. But faith that girds itself up for patient well-doing and fights the good fight gathers strength from the conflict and is sure of the rock under its feet.

If we doubt whether there is a God and then do nothing we shall presently live as though there were no God and slip down to a lower life; but if we live as in the presence of God and do all things as for Him, we shall grow sure of Him and not fail to catch visions of His face. If we believe, with William

James, that the universe "feels like a real fight," and with Donald Hankey that "True religion means betting one's life that there is a God," and then make the venture and plunge into the fight, we shall be able to declare, with Paul: "I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day."

We are living, we are dwelling,
In a grand and awful time,
In an age on ages telling,
To be living is sublime.
Worlds are charging, heaven beholding,
Thou hast but an hour to fight;
Now the blazoned cross unfolding,
On, right onward, for the right!

PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE DANIEL CONTROVERSY

By ROBERT DICK WILSON, Ph. D., D. D., Professor of Semitic Philology
and Old Testament Criticism, Princeton Theological Seminary

CAN a man rationally believe in the book of Daniel? That is, can he believe that the people mentioned in it existed and that the record of the words and deeds said to have been spoken or done by or to them is true? This article is an attempt to answer this question in the affirmative.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding as to what I am undertaking to do, let me say by way of clearly defining my purpose that by "rationally believe" I mean to believe in accordance with those laws of logic and evidence on the ground of which we accept the genuineness and veracity of the statements of any alleged historical document, that is, on the ground of its claims, its purpose, language, ideas, and its biographical, chronological, and geographical statements.

Before entering upon the discussion of our subject, it may be well to clear the ground of two or three possible misapprehensions as to the scope and limits of any investigation of the historical character of a Biblical document, arising from the fact that its narratives contain records of miraculous events. It seems to be taken for granted by many critics of these documents that a record containing accounts of miracles is by that very circumstance rendered incredible and open to suspicion as to its genuineness and integrity. However, it can be maintained that, on the contrary, an ancient document purporting to

be historical, which did not narrate events that were considered by the narrator and his readers to be of a miraculous character, would by this very omission lay itself open to doubt as to its genuineness. For all the peoples of antiquity thoroughly believed in miracles, and their admittedly genuine works are full of accounts of them. The *Iliad*, Herodotus, Livy, the inscriptions of Egypt, Babylon, and Assyria, the Old Testament and New Testament historical and prophetic books—all are full of omens and dreams and of the intervention of the gods in whom the people believed. Not merely Ashurbanipal and Nabunaid and Rameses II and Xerxes, but Hezekiah and Alexander and all the heroes of early Greece and Rome and the worthies of Israel believed in them and sought for the direct help of the gods in their behalf.

The dreams and visions, the fiery furnace and the lions' den, of Daniel are in harmony, therefore, with the other historical records of all ancient nations in this respect; and if we reject the Daniel document simply because it contains the records of alleged miracles, we must on the same ground reject almost every supposedly historical document of ancient times. Wherein the alleged miracle consisted, what really happened that the men of those times evidently supposed to be a miracle and that was designated by that name, is a legitimate subject of inquiry. Wherein lay the extraordinary character of the event, its origin, its dénouement, and its significance, are proper matters of investigation for the theologian, the philosopher, and the psychologist; but the philologist and the historian have to do merely with the genuineness of the record and not with its metaphysical grounds and its scientific explanations.

And what is true of miracles in general is true also of that most wonderful and unique of Old Testament miracles—predictive prophecy. One who denies on philosophical grounds and prepossessions the possibility and actuality of all superhuman or divine interventions in the affairs of men may be predisposed to doubt the genuineness of a document containing alleged predictions of events which afterwards occur in surprising harmony with what the prophet had foretold. But no one who believes that God may reveal His thoughts to man, and that as a matter of fact He has at sundry times and in diverse manners made His thoughts known to us to and through the prophets, has any logical, philosophical or scientific ground for contesting the age or integrity of a book, simply because it contains predictive prophecies which have later been fulfilled. On such grounds alone no Mohammedan, Jew or Christian has the right to entertain suspicions as to the genuineness and authenticity of the Hebrew prophetic books. On such grounds alone no Christian especially has the right to doubt a book from whose most highly contested portion the incarnate Lord Himself quotes words which He unequivocally attributes to Daniel the prophet. For we must not forget that the fundamental question of all in regard to a revelation from God is not how or why, or what kind of revelation has been made, but that a revelation has been made at all.

When one has admitted that a communication has been made by God to man, then will it be in order to consider the time, the manner, the form, the content, and the purpose of the communication, and wherein it agrees with and differs from other similar communi-

cations. The persons to whom God speaks, the extent and detailed character of His disclosures, the language that He employs, the means of the communication—the dream, the vision, the ecstasy, the angel of Jehovah, the still small voice or the very Son of God Himself in human form—these and all other non-essential characteristics are all subsidiary to the main fact, that God hath spoken. This is the fundamental, the essential, the supreme factor of a revelation. That God should speak at all was His own prerogative, and no less the manner in which He spake.

Now just here lies the fallacy of all those who admit that God has revealed His will to man and yet deny the genuineness of the book of Daniel on the ground of the character of the predictive prophecies contained in it. If, to quote a recent writer, it “contains a definite promise of deliverance which was wonderfully fulfilled (*cf.* 7:25; 8:25f.; 11:45ff.),” who is to set a limit of number to the predictive capacity, or will to reveal, of God? God, or the critics of God, which? For is it not evident that a man who asserts that “the ultimate triumph of the kingdom of God is here made known,” but that God could not have foreseen or foretold the course of events in the time of the Seleucid kings is gagging God, reducing Him to the limitations of humanity, and fixing for Him a periphery of knowledge and a radius of revelation beyond which He cannot, or must not, pass?

But, says the critic, I am doing no such thing. I am simply making Daniel follow “the analogy of all the other biblical writings.” “The conditions and circumstances of a prophet’s own age are always reflected in his messages; and the promises for the future and predictions of judgment always rest on

the historic basis of the period to which he belongs, having a practical bearing on present needs." So asserts the modern critic. But how does he undertake to substantiate his assertion about the analogy of the other prophets? By wilfully throwing out from these other prophets all that is analogous to the predictive portions of Daniel, and then affirming that Daniel is not analogous to the portions that remain. Thus they throw out more than half of Isaiah and large sections of Jeremiah, Amos, Micah, and Zechariah, largely because the ideas and predictions found in these sections will not harmonize with the theory of the evolution of the history of Israel—that golden image which has been set up in the universities of Germany before which all men are commanded to bow down and worship. For there is no certain evidence external to the Scriptures in favor of these changes from the traditional dates and authors. Nor is there any incontestable evidence in the books, or sections of books, that will justify the charges that they are neither genuine nor authentic. Much, it is true, has been claimed on the ground of language, and much has been assumed on the ground of the ideas expressed; but mostly the arguments for interpolation and pseudonymy have been based upon analogy and derived from the very definition, or proposition, that they are meant to prove.

Now, the force of the analogical argument must be admitted, when it is used to prove the possibility of the occurrence of a like event or of the existence of a similar thing. The argument for the continued existence of the soul after death is rendered probable to those who believe in the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy. The probability of

Old Testament miracles seems strong to those who believe in the Incarnation and the Resurrection. The possibility, or even the probability, of the decrees of Nebuchadnezzar and of Darius the Mede is assured by the numerous similar decrees of other tyrants.

So, also, it is a good argument from analogy to argue from the character of one or more of the prophecies in favor of the possibility, or even the probability, of other prophecies of a like nature. But, so far only can analogy take us. It proves at most a strong probability. For the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy do not prove that the soul will exist after death. The occurrence of some miracles does not prove that others occurred. That some tyrants have made cruel decrees does not prove that others did. And so the fact that some prophecies are of a certain kind does not prove that all must have been of that kind. It proves only that other prophecies may have been of that kind.

It is a pure assumption, therefore, to assert that, because certain prophecies reflect "the conditions and circumstances of a prophet's own age," all other prophecies must reflect them, and them only. This would be making prophecy nothing but a human product. The Christian, however, must ever believe that God spake through the prophets "by divers portions and in divers manners" and that "no prophecy ever came by the will of man; but men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Ghost." This speaking from God as they were moved by the Holy Ghost is the fundamental condition of a true prophet of Jehovah, which the conditions and circumstances of the prophet's age may modify in form, but not in essence. That is, the persons and events of which

the prophet speaks will be predominantly those of his own time, or of times preceding his own; and the language will give indelible marks of his age, his education, and his environment; the descriptions of manners and customs, the garments worn, the weapons of war used, the heathen gods worshiped, the festivals kept, the administration of government and the officers thereof, the chronology, the geography, the literary forms in dates, titles, contracts, letters, decrees, and subscriptions—all these will indicate the time at which the author wrote.

But with the fullest use of all these and of all other human marks and indications of the date of a document we must stop. To attempt to determine the genuineness and date of a document which purports to contain a revelation from God, by fixing arbitrarily a time limit for such a revelation, is a superhuman endeavor that borders on blasphemy. This sounds like strong and unwarranted language, but by what other term can we stigmatize the action of those who claim that the primary reason for impugning the genuineness of Isaiah 24-27 is that this section contains ideas that are new to Isaiah? The greatest of these new ideas is what Isaiah says about the Resurrection. But does he say this of himself? No; he represents God as saying it. It was not Isaiah's idea at all. It was God's. The modern critic, however, asserts that the idea of a resurrection is of purely human origin and that the Hebrews never thought of such a thing as the possibility of a resurrection till the post-captivity times; and that even then they must needs derive the idea from the Persians!

A fig for such so-called scholarship! Shame on any Christian who will sell his birthright of divine

revelation for such a mess of evolutionary pottage! Derived from the Persians, forsooth! Why not from the Egyptians, who for thousands of years had lived with and for this great idea? Why not from their own hearts as they agonized over the stark forms of their beloved dead? "If a man die, shall he live again?" Was Job the first to utter such thoughts as this? No, no. The heart of every parent who has loved a child "long since and lost a while" must agree with me that the first *homo sapiens* that ever sat and wept "for the touch of a vanished hand and the sound of a voice that is still" must have said as he looked at the still form of the departed: Shall he live again? And shall we see him as he was wont to be?

When we apply these criteria of the critics to the book of Daniel we find it fulfilling them as well as we have any reasonable right to expect; for the conditions and circumstances reflected in it are those at Babylon in the sixth century B.C., the age of Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus. The eight dates given are all from the accession's year of the former to the third year of the latter. The first six chapters are certainly meant to meet, and do meet, the conditions and circumstances of the sixth century B.C., rather than those of the second. In the last six chapters, however, and especially in the eleventh chapter, there is a detailed and accurate account of some events in the history of the Seleucids and Ptolemies, and an elaboration of certain doctrines, on the ground of which it is claimed that the whole book (for its unity is generally admitted) must have been written no earlier than 165 B.C. As these accounts of events are said in the book itself to have been made known

by God to Daniel in visions designed to reveal the future, we leave the decision as to the weight of this objection to the judgment of the reader. If he believes that God could not, or would not, reveal such an account, he will be wasting his time by reading farther in this article. For he will have decided the case on a preconceived opinion and not on the evidence. And in deciding this case on the ground of this opinion let him know that he has rejected also the predictions of Christ and all revelation of future events as well.

But if he believes that God could unveil the future, if He would, let him proceed with me to a consideration of the four doctrines, the enunciation of which by Daniel is said to imply that the book cannot have been composed till the second century, B.C. These doctrines concern angels, the resurrection, the judgment, and the Messiah. It is claimed that Daniel has some ideas on each of these four subjects that are new to Hebrew literature and different from what is to be found in the earlier prophets, that these new ideas were derived from the Persians, that they are similar to the ideas of apocalyptic literature, and that they at least indicate that the book was not written till late in the Greek period.

Three of the specifications in this charge may be admitted, to wit, that some of Daniel's ideas are new in certain characteristics, that the statements about them differ in some respects from those in earlier books, and that they are similar in some particulars to those found in the apocalyptic literature of later times; but the two important specifications bearing upon the date of Daniel, that is, that these ideas were derived from the Persians, and that they indicate

a second century origin of the document, are absolutely incapable of proof. For, first, the author of Daniel claims that what he has to say about these ideas was made known to him in the visions of God; second, there is no indication in the language of Daniel bearing on these subjects, or in any Persian, Babylonian, Greek, Hebrew, Aramaic, Egyptian or other document, that any such influence was ever exerted by the religion of Persia upon the religious ideas of those who were the subjects of the Achaemenid kings; third, the only Old Persian documents that have come down to us render it extremely improbable that the religion of the Avesta, in which these ideas are found, was the religion of the Achaemenid kings; fourth, no one knows when the Avesta was written, and it is more probable that its author derived his ideas from the Hebrews than *vice versa*; fifth, even if these ideas had been derived by the Hebrews from the religious teachings of the Zoroastrians, they may have been derived long before the time of Cyrus, since the Israelites had been settled in the cities of the Medes since the middle of the eighth century; sixth, there is no doubt that the doctrines of a resurrection and of a judgment may have been taken over from the Egyptians and those of angels from the Babylonians, among whom the Hebrews lived so long and with whom they had had intimate relations from the earliest periods of their history, nor, without doing the utmost violence to what purport to be early records of the Hebrews themselves, can we deny that a doctrine of a Messiah had been held among them from the earliest times. Besides, even if it could be shown that the idea of these doctrines had been suggested to Daniel, directly or indirectly, by the religious teach-

ings of the Persians, his treatment of them is so different as to require us to call it a renovation, a re-creation or, at least, an adaptation to the religion of Jehovah.

But the first of the points made above, to wit, that Daniel received his ideas on these subjects by revelation from God, will satisfy all the demands of origin and time. If he did not thus receive them, his book is a forgery, and the ideas contained in it are of purely human origin, expressing merely fancies and longings about subjects concerning which God alone can know. It is satisfying to know that all that the wisest of men can say about the derivation of these ideas is pure conjecture without any scrap of evidence in its favor.

But some of those who might admit that the ideas of Daniel may have originated among the Hebrews or have been derived from the Egyptians or Babylonians, or even from the Medo-Persians before 550 B.C., will perhaps claim that the absence of the influence of these ideas upon post-captivity literature proves that Daniel can not have been written till long after the captivity. Such a claim rests upon two violent and unwarranted assumptions: First, that a large part of the Old Testament which purports, or at least was supposed by the Jews, to have been written before the captivity was in fact composed after it; and, second, that the admittedly post-captivity literature ought naturally to show deeper and more distinct traces of the influence of Daniel's ideas, provided that they had originated and been promulgated as early as the sixth century B.C.

In answer to the first of these assumptions, it may be said that it will be time to discuss the traces of

ideas concerning angels, the resurrection, the judgment, and the Messiah, in the so-called priestly portion of the Pentateuch, in the Psalter, etc., when the fact of the late origin of the latter has been conceded. As to the second assumption, it is to be said that it cannot reasonably be expected that such books as Chronicles should show the influence of such a book as Daniel, even if it were admitted that the latter was composed long before the former, inasmuch as the book of Chronicles treats only, with the exception of the last two verses, of historical matters preceding 580 B.C. Nor is the fact that the history and doctrines of Daniel are not quoted, or referred to, in post-captivity literature before 200 B.C. as wonderful as some would have us believe. Chronicles purports only to give us the history of Israel up to the captivity. Ezra and Nehemiah and Esther have a definite purpose in view and they tell us only of events and persons connected with their histories. They seldom refer to the past and scarcely mention doctrines. Haggai is a mere fragment treating of a single event, and no sensible person would expect to search in it for references to his predecessors. Zechariah does mention angels and the Messiah, and in many particulars of form and substance closely resembles Daniel.

In the failure of Ben Sira to mention Daniel in his list of the heroes of Israel a more serious difficulty confronts us, but not one that is insuperable. For the fact that he does not put in this list the names of Mordecai and Ezra shows conclusively that he did not intend it to be inclusive of all of whom he must have known, nor of all that we might deem worthy to be placed in it. We must remember that this list is Ben Sira's and not ours. He gives more

space to the description of the garments and functions of a certain high priest named Simon than to the words and acts of any of the patriarchs, kings or prophets. We would, doubtless, have done differently. He gives seventeen verses to Aaron and a line or two to all the Minor Prophets together. He praises Nehemiah and ignores Ezra. In my opinion—and it is only an opinion—he most probably intentionally ignored Daniel because of the doctrines which the latter held. Daniel was essentially a Pharisee, whereas Ben Sira was just as essentially a Sadducee. The former expresses openly his belief in angels, resurrection, a judgment after death, a Messiah, and a universal kingdom with Christ as king; whereas the latter never mentions angels except in citations, believes only in an immortality of fame, and does not refer to a judgment or a Messiah. Lastly, when Ben Sira says that there never was a man like Joseph, he adds “in this respect, that his bones were mustered.” How an intelligent critic can use such a statement as a proof that Ben Sira knew nothing about Daniel and his dreams is beyond my comprehension. Perhaps he never read Ben Sira.

It is asserted further, by the critics, that the place of Daniel in our Hebrew Bibles is a proof that it was written late and after the canon of the prophets had been closed. Since Zechariah, Haggai, and Malachi are in this prophetic part of the present canon and as this part is said to have been canonized before 200 B.C., Daniel must, so it is affirmed, have been written after that time. This is a very specious argument. The principal thing against it is that, so far especially as Daniel is concerned, it has not a single scrap of direct evidence in its favor. It will

be admitted that all of the prophets were canonized and that they were probably translated into Greek before 200 B.C., but this does not prove that Daniel was not one of them. It is admitted, also, that Daniel does not appear among the prophets in any of the printed Hebrew Bibles, nor in any of the Hebrew sources later than 200 A.D. On the contrary, the Gospel of Matthew, the Ascension of Isaiah, Josephus, and Melito, all class him as a prophet, and the last three expressly put him among the prophets, the Ascension and Melito by name and Josephus by description and numeration.

Any inference as to the date of a book to be derived from its place in our printed Hebrew Bibles is rendered nugatory by the fact that the first time that the books of the Old Testament were ever put in their present order was in the edition printed in 1526. Of forty-three lists of these books that I have published, and to which I can now add several others, no two give the same order. Of thirty-four lists and classifications made before 600 A.D., from both Jewish and Gentile sources, all but the one in *Baba Bathra* include Daniel among the prophets. Of these sources, Second Maccabees, Philo, Matthew, Luke, Josephus, the Ascension of Isaiah, Melito, and Jerome are all, directly or indirectly, of Jewish origin, and the authors of all, with the possible exception of Luke and Melito, knew Hebrew. All the Greek, Latin, Syriac, Armenian, Ethiopic, and Coptic (?) sources (the authors of some of which knew Hebrew) place Daniel among the prophets.

As to *Baba Bathra*, the only dissentient from the general agreement, it was written some time after the Jews had made their selection of sections, called

Haphtaroth, to be read in their synagogue services; and as no part of Daniel had been selected for this purpose, the whole book was probably removed from its proper and earlier place among the other prophetic books and placed among the books for more private reading. The books containing the selections for public reading would thus be put together, simply for greater convenience in use, just as Ruth and Lamentations were separated from among the prophets, where they originally belonged, and arranged, along with Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, and Esther, in the portion called *Megilloth*, because these five books were read at the five great festivals of the Jews. We conclude, therefore, that the position assigned to the book of Daniel in a list composed about four hundred years after the time of the Maccabees and nearly seven hundred and fifty years after the death of Cyrus affords no evidence as to the date of its composition and the genuineness of its contents.

As to the attack upon the trustworthiness of the historical statements contained in Daniel, it may be said that they have all been satisfactorily met, except that which concerns the identification of Darius the Mede. As to this, the most likely suppositions are that he was the same as Gobryas, whom Cyrus appointed governor of Babylon just after the time of its conquest by the Medo-Persian army; or that Darius was a sub-king under Cyrus, the king of kings, having Gobryas under him as governor of the province of Babylon. Either of these views will harmonize with the Persian system of government and with all the statements of the book of Daniel. For we know that nearly all of the kings of Persia had two names, one a regnal name received at the time of their assumption

of the sovereignty, and the other their pre-regnal cognomen. That no tablets have been found with the name of Darius in their dates is not extraordinary, since the same is true of all the other sub-kings and governors of the empire during, or after, the reign of Cyrus. That Darius may have appointed one hundred and twenty satraps under himself is assured by the fact that Gobryas is said to have appointed satraps under him in the city of Babylon, and by the meaning of the word, which denotes no more than "protector of the kingdom." That Cyrus and Darius Hystaspis are said by Greek historians to have appointed fewer has nothing to do with the case, for a satrap might have satraps under him, just as a king had kings under him.

That Darius the Mede may have been a reflection of Darius Hystaspis, or of other kings, is controverted by the fact that no resemblance between them can be shown either in character or works. That he was a confusion of several of the kings of Persia is a wild and utterly unjustified assertion, amounting to little more than saying that he was a man and a king and that consequently he had both the virtues and the weaknesses common to all men who are also kings. That Daniel has confused his Darius the Mede, the son of Xerxes (*i. e.*, Ahasuerus), with Darius Hystaspis, the father of Xerxes of Thermopylae and Salamis, has not a shred of evidence in its favor; but, on the contrary, shows a clear discrimination of the author as between the two Dariuses. To speak of John Smith, the son of Peter, does not show that one does not know of Peter Smith, the son of John; much less that one does not know of the latter. It proves rather the opposite. For if there were only

one John Smith, or one Peter Smith, it would be perfectly obvious which of them was meant. So, if there had been but one Darius, or one Xerxes; but with half a dozen of the former and three or more of the latter, the author has thought it best to state clearly which of the Dariuses he meant.¹

That there was no Median empire, embracing Babylon within its bounds, between the reign of Nabunaid and that of Cyrus does not militate against the book of Daniel; for its author never says that there was a Median empire at all. He never says that Darius the Mede was either king of Media or of Persia, but simply that he received the kingdom of Belshazzar, the Chaldean king of Babylon.

All of the essential points which have been disputed concerning the kingship of Belshazzar have been satisfactorily explained. The last allegation—that he cannot have been king because he is not called king on the tablets—has been dispelled since Mr. Pinches published the tablet showing that oaths were taken in his name. On the tablets from the earliest to the latest times we have oaths recorded and they all, with the exception of a few in the name of the sacred city of Sippar, are in the name of a god, or a king, or of both together. The objections made to Daniel's statements about the expedition of Nebuchadnezzar, and the critics' alleged evidence in support of these objections derived from chronology and geography, may be shown to have been founded on the ignorance of commentators or upon the mere silence of documents. That he may have been mad for seven "times" is manifest from the fact that

¹For a full discussion of the objections to the historical statements of Daniel and for the evidence bearing upon these objections the reader is referred to the writer's book entitled *Studies in the Book of Daniel*.

there are two or three periods of his reign, covering about seven years each, from which no documents of his have come down to us; and especially from the fact that *'iddan*, the word for time in the Aramaic of Daniel and a word used nowhere else in the Old Testament, is indisputably a common Babylonian term to express an appointed, or fixed, time, being employed scores of times in the astronomical tablets and elsewhere in this sense. That the terms for king, wise man, and Chaldean are used by the author in a sense proper to the second century B.C., but impossible in the sixth, has been shown by a more complete induction of the facts not to be the case. In a tablet of the Yale collection, lately published by Professor Clay, the Babylonian word for Chaldean will be found in the midst of a list of seers and priests, thus confounding finally the unfounded and strenuously asserted assumption of the "scholars" who have exulted in this so-called evidence of the lack of genuineness on the part of Daniel!

As regards the claim, put forward by the late Dr. Driver and reaffirmed with a great array of alleged but absolutely irrelevant evidence by Professor Gray of Mansfield College, Oxford, that it was "unnatural and unnecessary," as well as "contrary to contemporary usage," for a writer of the Persian period to have employed the title "king of Persia," the readers of this article are left to their own judgment based upon the facts below, which no amount of quibbling or shifting of the issue or indulgence in personalities can possibly annul.

The facts and the evidence as to the use of the title in Persian times are as follows: There are thirty-three instances of its occurrence in extra Biblical docu-

ments between 535 and 400 B.C. It is found in the Persian, Susian, Babylonian, Greek, Hebrew, and Aramaic languages, and is said by Herodotus to have been used by the Ethiopians. It was used in localities as widely separated as Babylon, Ecbatana, Athens, and perhaps Siene. It was used by nineteen different authors in twenty different documents. Nabunaid, king of Babylon, employs it of Cyrus; Darius Hystaspis, of himself; the Babylonian subjects of Xerxes, once at least alone, of him. Aeschylus, who fought at Salamis, Xenophon, who led the retreat of the Ten Thousand, Herodotus, who had traveled throughout the bounds of the Persian Empire, who had been born at Halicanarsus in Asia Minor while it was subject to Persia, and whose history was read before the assembled multitude of knowing and critical Greeks at Olympia, all call the kings of Persia by this title. Are we, then, to asperse the genuineness of the Daniel document, because an eminent German professor, who lived before the age of Assyriology, and an Oxford professor and his followers unite in affirming that it was "contrary to contemporary usage" to employ it? In this age of democracy we might agree that it seems "unnatural and unnecessary," but we are compelled to admit that his Royal and Imperial Majesty, the war lord of Prussia and Germany, and his superman subjects, might object.

The space allotted me for this article forbids that I should more than state succinctly the results of investigations as to the linguistic characteristics of the book and their bearing upon the date of Daniel. Let it suffice to say that the virulent assaults upon the genuineness of the book along the line of language have failed of their purpose. The proper names,

being as they are, Sumerian, Babylonian, Persian, Aramaic, and Hebrew, suit the time of Cyrus and the provenance of Babylon. So, also, do the common names of foreign origin; for every unprejudiced scholar will admit that by the time of Cyrus Medo-Persian words (for the Medes spoke substantially the same language as the Persians), especially governmental terms, may easily have injected themselves into the language of the Hebrews, of whom many had been settled in the cities of the Medes for about two hundred years. Moreover, it is a question that I would like to have the critics answer, why there are none of the so-called Persian words of Daniel in either Ben Sira or the Zadokite Fragments; and why we meet with not one of them anywhere in the Bible, except in Ezra-Nehemiah, Chronicles, and Esther. If Daniel were written in June, 164 B.C., right in the midst of the Maccabean struggle for freedom, and his work could be accepted as patriotic and proper, notwithstanding the large number of its foreign vocables, why is it that Jonah and Joel and the numerous parts of Isaiah, Micah, Nahum, Jeremiah, and Proverbs, and the half of the Pentateuch—called P, and the one hundred and forty-nine Psalms, more or less, that are assigned by these literary critics to the period of the Persians and of their Greek successors—why is it, I say, that the authors of all of these anonymous interpolations and pseudepigraphs have eschewed utterly all of these so-called Persian words, which the author of Daniel thought it proper to use in a popular work designed to restore the decadent faith and courage of a disheartened nation?

As to the Greek words in Daniel, the inscriptions of Sargon and Sennacherib show us that a hundred

years before the birth of Daniel the Greeks of Cyprus and Cilicia had been subject to the Assyrian power; and the inscriptions at Abu Simbal in Egypt and the Greek historians show that Greeks had been serving as soldiers in the armies of Egypt and Babylon long before Daniel wrote his book. Thousands of Greeks must have been taken prisoners by the kings of Assyria and Babylon and have been sold into Babylonia. Thousands must have been bought from slavery in Syria and Mesopotamia and Assyria and the Lydians and Phenicians. These pitiful exiles from the land of music, poetry, and song may have hung their lyres and their psalteries on the same willow on which the Hebrew poet hung his harp and may have wept as they remembered Athens.

Finally, has it never struck the critics as somewhat singular that, if Daniel were composed in Maccabean times, he should have so many resemblances to Ezekiel, Ezra-Nehemiah, Chronicles, and Esther, both in grammar and vocabulary, and so few to all that numerous list of pseudepigraphic, pseudonymous, and anonymous writings which they have violently wrested from their supposed authors, ages, and background and dumped into the period of the Seleucids? Why has no one of the literary critics attempted to show the resemblance of Daniel to Ecclesiasticus? If the manner and method of comparison of the critics were as infallible as they claim, these two great works should be much alike in ideas, vocabulary, and grammar. But they, unfortunately for the manner and the method, are not merely not alike, but much unlike. *Hinc lachrymae illae!* Hence that gloomy sadness that now beclouds the critic's brow as he gazes on the dissolving shadows of his exploded theories.

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THE UNBELIEVING INTELLECTUALS AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

III. THE UNBELIEVING PHILOSOPHERS

By Professor WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON of Lincoln University

As a man thinketh in his heart so is he.

The philosopher, like the workman in any other trade or profession, must work with his own tools and according to his own methods. He must not take a short-cut to the solution of his fundamental problems by an appeal to ecclesiastical or Scriptural authority; but, on the other hand, he cannot ignore the data of Christianity in framing his religious philosophy any more than he can construct a cosmology which leaves out of account the researches of Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, and Darwin. Without ceasing to be a philosopher he may find, with Mr. Balfour, that our various beliefs are more coherent and satisfactory in a theistic than in a naturalistic setting, and more coherent in a Christian than in a merely theistic setting; or with Professor Royce, that Christianity gives us thus far our "principal glimpse of the home-land of the spirit."

While it is possible, happily, to be an open-minded philosopher and at the same time a convinced and devoted Christian, it must be acknowledged that philosophical writers are apt to show the defects of their qualities when they approach religious questions. Occupied mainly with the relationships of thought, they are inclined to attach too little importance to the historical basis of Christianity and to its experiential evidence, and to treat the doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement in so general a way, apart from their

historic fulfilment in a Person, that their value for religion is lessened if not destroyed.

Among "unbelieving philosophers" we may include those of varying shades of unbelief, and our discussion may conveniently follow three lines: I. The Philosophers and Christian Theism; II. The Philosophers and Christian Ethics; III. Unbelief and the World War.

I. THE PHILOSOPHERS AND CHRISTIAN THEISM

Recent philosophy has not denied God; it has been in its leading exponents spiritualistic rather than materialistic, and along the philosophical path has often arrived at insights in singular harmony with the teachings of Christianity. But from the standpoint of a pure theism, such as is assumed as the rational groundwork of Christianity, its conceptions of God have often been inadequate.

The course of philosophical thought as well as of religious history shows that theism cannot maintain itself in purity and vigor apart from the support of Christian history and doctrine. If we take the first article of the creed: "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth," as a plain statement of the theistic position, we find that recent philosophy, and indeed philosophy since the time of Kant, has tended to weaken it at three points: (1) Calling in question, in its various developments, the personality of God, (2) calling in question the power of God, and (3) looking askance at the doctrine of creation.

1. The conception of God is inadequate if He be regarded as an abstract, supra-personal Absolute. If by supra-personal we mean only that there is more in God than is included in finite personality, the term may be allowed; but if in the supra-personal such attributes as

wisdom, holiness, and love are "transcended," "transmuted," in the sense of being "suppressed" and "destroyed"—to use some of Mr. Bradley's expressions—then the supra-personal becomes for religion lower than the personal.

The loving worm within its clod,
Were diviner than a loveless God
Amid his worlds. * * *

There is a necessary progress of thought in the statement: "The Absolute is not personal, nor is it moral, nor is it beautiful or true" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 533). With Mr. Bradley the personal, whether in God or man, must be the finite, and finite personality cannot be real in an unqualified sense. We cannot but feel that when our finite personality is treated as illusory, we are deserting the "ultimate bed-rock of fact," and that any attempt to find a higher degree of reality in the shadowy region of the Absolute is foredoomed to failure.

In a later work, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, 1917, Mr. Bradley seems to approach more closely the theistic position, as when he says that "goodness, beauty, and truth are all there is which in the end is real" (p. 469), but there is no indication that the constructive principles of the earlier work are abandoned. Certainly the doctrine that we as finite spirits belong to a realm of illusory appearance, whose end is to be merged or suppressed in a supra-personal Absolute, stripped of theistic attributes although by way of compliment called "spiritual," is as little available for the use of religion as the agnostic naturalism of Spencer.

The two poles of theistic thought are the personality of God and man; and the strength of theism is in the fact of inter-communion between them. "When thou

saidst, Seek ye my face; my heart said unto thee, Thy face, Lord, will I seek." In such "interlockings" of the human and the divine, as Dr. Lindsay intimates in his *Philosophical System of Theistic Idealism*, 1917, we become sure of God, and "in such authentication of our immortality lies the peerless significance of personality" (p. 491).

Another line of the Kantian development is followed by Höffding when he emphasizes the principle of value as the essential thing in religion. For faith in a future life, "an egoistic form of religiosity," is substituted faith in the persistence of the highest values, and for faith in a personal God, a "religious paradox," is substituted the presentiment "that the principle of the world of values is in the end identical with the principle of causal connection within existence" (*Philosophy of Religion*, p. 115). Höffding well says that "the deepest religious word ever spoken is the prayer of Jesus: 'not my will, but Thine be done;'" but the meaning of this deepest word would evaporate if translated into the terms of Höffding's philosophy: Not my will be done, but may values (and we must have "courageous resignation," because we cannot tell whether our values are the highest) be conserved! We can only resign our wills as a religious act to One who holds our personality sacred and loves us, and, we might add, to One of infinite power and wisdom (see Mark 14:36). Höffding, in fact, explains away the meaning of his splendid phrase, "the conservation of value," instead of drawing out its implications. Value has no meaning apart from a valuer and from persons, or things in relation to persons, to be valued. And there can be no faith in the persistence of the highest values if there is no Valuer, whose nature supplies the norm of the

highest values and whose will ensures their persistence. The kingdom of values of Höfding, and the kingdom of ends implied in the reality of the goodness, beauty, and truth of Bradley's essays, have no meaning or existence except for a kingdom of persons.

2. The two most powerful influences in modern thought have been the idealism of Kant and the doctrine of evolution. Two inheritors of the Kantian tradition, as we have seen, have disparaged human personality as having only quasi or transient reality, and have united in affirming that a personal God must be a finite God. The notion of a finite God, a struggling God, or a God who "muddles through," has received notable support from the evolutionary side. We are told that evolution is not taken seriously unless we carry over the concepts of change and growth into the construction of our idea of Deity, unless, in fact, we paraphrase the creed or catechism so as to read: I believe in Creative Evolution, finite, temporal, and changeable. William James, Bergson, Sir Oliver Lodge, and H. G. Wells are among those who have commended to us this conception, as being most useful for religion, of a finite or struggling God. The relation of a God so conceived to the ultimate reality of the universe is variously described. We may have an ultimate dualism or pluralism with God as one element—"one of the eaches" (James); or there may be a living creative impulse closely identified with God, but in a way not clearly specified (Bergson); or, in place of the Christian Trinity, we may erect the sort of trinity which Mr. Wells constructs in his God the Invisible King: First, the "Veiled Being," incomprehensible and beyond good and evil; and second, proceeding out of this "in a manner altogether inconceivable," a lesser or second

being called life-force, and then a God, moral and loving, coming "we know not whence," but we know that "he has begun and will never end;" or finally, with Sir Oliver Lodge, in his *Modern Problems*, we may be impressed with the reality of "powerful but not almighty helpers," but be impressed as well "with the fearful majesty of still higher aspects of the universe culminating in an immanent Unity, which transcends our utmost possibilities of thought."

Some of those who preach the doctrine of a finite god think of him evidently as a secondary being similar to the created Logos or Christ of Arian speculation. That the requirements of thought are not satisfied is shown by the tendency to posit a more ultimate Being behind the finite deity. Nor are the moral requirements of our nature fully met by the finite god, as is recognized by James at the close of his *Pragmatism*: "This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast." Nor is it at all evident that the belief in a struggling deity is the natural reaction of our religious consciousness in the present world-crisis. If God, and with Him morality, had a beginning, as Mr. Wells holds, why may they not have an end? If God and morality are an afterthought in the universe which is not fundamentally moral, their position is precarious, and the ultimate triumph of the right is at best only a pious hope. A more robust faith is that of President Lincoln, who said in the darkest hour of the Civil War: "The will of God prevails."

It may be remarked that in the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement we have all the advantages claimed for religion by the conception of a finite and struggling God, without the disadvantages. The God of Christian belief and worship is not oblivious

of the temporal struggle, but suffers with us and for us. The dilemma which has been made acute by the sufferings of the present time between a God of almighty power and a God of infinite love, is resolved, so far as may be at least, in the light of the cross and resurrection of Christ. As we look at these we may say with equal assurance that the love of God has no limit and that His power has no limit. The idea of a finite or evolving God cannot give satisfaction to the sense of reverence and of dependence which is the essence of the religious spirit. It does not satisfy man in his moments of weakness and temptation, when he would fain say: "Our help is in the name of the Lord, who made heaven and earth," or when, amid tragedy and despair, he would rest upon everlasting arms. It does not satisfy him in his finer and more heroic moods when he responds to the call of an infinite Demander, and thrills with a sense of "the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high." The verdict of the moral consciousness, as Professor Pringle-Pattison says, is surely in favor of "the reality of the ideal and its infinite transcendence of finite attainment."

3. The task of most philosophers since Kant has been to resolve some one of the dualisms which he introduced into philosophy. With Bradley it was the dualism between the world of appearance and that of reality, with Höffding it was the dualism between the world of values and that of existence, while with Bergson it was the dualism between the real world of living beings, apprehended only by intuition, and the symbolic and artificial world of physical science, constructed by the intellect. Kant himself was of course a convinced theist, but several points in the Kantian system have not been favorable to the integrity and dominance of

theistic faith. With Kant, for example, God was no longer the Creator of the heavens and the earth, but occupied the more modest position of a postulate or norm in the moral universe; and even here the method of His introduction, as a guarantee that the righteous would be rewarded and that happiness would in the end be coincident with holiness, suggests that God is the servant of man, and that His supreme end is to glorify man and to secure the happiness of man. It is not to be wondered at that many of the developments from the Kantian teaching, in spite of the high moral idealism of the master, have tended to lessen the influence and impair the integrity of Christian theism.

Even in the controversy between naturalism and theism the Kantian philosophy has given an uncertain sound. The question at issue is whether mind in the larger sense is an interloper in the universe, an accident or at most an incident, or is the master of the house. Is Mind, to use a popular figure, a deadhead tramp stealing a ride upon the freight train of mechanism, or is it the engineer who runs the train? To naturalism mind is the tramp who does not influence the motion of the train and is liable to be put off at any moment, while theism holds that without mind the train would never have started and could not keep on running. The compromise which Kant proposed between naturalism and theism cannot be said to be satisfactory, however influential it has been with subsequent thinkers. The mechanism of nature was, so far as its laws are concerned, the product of mind, but man became a prisoner within the house he himself had built. All his actions in time and space were rigidly subject to the laws of mechanical necessity. At the same time God, no longer the Creator of the universe or its efficient or final

cause, was denied access to the house; and those who follow the Kantian tradition would as rigidly exclude the supernatural from the region of sensible phenomena as would the materialist. It is impossible on Kantian principles that God should raise the dead.

The Kantian dualism between the world of nature (the world of unreal appearance and the sphere of necessity, but the only object of knowledge) and the world of the moral postulates (the home indeed of reality and freedom, but the object merely of faith) has wrought confusion in theistic thought. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." When Kant with the best of intentions destroyed knowledge of God to make room for faith, he entered, as the history of thought has shown, upon a dangerous course. The ruins of reason provide an insecure foundation for the fabric of faith. If the *noumena*, God, and Freedom, dwell in a region so remote that they are inaccessible to reason and are so impotent that they cannot affect the chain of physical causation, they may be regarded as negligible quantities; and the descent of Kantianism to the naturalism of Spencer was natural if not inevitable. The cry, "Back to Kant," has often meant, Back from Kant to Hume; just as in a parallel case the cry, Back to Jesus, has sometimes meant, Back to the Jewish view of Jesus and of the way of salvation.

The fortunes of theism and of supernatural Christianity are bound up together. The personality of God, His sovereign power and His transcendence of the world as Creator, as well as His love, are permanently secure only under the Christian scheme of things. When men cease to believe in Christ they are not likely to continue to believe in God, and a reduced Christianity means a whittled-down theism. When it is said, as by

Eucken, that we cannot confine the union of God and man to one unique instance, nor make the expression of divine love and grace dependent upon its one expression in Jesus Christ, nor believe in the resurrection lest there be "an overthrow of the total order of nature," we are not surprised that the personality of God is loosely held on the ground that it is too anthropomorphic, emotional, and symbolic. The transcendence of God over the world of nature and of man, necessary to His ineffable holiness as well as to His almighty power, is only safeguarded when we believe in a God who raises the dead and calls the things that are not as though they were. The supernatural must lie at the basis of the natural in a fully theistic view of the universe.

II. THE PHILOSOPHERS AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS

It is a singular, and at first glance a disconcerting, fact that many "intellectuals" who guided the thought and inspired the moral enthusiasm of the past generation were not adherents of an orthodox Christian creed. We refer to serious thinkers upon the deepest problems of human life—philosophers in the popular sense—such as Carlyle, Ruskin, George Eliot, Matthew Arnold, and Emerson in America. Professor Dewey may have reasons for his suggestion, in a recent work on German Philosophy and Politics, that we may "give up historical and miraculous elements as indifferent accretions and retain the moral substance and emotional values of Christianity." But when we study the biography of these writers, who have been the prophets of their age, we find that they were reared under Christian and, if we except Emerson, under directly evangelical influence. Christianity was the molding influence of

their younger life, and gave the "set" to their thought and character. Theirs, if we may so express it, was a Christianity of the afterglow; the halo of Christian sentiments and ideals clung to them after the creed of orthodoxy had wholly or in part been discarded.

George Eliot, in a famous conversation with Frederic Myers at Cambridge, speaking of the three trumpet calls of men: God, immortality and duty, "pronounced, with terrible earnestness, how inconceivable the first, how unbelievable the second, and yet how peremptory and absolute the third." We may doubt, though, whether she would have felt the same sense of the sacredness of duty if she had not been reared in the larger faith in God and immortality. Matthew Arnold, again, sings in lofty strain:

Hath man no second life?—Pitch this one high!
Sits there no judge in Heaven, our sins to see?—
More strictly, then, the inward judge obey!

But we ask once more whether the lofty idealism of Arnold's sonnet would have been possible apart from that faith in Heaven and a heavenly Judge in which he was brought up. It may still be maintained that religion and ethics, the Christian religion and Christian ethics, are inseparably bound together.

Mr. Balfour has argued persuasively, in his *Theism and Humanism*, that morality loses prestige if interpreted in a naturalistic rather than a theistic setting. And with prestige, it may be added, it will eventually lose its power over human conduct. It has, at any rate, not yet been demonstrated (and recent history seems to afford an impressive demonstration in the other direction) that morality can be divorced from religion. As Goldwin Smith has said in a letter: "*Men*

(not great historical communities) you may find at the present day, and not a few of them, whose morality is unaffected by the intellectual rejection of old beliefs, while their characters are exalted by science or other high and beneficent pursuits. But then these men have all been brought up and formed under religion, which adheres to them under the guise of 'reverence for the unknown,' and always carries with it a latent belief in some sort of immortality. You must wash the vessel more thoroughly before your experiment can be fairly tried."

Professor J. H. Leuba seems to admit that, if we think through the problem of morality, it will lead us to a theistic view of the universe. He believes, however, that ultimate solutions are not urgent, and that all we need to say is that morals arise among men—in the course of human evolution. Man thus becomes a sort of "moral Melchizedek," and morality has a precarious place in a non-moral universe. A man-made ethical system may be abrogated by man or by any set of men or even by an individual. If the current morality is distasteful, say, to one of Nietzsche's genius, he can say in effect: I acknowledge no obligation to obey the moral maxims of the common herd. The maxims of slaves are good enough perhaps for the mish-mash of the mob, but I will follow my own principles, and bring around the world—or all of the world worth considering—to my way of thinking.

George Eliot has said that "man is by nature an unmitigated savage; let him alone and he lapses into barbarism." Human nature being what it is, it would be easy to predict, and could now easily be proved by a historical example, that morality when divorced from religion is readily cast aside or turned into im-

moralism. The motto of naturalism easily becomes: Follow instinct rather than ideals. Men will join in the dance around the golden calf, and will say: "These be thy gods, O Israel." They will worship at the shrine of Eros and will glorify sexual passion, as is done in the pages of Freud and Jung. Or in a scientific age they will take their cue from the struggle of the brutes, and write their national code of ethics in the terms of struggle and survival and the will to power. The law of naturalism will read: Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost; and the gospel of naturalism will be couched in the terms: Blessed are the war-makers, for theirs is the kingdom of Odin who is greater than Jehovah.

The tender mercies of naturalistic ethics are cruel, whether the lust for power or the sexual passion is placed in the seat of authority over human life. L. S. Thornton, in his *Conduct and the Supernatural*, written before the war but not published till 1915, was prophetic when he contended that, where the restraints and ideals of supernatural religion are absent, conduct reverts to the plane of animal instinct. He was prophetic when he declared that "the repudiation of Christian moral standards is a direct and entirely natural result of the earlier rejection of Christian dogma," and that it can be said with absolute certainty that "the revolt against the Christian ethic is due to the previous repudiation of the doctrine upon which it is founded." Than the ethics of "infinite and mysterious obligation from on high" there is no other ethics that can permanently lift men and hold men in their moral ideals and practices above the plane of animalism. And for the maintenance of ethical standards in full

vigor and power a Christian view of the universe is necessary. Certainly the course of thought, theological, philosophical, and political, as well as of events in Germany, is not favorable to the belief that men will long retain "the moral substance and emotional values of Christianity" while giving up "historical and miraculous elements as indifferent accretions."

In our survey of the relation of the philosophical intellectuals to the Christian faith, we have been specially interested in their attitude toward the theistic foundation of Christianity and toward its ethical teaching. We have been led to the conclusion, however, that a belief in supernatural Christianity, that is, in the trustworthiness of the Christian history and the truth of the Christian doctrines, is necessary if Christian theism or any theism worthy of the name is to retain its hold upon human thought, and if Christian morality or any morality that can resist the impulse toward animalism is to retain its empire over human conduct. But if Christianity is of central importance in the world of thought and of individual conduct, it is of equal importance in the world of society, of human institutions, and of national relationships. It is the sovereign demand of Christianity not only that every thought should be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ and that every act of the individual should be regulated by the principles of His Gospel, but that all the relationships and institutions of men should come under the rule of Christ. "He shall break in pieces the oppressor." "All kings shall fall down before him; all nations shall serve him." "Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy foot-stool." "He must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet." "The kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord, and of his

Christ." These are the prophecies of both the Old and the New Testament, and if they are true, Christianity is not merely an ornament to our civilization, as perhaps we have thought, but is the foundation of national welfare. Only that nation that hears His words and does them shall be called a wise nation; the nation that rejects His teaching shall be destroyed.

III. UNBELIEF AND THE WORLD WAR

Fifty years and more ago a movement was started in Germany, employing to some extent the Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, the doctrine of evolution, and the methods of critical scholarship, whose result, if not intention, was successively to belittle the importance of Jesus Christ. The Old Testament was attacked and the New Testament was threatened. The early chapters of the Gospels, telling of the Virgin Birth, and then the later chapters, telling of the Resurrection were excised. By a major operation the historical backbone of the Gospels, the miracles, was then dissected out, and everything that suggested transcendent claims or attributes in the Person and life of Jesus was eliminated. The course of liberal thought divided into two main streams, one culminating in the conception of a semi-mythical, shadowy Jesus, whose figure tended ever more to fade from the field of actual history; the other issuing in a view of Jesus as a psychiatric abnormality obsessed with the delusion that He was the Messiah. But whether we accept the alternative of a mythical Jesus or that of a mad Jesus, in either case He became a negligible quantity whom we could treat with silent contempt or open scorn or fulsome compliment at will, but could not reverence or even respect.

Thoughtful observers of the increasingly sceptical and anti-Christian tendency of German philosophy and theology, with its echoes in other countries, had some misgivings, but in general it was supposed that things would go on much as before. Even the truculent tone of German political writers attracted little attention. It was supposed that the ethics of the Golden Rule and of the parable of the Good Samaritan were so axiomatic that they must be taken for granted whatever might be the fate of any theological dogma. Everybody, theoretically at least, was devoted to Jesus' ideal of service, and if men practised a different code they were ashamed to confess it. The real problem of ethics was to make the Christian ideals more effective in practice. It was supposed at any rate, that civilization, with its ordered institutions, its luxuries and material comforts and social amenities, its security for life and property, and its freedom from famine and even from war, was founded so securely on the progress of science and education, and on the commercial and cultural intercourse among the nations, that it was one of the things that could not be shaken by academic discussion of creed or even of morals. Such optimism was destined to have a rude awakening. We were living in a fool's paradise, as we found when, on the one hand St. Paul's catalogue of sufferings, persecution, famine, nakedness, peril, sword (Rom. 8), and, on the other his catalogue of pagan vices, covetousness, envy, murder, deceit, malignity, boastful, inventors of evil things, covenant-breakers, without natural affection, unmerciful (Rom. 1), became commonplaces of the conflict.

It was discovered that the sustained attack upon Christian history and dogma was a prelude to an assault upon the citadel of Christian ethics. It was found that

the demand of German militarism for a new religion in place of an imported Christianity—a religion which should be truly national and should exalt the militaristic spirit—was to be taken seriously, and that in fact the breakdown of Christianity in high places prepared the way for the frank adoption in theory and practice of the gladiatorial theory of existence, or of a religion of valor and force. The popularity of the Nietzschean ethics, with their scorn of the so-called slave-morality of Christianity and their exaltation of the vices of cruelty, treachery, and oppression to the rank of cardinal virtues, was accompanied and followed by Nietzscheanism in action. The rulers of Germany in the worlds of thought and action seemed to be throwing down a challenge and to be saying unmistakably by word and deed: "Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us."

It has become increasingly evident that the recent desperate struggle was a conflict of opposing ideals and spiritual forces. The issues involved can be stated in political terms, as a conflict between the ideal of a brotherhood of nations and a narrow and selfish nationalism; or between the ideal of democracy as expressed in Lincoln's "a government of the people, by the people, for the people," and the ideal of autocracy as expressed by the Kaiser's "We Hohenzollerns receive our crown directly from God; whoever opposes me I shall crush." But democracy is really founded upon a religious and Christian principle, that of the infinite value of the individual. True democracy cannot flourish in a naturalistic or anti-Christian atmosphere, because the individual in that case is not related to any eternal values. There is no God in whose image He is made, no future of possible gloom or glory

stretching before him, and no divine imperative to give solemnity and meaning to his actions. No sure bulwark against tyranny, whether of the master or the man, can then be erected. On the other hand, when men rise up in the consciousness that they are children of God, and are themselves enjoying the glorious liberty of the children of God; political and economic freedom is just around the corner. Recognizing and insisting upon their own rights, they will recognize and respect also the rights of others.

An American journalist and an English statesman have recently given utterance to the conviction that no other foundation for democracy and civilization can be laid than is laid, which is Jesus Christ. Mr. Watterson, of the Louisville Courier-Journal, said in his striking Christmas message: "Democracy is but a side issue. The paramount issue, underlying the issue of democracy, is the religion of Christ and him crucified; the bed-rock of civilization; the source and resource of all that is worth having in the world that is, that gives promise in the world to come." And Viscount Earl Grey, according to Harold Begbie's *Life*, gives this as his last message: "I want to say to people that there is a real way out of all this mess materialism has got them into. I've been trying to tell them for thirty years. It's Christ's way. Mazzini saw it. We've got to give up quarreling. We've got to come together. We've got to realize that we're members of the same family. There's nothing that can help humanity, I'm perfectly sure there isn't, *perfectly sure*, except love. Love is the way out, and the way up. That's my farewell to the world."

While tracing the connection between an anti-Christian philosophy and an anti-Christian morality

and social order, it may not be out of place, in closing, to glance at certain tendencies at work in the philosophical faculties of our own institutions. Wishing only to describe these general tendencies among our philosophers (with whom for our present purpose psychologists are included), and not speaking in disparagement in any way of any individual, the writer ventures to record certain facts which have come to his attention. Reference is made to philosophical teachers in four representative institutions of learning located in as many different states. One of these teachers is a practical materialist, his materialism being perhaps tempered by an idealistic theory of knowledge; one is said to boast that he has not been to church for twenty years; one teaches that Christianity has been discredited in its fundamental doctrines; one is said by a student to have declared in the class-room that anyone today who preaches evangelical doctrine is preaching what he knows not to be true; one declared in a public address that what America most needs is an American philosophy, not Judaism nor Christianity, but something equally as good as either; and one claims to be an orthodox Christian while discarding every article of the Christian or theistic creed. A student of one of the teachers alluded to above remarked to the writer: "Professor X. has taken away my faith. I do not believe now that there is anything in the world but chance;" while a student of another declared that for him Christianity had served its day and passed away.

The lack of faith in any one philosophical teacher or the loss of faith by an individual student may be a matter of private concern, but if the thinking of our brightest young men and women, our future leaders of thought and action, is to be molded by teachers an-

tagonistic in their doctrines to Christianity (although personally of undoubted sincerity and high moral purpose), it becomes a matter of grave practical and national interest. If the teaching of philosophy in our colleges and universities is more than a harmless pastime, but is vitally related, as we believe it to be, to the life of the nation, the tendencies alluded to cannot persist and prevail throughout our leading institutions and throughout a series of years without bearing fruit in national character. What the harvest will be, if these tendencies remain unchecked, it will not be difficult, in the light of recent history, to predict.

LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, PENNSYLVANIA.

TERTULLIAN OF CARTHAGE

By E. G. SIHLER, Ph.D., of New York University

THE fiery, and in many ways incomparable, and in no wise easily definable, presbyter of Carthage was a close contemporary of Clement of Alexandria. The works of neither contain any recognition of supremacy of the episcopal see of Rome and its holder, though the desire and policy of that functionary to assume a centralizing and imperial power, resembling that of the secular emperors, are noticeable in a single passage of Tertullian referring to churches in Asia and Phrygia.¹

Like Clement, Tertullian flourished under Septimius Severus and Caracalla (193-217 A.D.). We must not, in this study, dwell on the last or Montanistic stage of Tertullian. The Montanists were a schism rather than a sect, more rigorously Christian in certain ways than the church itself, more insistent on the sternest standards of Biblical conduct, claiming also that the Paraclete was still coming and to come and that special endowments of grace (*charismata*)² were still to be vouchsafed within the church. It was, I say, a schism, aiming indeed to realize that communion of saints named in the creed; actually, however, the Montanists bore in themselves the germs of a trend toward a narrow and ever narrowing theocratic conventicle.

In a large way Tertullian impresses us as that leader who made of the *ecclesia militans* a joyous and vigorous reality, challenging the pagan world surging about and persecuting it, confronting also the Gnostic heresies dazzling or corroding within, and incidentally defending the canon of both Testaments; doing all this with a

¹*Adversus Praxean*, c. 1.

²*De Anima*, 9.

rapturous and glowing eloquence and energy which made him, in my estimation, a much more positive and incisive herald of the Christian faith than Clement of Alexandria, recently presented to the readers of *THE BIBLICAL REVIEW*. The entire personality of Tertullian and the superb positiveness of his Christian asseveration are in no wise tintured, hampered or diluted by that same *saecularis sapientia* as is ever the case with the Presbyter of Alexandria, who, while striving to harmonize Platonism and Christianity, still remained within the pale of the church, while the pleader and lawyer of Carthage in the end crossed the threshold of an organization which was fast assuming the aspect of a hierarchy, a spiritual autocracy.

A *rhetor* and *patronus* perhaps unto middle life, Tertullian had gained the familiarity with classic letters long established and prescribed for those professions. But the profound spiritual meaning of his Christian conversion, together with the analysis by him of the philosophical theosophy of Gnosticism, must needs have endowed his philosophical reading with a degree of keen interest far exceeding that of mere erudition or sciolism. This side of his culture is most widely revealed in his treatise, *On the Soul (De Anima)*, where he surveys in order the tenets of the chief schools, from Thales to Chrysippus. Even medical writers like Soranus or the great anatomists of Alexandria are cited.⁸ One cannot help perceiving, however, that the renewed interest in Platonism (then and for several centuries onward) gave to that speculation a certain quasi-dogmatic preëminence. But, unlike Clement, Tertullian is not impressed by it at all. In this same treatise, then, he goes on to sense perception, which he claims as genuine and real for the Saviour, rejecting the docetism

⁸*Ibid.*, c. 6.

of Marcion as well as the incidental critique of Gospel facts, a higher criticism which even then, before Strauss and Renan, had arisen: "But not even in the case of the Apostles did its nature deceive them: faithful were both their sight and hearing on the mountain [Matt. 17:3 ff], faithful also the taste of that wine, although it was water before [John 2:9], faithful also the touch of Thomas [John 20:28] who thenceforward was a believer. Read the witness-ship of John [1 John 1:1]: 'which we have seen, says he, which we have heard, have seen with our own eyes, which our own hands have handled, of the Word of Life.' "

Tertullian has, we see, taken his stand definitely with the Gospel of Galilee, and his soul is emancipated from the thralldom of the great names in Greek speculation.⁴ Paul's monition (Col. 2:8) has become a principle of his inner life. "The learning of God blundered, I ween, in taking its rise in Judaea rather than in Greece. Christ, too, made a mistake in sending out fishermen for preaching rather than learned rhetoricians" (*De Anima*, 3).

The Judgment, to his keen and straightforward mind, was an essential and indispensable function and act in the very conception of the Godhead: "There are those, who, although they do not deny God, do not think that He absolutely is the examiner and umpire and judge, in which matter at all events they scorn us most of all, who have hastened to that doctrine [the Christian] through fear of the judgment announced as to come" (*De Testimonio Animae*, 2). He, too, was once a pagan: "He, who, when that period of time is spent, is going to judge his worshipers so as to give them the requital of eternal life, the wicked to destine to fire equally eternal

⁴"Alii immortalem negant animum, alii plus quam immortalem affirmant, alii de substantia, alii de forma, alii de unaquaque dispositione disceptant; hi statum eius aliunde ducunt, hi exitum aliorum abducunt, prout aut Platonis honor aut Zenonis vigor aut Aristotelis tenor aut Epicuri stupor aut Heracliti maeror aut Empedoclis furor persuaserunt" (*De Anima*, 3).

and continual, resurrecting all who died from the beginning, and remolding them and reviewing them with a view to the judgment of both deserts. *These things we too once upon a time laughed at. We belonged to you. Christians are developed [fiunt]; they are not Christians by birth*" (*Apologeticus* 18). Long before the *Dies irae, dies illa* of medieval times began to ring out its majestic peal to the Christian consciousness, the glowing pen of Tertullian elaborated that theme in his own way and for his own world, the pagan world. Not before a Rhadamanthys was it to be when tragedians and other stage folk, where charioteers and athletes, were to appear on a stage new to them.

"Here, I say, is He, the son of a carpenter or of a loose woman,⁵ destroyer of the Sabbath, a Samaritan and possessed of the devil. Here is He, whom ye bought of Judas, beaten with the reed and fists, befouled with spittle, given gall and vinegar to drink. Here is He, whom even His disciples filched away on the sly so that He might be said to have arisen, or the gardener carried Him away, lest his beds of lettuce might suffer from the great number of visitors. That you may gaze upon such scenes, that you may rejoice in such things, who, a praetor or consul or quaestor or priest, will furnish you the opportunity from his own bounty? * * * But of what kind are those scenes which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor have they mounted into the heart of man? More pleasing, I ween, than the races and both theaters and all the stadium" (*De Spectaculis*, 30).

Was the pagan view and vision of their Christian fellow citizens more truthful and so, fairer, under

⁵*Quaestuariae*. Tertullian here scornfully alludes to the taunts currently made, especially by the Jews, against the maternity and paternity of the Saviour; cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, I, 28.

Septimius Severus and Caracalla than it had been under Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonines? The Christians simply could not, through their manifold dissent, live in conformity, and so in harmony, with the *nationes*, or *ethnici* (collectively), of the Empire. "Against these things then we are employed: Against the institutions of ancestors, against the prestige of established things, against the statutes of those who are our masters, against the argumentations of experts, against antiquity, custom, necessity, against precedents, *prodigia*, miracles" (*Ad Nationes*, II. 1).

The indirect condemnation of the current shows was resented by the pagan world. "There are those who think that the Christians, a class prepared for death, are educated toward this stubbornness by their abandonment of pleasures, that they more easily may despise life, having lopped off the bonds of connection therewith, lest they may yearn for that which they have now rendered superfluous for themselves" (*De Spectaculis*, 1). The term "brothers" current among the Christians was still given a sinister interpretation by the pagans.⁶ The domestics in Christian households were stirred up to make charges against the same.⁷ "If the Tiber floods the city, if the Nile fails to inundate the fields * * *, if there is an earthquake, if a famine, if a plague, at once the cry is: 'To the lions with the Christians!'"⁸ "You groan at the daily growing number of the Christians. You cry out that the community is hemmed in, that the Christians exist in the open country, in fortified places, in the islands. You are grieving, that every sex, every age, every rank in fine is coming over to us away from you" (*Ad Nationes*, I, 1).

⁶Infamant. *Apologeticus*, 39.

⁷Omnes a nullis magis prodimur (*Ad Nationes*, I, 7).

⁸*Apologeticus*, 40; *Ad Nationes*, I, 9.

Elsewhere⁹ the Presbyter recounts the current modes of execution applied to the Christians: Cross and pale, the lacerating of their flanks with metal instruments, beheading, wild beasts, burning at the stake, while minor penalties were work in the mines or relegation to islands. One of the stated questions put by the proconsul then to the Christian martyrs in the brief trial preceding their condemnation seems to have been this:¹⁰ "What master do you confess?" When, it would seem, the answer, "Christ," instead of the reigning emperor, was at once rated as an admission of treason or disloyalty. The confession of the Name was made to suffice, as a rule of procedure. The charges associated with the Name, infanticide, incestuous debauchery in nocturnal meetings, were not really investigated nor proven; the mere tenacious tradition of popular obloquy and hatred, maintained, perhaps from Nero's time onward, certainly from that of the Roman senators, pleaders, authors, and literary friends, Tacitus and the younger Pliny on,¹¹ and summed up in Pliny's phrase "*flagitia cohaerentia nomini*," was still in force. Tertullian, indeed,¹² with the text of Pliny's report to Trajan before him, sharply censures the precedent set by that Emperor, which entirely dispensed with any genuine ascertainment of facts, a negative, nay, a very cruel measure, the crimes being simply implied with the Name.

Why this coherence? Why, Tertullian asks, why this hatred of the Founder of the Christian religion, while the public is indifferent as to the founders of the Platonic, the Epicurean or Pythagorean schools,

⁹ *Apologeticus*, 12.

¹⁰ *Quem dominum confiteretur interroganti praesidi (De Jeuniis, c. 12).* Cf. also our Lord's own prediction (Matt. 24: 9): "And you will be hated by all the nations on account of my name."

¹¹ Cf. Tertullian (*Apologeticus*, 7):

¹² *Ibid.*, 2.

indifferent as to the medical authority of Erasistratus or the scholarly of Aristarchus? In the following citation of the current depreciation of Christ Himself, Tertullian may have had Celsus in mind: "They will say * * * a man of common condition, a sorcerer, filched after death from the tomb by his disciples" (*Apologeticus*, 23). But "We say it, and we say it openly, and torn and bloodstained from your torture we cry out aloud: It is God whom we worship through Christ. Deem Him a mere man [if you will], it is through Him and in Him that God wishes to be known and worshiped." The pagans, in every province, considered the Christians as chiefly *stubborn*, because a slight ritual act of occasional or periodic conformity with official usage appeared to the pagan citizens a mere passing trifle, as it was indeed for themselves, without the slightest spiritual significance, but the holding aloof of the Christian citizens was indeed what Tertullian calls it, *obstinatio fidei*.¹³

At this time the worship of deceased emperors, emperor cult, had come to depress the cult of ancient and local gods into a decidedly inferior grade, both of estimation and observance, and this universal civic religion was the one palpable and obligatory form. For the *genius* of living emperors it was kept on the birthday or anniversary of accession. Thus, then, the pagan provincials called on their Christian fellow subjects to "sacrifice for the welfare of the Emperor,"¹⁴ and, to use Tertullian's expression, "there lies upon you the necessity of constraining us, as much as there lies on us the obligation of facing the crisis." And he further asserts quite definitely that now the Emperor was honored much more than the gods of tradition, which were at bottom creatures of the state and must in

¹³*Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 28.

the nature of things be feeblcr than the body which created them.

Thus runs the dialectic of the former pleader, in whom keen logic is often found blended with brilliant rhetoric and dazzling epigram. The Christians, he claims, are more truly loyal, because they invoke not state-created somethings but "the eternal God, the true God, the living God, whose grace even emperors prefer to that of the others. * * * We are always praying for all emperors, a long life for them, a secure government, a safe dynasty, brave armies, a faithful senate, a quiet world, * * * who offer up for him a rich and a greater sacrifice than he himself commanded, viz., a prayer issuing from a chaste heart, from a soul free from guile, from a spirit of holiness, not grains of incense worth an *as*, the exudations of a tree in Araby, nor two drops of wine, nor the blood of a rejected ox which chooses to die. * * * Thus then let [metal] claws dig into us as we are spread out to God, let crosses suspend us, fires lick us, swords cut our throats, beasts leap on us" (*Apologeticus*, 30). He defies the provincial governors¹⁵ to institute persecutions of Christians in order to gratify the populace and so to enhance their own popularity. "We are rendered more numerous as often as your sickle harvests our lives; *the blood of the Christians is the seed grain* [of a new crop]." ¹⁶

In a memorial of his later life addressed to the proconsul Scapula, he demands freedom of worship as a fundamental right: "One's religion is neither a hindrance nor an advantage to another," and he refers to the Christians of that province as follows: "Since so great a multitude of men, almost a majority in each town, we

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁶This, for the general reader, has proved to be the most familiar, if not the most famous, utterance of Tertullian: "Semen est sanguis Christianorum" (*Ibid.*, 50).

live in silence and self-control, perhaps better known as individuals than collectively, and not readily identified from any other source than from the reform of former delinquencies." "Pilgrims and strangers"—all souls with any spiritual aspirations are so or become so in this poor and evanescent world of sense and seeming, not the Christian soul alone, but in the world of that time the sincere Christians were very much more than now a people apart.

Most of the Roman games were originally established in connection with the service of some Roman or imported god (as the *Megalenses* for the Phrygian Great Mother), and in celebration were often introduced by acts of elaborate religious ritual, and from the Tiber these things spread to the provinces. As to the origin of pagan mythology and worship, Tertullian seems to have been greatly taken with the theory of Euhemerus,¹⁷ that historical personages after their death were so canonized; idolatry to his vision was a sort of ancestor worship, *parentatio*.¹⁸ As for the theaters: "We keep aloof from the theater, which is the private meeting place of unchastity, where nothing is approved except that which is not approved elsewhere. Thus its chief attraction is mostly gotten up by filth, which an Atellan pantomime, which even an actor of burlesque represents through female roles, destroying the sex of chastity, so that they may blush more easily at home than on the stage. * * * Nor is there any place for Christians in the amphitheater, where gladiators slay each other for the entertainment of the public, and where blood-curdling scenes are enacted when wild beasts rend their victims" (*De Spectaculis*, 19). There were even then moral latitudinarians, who claimed that such spectacles

¹⁷Cum ipsos deos nationum homines retro fuisse etiam apud suos constet (*De Idololatria*, 15).

¹⁸*De Spectaculis*, 12.

were not specifically forbidden in the Scriptures; the sun, nay, God Himself, beheld impurity without being stained thereby.¹⁹ "But how can the human defendant compare himself with the divine Judge?"

As for God, setting aside philosophical systems of creation or cosmology, whether of the Platonic or the Epicurean type, Tertullian held that God certainly must be conceived as being without beginning and end and thus distinct from all matter.²⁰ And immutable the Godhead must be and not liable to corruption, decline or decay, blissful and not liable to any suffering, nor to be identified with sun, moon or stars. "Or when they use gold, bronze, silver, ivory, wood, * * * for the fashioning of idols, who placed these materials in the world but God, the Creator of the world? Man himself, the doer of all shameful deeds, is not only a work of God, but an image; and still, in body and spirit he has revolted from [*descivit*] his Creator. For we have not gotten our eyes for carnal desires, nor our tongue for evil report, nor our ears to be receptacles of evil report, nor our palate for the charges of the palate, * * * our hands for deeds of violence, our gait for a roving life. Or is the spirit immanent in the body that it may become the means of devising plots and deceptions and acts of unfairness? I ween not."

And he goes on to accept the Biblical record and doctrine of the Fall without subterfuge, palliation or compromise.²¹ In our late generation, when the name of Christian, somewhat loosely and laxly, is held by unnumbered myriads indeed, but often without any moral or spiritual integrity in the holding thereof, while, on the other hand, the positive dignity of the term Christian has an axiomatic ring the world over, it is indeed

¹⁹*Ibid.*, §20.

²⁰*Ad Nationes*, II, §3.

²¹*De Spectaculis*, §2.

supremely difficult for us to realize within ourselves the tremendous earnestness and the consuming loyalty of the men and women in Tertullian's time who wore that name, Christian, surrounded and hated as they were, for that name's sake, by an unchristian world. There are Christians today, I believe, both in pulpit and pew, who have so far conformed to the materialism of this generation and its ancillary pseudophilosophy, as to banish eschatology, the doctrine of His consummation, from the slender total of their diluted creed, a creed secularized and reducing the transcendental yearnings of the soul to a set of rules for social betterment. It was not so with the Christians of the reigns of Septimius Severus and of Caracalla, from Mesopotamia to the pillars of Hercules, when the Judgment to come was a beacon to live by and a mighty consolation for dying. (Cf. Matt. 16: 25-27.)

As for the person of Christ,²² Christianity, while a comparatively modern religion, might, he says, be taken as deriving some advantage in *status* from its relationship to Judaism, a *religio licita*. But apart from many differences in ritual and holidays and food and circumcision, there is, above all, a different name, derived from Him whom the Jews hold a mere man, and they deem the Christians worshipers of a mere human being. "But we neither blush as to Christ, since it is our gratification to be rated under His name, and under it to be found guilty. * * * We must therefore make a few statements about Christ as a divine being."

Tertullian then goes on to review the history of Israel, its earlier spiritual privileges and eminence, the catastrophe (under Vespasian and Titus) and the latter condition of that race, roaming over the face of the earth, but banished from its own and ancient land.

²² *Apologeticus*, 21.

But the Christian confession drew far away from the narrow ethnic cohesion of Israel, striving as it did for universality, appealing to every race, state, and people, to the whole world, in fact. The dispenser and teacher of this doctrine of world-wide grace was He who was announced Son of God.

Next, Tertullian takes up Christ as the Logos, glancing also at the Stoic conception of that term. Now as to Christ, through whom God made all things (as in St. John's Gospel), He issued from God, begotten through issuing from the essence of God, "and therefore called Son of God, and God, from the unity of substance,"²³ as the ray issues from the sun, a part from the whole, but the sun will be in the beam because it is a sunbeam; nor is the substance (or essence) detached, but extended. So it is Spirit from Spirit²³ and God from God, as light kindled from light, * * * and what has issued from God is God and Son of God, and both are one." He then proceeds to the virgin birth and incarnation, where God and man were blended. (*Nascitur homo deus mistus.*) The first advent, it is true, was in humility. But even then His other nature was abundantly revealed, in that He drove out unclean spirits, gave sight to the blind, cleansed lepers, re-endowed paralytics with control of their limbs, restored the dead to life by a word, made the very elements His servants, curbing storms and walking on the waters, showing that He was the Logos of God, the Word of the beginning. The entire Gospel story is tersely presented, apart from one antiquarian slip when he calls Pilate procurator of Syria. Then the crucifixion, armed guard at tomb, resurrection, the forty days, ascension, disciples spread over the world, persecution of Nero.²⁴

²³As later expressed in the Nicene Creed.

²⁴*Ad Nationes*, I, 7.

It is this faith (in the resurrection) which furnishes firmness in the persecution of latter years; it is that hope which disdains death.²⁵ "Laugh ye, therefore, as much as ye please at the supremely stupid minds which die in order that they may live. * * * Is not this prospect of absolute identity even in bodily resurrection more equitable than the metempsychosis of the Pythagorean school? And with you pagans it is not merely myth-tellers and poets who speak of a judgment to come out of retribution, but philosophers also."²⁶

Now all these treatises so far presented are comparatively brief. The most bulky of his extant works is his polemic against Marcion, the eminent Gnostic. The specious and insidious "higher knowledge" had now reached the western part of the Empire, spreading in the valley of the Rhone (as we see from Irenaeus), no less than on the shores of western North Africa. While our author then, in 207 A.D., seems to have passed into his latter stage of Montanism, his work is still, of that time, the most notable defense of Biblical faith and its records against the speculative theosophy of the Gnostic cult. Marcion of Pontus began his work under Antoninus Pius, about 144 A.D.²⁷ Clearly the work of Marcion still had a great vogue. It cannot be our design here to coördinate the dogmas of Marcion from the pages of Tertullian, a task often accomplished both before and after Neander, not to speak of Irenaeus and Hippolytus.

It is the two Gods of Marcion, which challenge both the dialectic of Tertullian not less than his deep and consistent loyalty to Scripture as the records of revelation. For Marcion, the Creator is not *good* in the high-

²⁵*Ibid.*, I, 19.

²⁶Plato, Republic, book 10; *Gorgias*, 523 ff.

²⁷Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, I, 25; Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem*, I, 19.

est sense; He is indeed the God of the Jews but not of the Gnostics; it is not He whom Christ revealed. Evil was due to matter. There is, corresponding to our visible world, an invisible one (Plato's world of ideas), under the exclusive control of the non-Jewish higher God, who was revealed in Christ in the 15th year of Tiberius (29 A.D.), a Christ, however, Tertullian claims, whose annals began only with Marcion, his prophet, under Antoninus Pius. Marcion's introductory work, his *Antitheses*, had this design, to point out that Law and Gospel were irreconcilable, and consequently their respective authors or originators were likewise different and distinct; no prophecy therefore of our Christ. Marcion strove to buttress his thesis by citing the differences between Paul and Peter (Gal. 2: 11), which, however, as Tertullian properly insists, bore only on ceremonial, food, ritual of Judaism, not on any essentials of Christian faith; there was for them all and in all their preaching but one Gospel (Gal. 1: 7; 2: 4).

Tertullian urges also, as a practical argument, the consistent and harmonious tradition of faith and doctrine, from the apostolic founders of the concrete churches onward, transmitted and maintained down to Tertullian's time; every one of those churches "confessed Christ in the Creator."²⁸ Marcion's God in fact is Plato's idea of the Good, and Marcion utterly rejected the doctrine of the Fall and of the origin of sin; unthinkable, he claimed, that on account of so trifling a delinquency as that in Paradise, sin should permanently and essentially have vitiated man's nature. Marcion also denied the resurrection of the body, and taught docetism, viz., that Christ during His sojourn in Palestine had but a phantasmal body. Marcion also

²⁸Nullam autem apostolici census ecclesiam invenias, quae non in creatore christianizet (*Adversus Marcionem*, I, 21).

censured in the Jewish Creator anger and other emotions (the Stoic postulate of ἀπάθεια).

But what a god is that one, says Tertullian, who does not punish sin, who does not concern himself with good and evil, a do-nothing and care-nothing deity, who judges not, who is defied and disobeyed with impunity? The fear and awe of the Eternal Judge was indeed one of the strongest forces in Tertullian's soul, through which he separated himself from the world and its specious pleasures.²⁹ But much more severe was the test of persecution and the occasion thereof, the emergency when the box with incense was presented to the suspected ones (*acerram offerre*), when all those who took even a mere grain from it and threw it upon the altar kindled before an image of the Emperor thus confessed themselves non-Christian and by so slight an act (as the pagans rated it) gained their lives.³⁰ "Nay, nay," you (the Marcionites) say, "we would not deny Christ thus." You yourselves then *fear* this sin, and in so doing you certainly fear Him who forbids sin.

Further on Tertullian argues that God did not make perpetual sinlessness compulsory for Adam, and it was no denial of God's goodness that this was so.³¹ "God alone is good in His essential being" (*Bonus natura deus solus*. II, 6). As for man, "neither the reward for good nor evil could be justly allotted to him who had been proven either good or evil by necessity, not by volition." God had created man "not for living merely, but for right living" (II, 8). Tertullian bases his theology here on Genesis 2:7, *living* being a divine gift, *right living* a divine injunction. "Freedom of decision [*libertas arbitrii*, the αὐτεξούσιον of Clement of

²⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 27.

³⁰ Cf. Pliny, Epp. 10, 96: "Cum praeunte me deos appellarent et *imagini tuae* quam propter hoc iusseram cum simulacris numinum adferri, *tunc* ac vino supplicarent."

³¹ *Adversus Marcionem*, II, 5.

Alexandria] must [not] throw its own fall upon him by whom it was not administered as it ought to have been" (II, 9). Whatever our spiritual or academic pride may find to like or dislike in this tremendous domain of Creator, creature, sin, evil, responsibility, life, and death, we will grant to Tertullian and to Pascal,³² that the creature, now and actually, is essentially and abysmally inferior to Him in whom is neither sin nor limitation of time or power, or measure of goodness.

As for evil, the Marcionites did not hesitate to make the *demiurge*, or God of the Jews, directly responsible for it,³³ not merely for the evils of transgression and punishment. We see then that the Marcionites, like many critics of our own times, confronted Scripture and Scriptural doctrine with conceptions and postulates which were intrinsically philosophical and speculative, but certainly also extrascriptural, a form of higher criticism which always has overawed, and probably always will overawe, those who have none or but a secular anchor in their own souls. Tertullian here greatly differs from Clement of Alexandria, whose striving to blend or buttress Christianity with Platonism and certain elements of Stoicism is so pronounced, especially in his *Stromateis*, as we saw in a former study. Tertullian, in fact, as a Christian believer, had cleanly emancipated himself from the authority of the various philosophical schools, and with keen perception he measured their influence upon the various Gnostic sects, which had been and were still greatly disturbing the Christian church through their partial or simulated adherence to some of her doctrines, "because they destroy the faith of some."³⁴ I subjoin

³²Who, in his *Pensées*, touched upon this matter in his own lucid and forceful manner.

³³*Adversus Marcionem*, II, 14.

³⁴*Quia fidem quorundam subvertunt (De Praescriptione Haereticorum, 1).*

a passage which in force and sweeping comprehensiveness is not equalled by anything preserved of his pen:

“These are the doctrines of human beings and of live spirits which were born for itching ears [2 Tim. 4: 3] from the spirit of secular wisdom, which the Lord calling foolishness has chosen the foolish things [1 Cor. 1: 27] of the world toward the confusion even of philosophy itself. For that is the theme of secular wisdom; it is a rash interpreter of the nature and disposition of God. The heresies themselves are equipped by philosophy. Hence the ‘eons’ and ‘forms,’³⁵ what d’you call ‘em, and the three types of man in Valentinus; he had been a Platonist. Hence Marcion’s God, better on account of his calmness³⁶; he had come from the Stoics. And that the soul is said to perish is held by the Epicureans, and the restoration of the body is denied by the united voice of the teaching of all the philosophers; and where matter is equalized with God, that is the teaching of Zeno, and when something is propounded of a fiery God, Heraclitus pops up. The same themes are handled with the heretics and the philosophers; the same repeated treatments are involved: Whence evil, and why? and what latterly Valentinus set forth: Whence God? [Answer:] ‘From reflection and untimely birth.’ Poor Aristotle! who established dialectic for them, that craft resembling the chameleon, to build up or to pull down; in statements, forced; in computations, harsh; in arguments, the worker of contentions; troublesome even to itself; treating everything all over again, that it may never accomplish the treatment of anything at all.”

After citing 1 Timothy 1: 4; Titus 3: 9; and Colossians 2: 8, Tertullian goes on to say: “He [Paul] had

³⁵The “ideas” of Plato.

³⁶The *ἀπάθεια* of the Stoic system.

been at Athens, and he knew through personal contact [*congressibus*] that human wisdom which affects truth and spoils it too, a wisdom which itself also was much divided into its own schools, through the variety of sects which fought one another. * * * Let them see to it, who have produced a Stoic and Platonic and dialectic Christianity" (*De Praescriptione Haereticorum*, 7). (The Gnostics, I believe, are meant; or Clement?)

Of course, Marcion, in his new Christian insight, found himself at variance not only with apostolic tradition but with almost every portion of the New Testament. Here I may cite Neander, of whom otherwise the present study has maintained complete independence: "But here also he [Marcion] presents to us a warning example, showing how such investigations, when guided and controlled by preconceived dogmatic opinions³⁷ in which the understanding has entangled itself, must necessarily lead to disastrous results—showing how easily an arbitrary hypercriticism may slide into the opposite extreme in opposing a careless facility of belief, and how readily, in combating one class of doctrinal prejudices one may fall into others differing only in kind."³⁸

At this time the cleavage of Apostolic and Gnostic churches seemed to be quite palpable and fairly familiar to all Christians; one could institute a survey (*recensus*) of Apostolic and heretical churches.³⁹ There were then, everywhere, accessible records, as to how old they were, who founded them, who had presided over them in order from the beginning. Besides churches of their

³⁷Neander probably had in mind F. C. Baur and the Tuebingen School.

³⁸Aug. Neander, *General History of the Christian Church*, transl. by Joseph Torrey, Boston, 1853, vol. I, p. 460.

³⁹Facillime hoc probatur apostolicarum et haereticarum ecclesiarum recensu (*Adversus Marcionem*, III, 1.)

own, the Gnostics had specific regulations, *e.g.*, as to baptism, probably each of the sects of cults something apart. Marcion himself, *e.g.*, seems to have admitted no one to baptism but virgins or unmarried men or widows or those who previously had divorced their spouse, and definitely discontinued the connubial relation of life.⁴⁰

As the Christology of the Apostolic Church (*e.g.*, the suffering of our Lord, the atonement, etc.) was in the main offensive to the Pontic thinker, it is fairly obvious, that the Gospels of the Apostolic church were likewise offensive to him. As a matter of fact, he had composed or constructed a gospel, or gospel-narrative, of his own.⁴¹ These early assaults upon the authenticity and veracity of our Gospels we might well examine with some care. Marcion operated thus: He inserted statements of fact due to his own devising.⁴² This "gospel," as we saw, he buttressed by his controversial monograph, his *Antitheses*, to prove that Law and Gospel were incompatible. Tertullian, in surveying the Gospels of the general church distinguished between Matthew and John on the one side⁴³ as being directly apostolic and presenting Christ as the corollary (*supplementum*) of Law and Prophets, whereas those of Mark and Luke were supported by the authority of their apostolic teachers and principals, Peter and Paul.⁴⁴ These were four definite names. But Marcion's gospel bore at its head no definite name but his own. On the other hand, Paul at Jerusalem (Gal. 2:2), by actual conference with the witnessing apostles, sought to secure certainty as to the harmony of his own Gospel with theirs.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ *Adversus Marcionem*, I, 29).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, III, 17.

⁴² *Interpolando*, IV, 1; *Adulteratam* IV, 2.

⁴³ *Adversus Marcionem*, IV, 2.

⁴⁴ Cf. Eusebius, II, 15; V, 8.

⁴⁵ *Adversus Marcionem*, IV, 2.

Now Marcion, herein a precursor of the Tuebingen school and other higher critics, grounded his Gospel-critique on Paul's rebuke of Peter (Gal. 2:11) at Antioch, claiming therefrom that the Gospels according to Matthew, Mark, and John were not authentic or reliable. He therefore proceeded to utilize the Paulinian Luke alone, rejecting, however, many parts of that writer also; Marcion "seems to have chosen Luke to slash him" (*Lucam videtur Marcion elegisse, quem caederet*. IV, 2); Judaizers, to incorporate Law and Prophets, had interpolated Luke.⁴⁶ As such no doubt Marcion considered, *e.g.*, the narrative of the discourse on the way to Emmaus. Marcion, then, was the first critic—Christian self-claimed, in the period from Tiberius to Antoninus Pius, who outrightly called in question the records of the Christian church, having, as Tertullian says with characteristic irony, "been so long looked forward to by Christ, who now felt remorse at having been in a hurry to send out the apostles without the assistance of Marcion" (IV, 4).

Tertullian then goes on to a line of argumentation, which has greatly impressed the present writer, much of whose life has been spent in the pursuits of historical criticism and in the weighing of sources and tradition in the domain of ancient history. Tertullian says: "If it is a well established fact, that that is more true [*verius*] which is earlier, and that is earlier which also was from the beginning, and that this is from the beginning which is from the apostles, that which with the churches of the apostles was sacrosanct" (*sacrosanctum*, IV, 5). This, then, was something resembling that ancient and solemnly asserted privilege of inviolable immunity guaranteed both by the state and by the curses of religious awe, the strongest and most sweeping

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, IV, 4.

term I believe, which the former *patronus* and *rhetor* could find within the compass of Latin utterance,⁴⁷ something or somebody hallowed (as the *Tribunus Plebis*, *e.g.*), an injury to whom caused the misdemeanant to forfeit his life. And Tertullian says elsewhere: "Traverse the Apostolic churches, in which up to the present time [*adhuc*] the chairs of the apostles [*i.e.*, the physical utensils] are used for the purposes of presiding [*praesidentur*] in which [churches] the very authentic letters of the same are read out [in service, I think] causing to resound the voice, and representing the face of each of them" (*De Praescriptione Haereticorum*).

This, then, is the gist of Tertullian's claim: The churches established by the apostles received the Gospels in the lifetime of the apostles. The churches were infinitely scrupulous, nay jealous, to admit neither person nor document, unless absolutely certified as to their mandate or authenticity. These matters could be traced backward by what Tertullian calls the *census* (*i.e.*, the official records and documents) of the churches. Now then, I say, would it not have been impossible to introduce and permanently establish a document forged under the name of an apostle in the latter's lifetime and service, without the consequence of prompt discovery and rejection? And, further, would it not have been even more impossible and wholly vain to attempt introducing a forged epistle or gospel to churches and disciples after the death of the author? Marcion, *e.g.*, rejected the Apocalypse; still all the "supervisors" (or bishops) installed by St. John and those succeeding the first ones accepted that book of the New Testament.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Holmes' version (Antenice Library, 1868), "kept as a sacred deposit," is inadequate. Westcott's (On the Canon, p. 384) "inviolable" is closer; *cf.* Festus, s.v. "*Sacrosanctum* dicitur, quod iure iurando interposito est institutum, si quis id violasset, ut morte poenas penderet. Cuius generis sunt tribuni plebis aedilesque eiusdem ordinis."

⁴⁸*Adversus Marcionem*, IV, 5.

It is then an assumption of boldest assurance, a conjecture beyond the wildest fancy, to assert that the churches, viz., the seven churches in the Roman province of "Asia," particularly the church in the provincial capital, Ephesus, a church doubly dear and familiar to John the reputed author, and further especially that of Smyrna⁴⁹—unthinkable, we claim with Tertullian, that these churches (*Joannis alumnas ecclesias*) one and all, should have been imposed upon, either during the lifetime of that long-lived disciple and apostle, or after his death.

The succession of bishops, as recorded in Clement's or Tertullian's time, was in no wise more definite, ascertainable, and truly transmitted from the beginning, than was the genuineness of the documents which confirmed and guaranteed the original missionary labors and the acts of ordaining the supervisors or "bishops." For Luke, therefore, Tertullian claims a condition of integrity, a character of not having been tampered with, from Paul's time to his own day. Matthew, Mark, and John obviously were certified by the same voucher.

We must be content with but a small number of the exegetical and critical sallies of Marcion; in the end I trust we will be brought to hold in even greater reverence perhaps than ever before that Testament which like its core and kernel, the Cross, "towers above the wrecks of time," or above the restless and ever resurgent tides of erudite and ambitious speculation. Marcion's Christ was not born of the Virgin Mary at Bethlehem, but in a sudden epiphany turned up at Capernaum in the 15th year of Tiberius; so Marcion would seem to have eliminated everything in Luke which preceded.

⁴⁹Polycarpus, Johannis apostoli discipulus et ab eo Smyrnae episcopus ordinatus, totius Asiae episcopus princeps fuit, quippe qui nonnullos Apostolorum et eorum qui Dominum viderant, magistros habuerit et viderit (Jerome, *De Viris Illustribus*).

When our Lord spoke of mother and brethren (Luke 8:21), he thereby, according to Marcion, avowed a denial of his own nativity not merely of Mary, but he denied any birth at all.

We marvel at the leadership of one, who operated with such almost childish crudeness and violence of exegetical procedure. In our authentic Luke (10: 25) the question put to Christ by an expert in the Law (νομικός) is this: "Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" (ζωὴν αἰώνιον) Marcion struck out the adjective eternal. Why? The Jewish scholar, according to Marcion's pet doctrine, merely meant long physical life, which alone the demiurge, the Creator-God of the Jews, could bestow. Again, when (Luke 11:1) one of the disciples asked our Lord to teach them how to pray, "as John also taught his disciples," Marcion expounded this as follows: The God of Christ was different from that of John, and the disciples of each recognized different Gods.⁵⁰ The title of Ephesians Marcion changed to Laodiceans. In Romans he removed "what he wanted." In a word, Marcion's higher criticism was dominated by his one fundamental design, to present Christ as an enemy to the Law and as having no relation whatever to the Prophecy of the Old Testament.

But we must conclude this matter as well as the present study with a critical *tour de force* of the speculative reformer of the Gospel, in Ephesians 3: 9: "And to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery which from the beginning of the world *hath been hid in God who created all things.*" (τοῦ μυστηρίου τοῦ ἀποκεκρυμμένου ἀπὸ αἰώνων ἐν τῷ θεῷ τῶ πάντα κτίσαντι). Marcion simply struck out the preposition *in* so as to secure this sense: "The mystery," etc., "which from

⁵⁰ *Adversus Marcionem*, IV, 26.

the beginning of the world had been hid *to* [we say *from*] the God who created all things." Clearly Marcion's criticism and exegesis were simply subservient and ancillary to his own speculative and metaphysical prepossessions. The *demiurge* of Plato's *Timaeus* (identified with the Creator of Genesis) must needs be distinct from and inferior to Plato's (and Marcion's) *Good God*, unconcerned with matter, the sovereign in that non-material and pre-material world, of which the beneficent "forms" or "ideas" were the emanations.

NEW YORK.

LITERARY REVIEWS

CURRENT AFFAIRS

THE YEAR BOOK OF THE CHURCHES, FOR 1919, HAS SOME figures which are encouraging, so far as statistics can be taken as a measure of the church's strength. One of the interesting statements is that women constitute about 56 per cent. of the church membership in America, although the proportion varies among the different denominations. Here is a summary showing the growth during a decade of both churches and Sunday Schools:

"The thirty bodies constituting the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America now show a total membership of 18,620,136 with 14,345,298 scholars in their Sunday Schools. The total value of their church property is \$1,040,236,194. A further study of the growth of the eight leading bodies of the Federal Council shows that while the general rate of increase for all American religious bodies for the decade was good, these denominations made the following increases: The Methodist Episcopal church, with a membership of 3,718,396, reports an increase of 25 per cent.; the Methodist Episcopal church, South, with an added 28 per cent. now numbers its communicants at 2,108,061. The Presbyterian church in the United States of America enrolls 1,613,056 members, a growth of almost 37 per cent. The Congregational church with 90,000 new members, or 13 per cent. increase, has 790,163 communicants; and the Protestant Episcopal church, having added 24 per cent. to its membership, has now 1,098,173. The Baptist church organizations reporting to the Northern Convention of that body show 1,227,448 members, an increase during the ten years of 16 per cent.; and the colored Baptist membership of 3,018,341 shows an increase of almost 33 per cent. The Disciples of Christ, whose communion now numbers 1,231,404, reports 24 per cent. of growth.

"In the Sunday School reports, with a total of 19,951,675 children enrolled [including those of bodies not affiliated with the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America], and almost two million teachers and officers, there is a rise over the figures of the ten years previous of five and a quarter million. In the Baptist churches of the Northern Convention 1,024,125 children and 112,250 teachers are now enrolled; 1,656,324 children with 159,733 teachers and officers are reported by the Baptist

churches of the Southern Convention; and the colored Baptists register 1,204,328 children and 125,474 teachers. The Presbyterian U. S. A. Sunday Schools with 145,196 teachers and 1,387,938 scholars show a high percentage of new recruits, being 32 per cent. above the figures for the previous decade. The Congregational churches have Sunday Schools totaling 654,102 members and 81,690 teachers and officers, in contrast to the 638,089 pupils of the earlier census. * * *

The ratio which the Sunday School scholars, outside the numbers of teachers and officers (who may be supposed to be included in the church membership), bears to the numbers of church members, is of interest.

"In the Disciples of Christ, the percentage is 77, or in other words for every 100 church members there are 77 children in the Sunday School. In the Congregational church it is 82 per cent.; the Roman Catholic church, 12 per cent.; the Protestant Episcopal church, 45 per cent.; the Methodist Episcopal church, 105 per cent.; the Methodist Episcopal church, South, 80 per cent.; the Presbyterian church, 86 per cent.; the Baptist church of the Northern convention, 84 per cent.; of the Southern convention, 61 per cent.; and that of the Colored Baptist church is 40 per cent."

THE ABIDING IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IS EVIDENCED BY the large share it has in the discussions of the causes of the war and of the present and future needs of the world. The church is of course the subject of no small debate, and statements to its credit and discredit fill the public prints. An unusual amount of discussion has been called forth by an article in *The Atlantic Monthly* for January, written by Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick and reflecting his observations made during the six months he spent on the western front. Looking through the eyes of the soldiers, Mr. Fosdick finds glaring faults in the church, which seriously menace its present and future influence upon these young men, who "have learned to face real facts and to fight hard battles. When they come home, they will turn a half-conscious but scathing scrutiny upon the church and all her ways."

He points out as their chief objections to the church "the selfishness of our appeal, the pettiness of our sectarian emphasis, the negativeness of our ethic, the undemocratic quality of our fellowship." We quote as a characteristic passage a number of

sentences from the section devoted to "the negativeness of the churches' ethic:"

"These soldiers see ahead of them a generation facing prodigious problems, on whose successful solution the weal of humanity depends. They see arising questions of international organization and of social justice, which, unanswered, will make defeat out of the most splendid victory that they can win. They see the need of great character directed to great ends. They do not want to die in vain. They want a fairer, more fraternal world to show for their travail. But only vaguely, if at all, do they associate the churches with that deep desire or rely on them to help much in achieving it. The churches which they have known have impressed multitudes of them as having no ethical enthusiasm for anything except negative ideals of individual behavior. And one returns from France vehemently feeling that, in the midst of so great a generation, to be a small man or a small church obsessed by piddling prohibitions is disgrace."

Naturally, Mr. Fosdick has found both enthusiastic supporters and vigorous critics. Many in the church feel that he has said what should be said to goad the church into an awakening to her shortcomings, duties, and present opportunities. Others, including some of our most aggressive ministers, object to this indictment because they believe that in recent years the church has been increasingly alive to these very faults and is doing much to overcome them.

Among those dissenting from Mr. Fosdick's views is Dean Charles A. Brown, of the Yale School of Religion, whose wide experience covers the pastorate, membership for years of the Central Labor Council in a large city, active work in city organized charity, home missionary work in lumber camps and mining towns, and membership in a university faculty. In an article in *The Congregationalist*, Dr. Brown says concerning the church as the source of responsive workers for all sorts of positive and socially uplifting effort:

"The Social Settlement if called upon for candidates to swelter on the Congo or to shiver in Alaska and Labrador, to face and relieve the dirt, the squalor, the disease, and the vice of the crowded sections of the Orient, or to brave the attacks of the Boxers or the horrors of Armenian massacres, would be swift to say, 'It is not in me.' And the Labor Union would speedily add, 'It is not in me.' This army of the choicest young people we know, enlisting for a warfare in which there is no discharge, going out to minister to people whose faces they have never seen,

whose names they do not know, whose languages they cannot as yet speak, but whose needs they have made their own in warmest sympathy, comes forth steadily from these churches which have, according to the essayists, become so feeble as to have 'no ethical enthusiasm for anything except negative ideals of individual behavior.' * * *

"Since this country entered the War I have spoken in nearly a score of the great cantonments in thirteen States reaching all the way from Camp Devens, Mass., to Camp Fremont, Cal. I have spoken in hundreds of meetings of civilians on behalf of the various activities connected with the winning of the War. In connection with this service I have been told in more communities than I can count up that no set of men have given themselves more promptly or generously to these lines of effort than the pastors of the churches. I have been told also that in the work of the Red Cross and kindred agencies the percentage of women from the churches has far exceeded the percentage from any other organization or from the great 'unchurched mass which is so eager to embrace real Christianity.' Many other agencies have done nobly, but the highest praise seems to be given to the steady, generous, patriotic devotion of those who have learned in their places of worship to follow him who came not to be ministered unto but to minister. * * *

"Have not we had about enough of this wholesale abuse of organized religion? It gives great satisfaction in certain quarters, but they are not the quarters to which the poor world looks for its spiritual help."

The Minneapolis Tribune recently published an article in the course of which the matter of attacking the church was treated in this terse way:

"It is a singular but conspicuous fact that whenever anything breaks down in our social system the Church is charged with dereliction; on the other hand, whenever things move along normally and all our various agencies efficiently function, there is little said for the institution that constitutes a large part of the source of inspiration and power.

"We do believe that now and again there have been marked evidences of narrowness and bigotry in the administration of religious institutions. Again, we submit that all too frequently the whole accent has been placed upon future bliss rather than present world-betterment; but our age had witnessed revolutionary changes, not only in the Church's teaching but in the Church's method. There may not be many martyrs in our day, but there are certainly Christian heroes to be found in every town and city ready to spend and be spent, not only that their

fellows may have a closer realization of a future heaven, but a more perfect realization of a better world in which we now live. * * *

"The clergy are not by any means free from faults, but it is our observation that the vast majority of them are, with great limitations of both means and money, prosecuting a work that calls for harder service, greater tact, finer diplomacy, and truer consecration than that called for by any other occupation with which we are familiar."

THE URGENCY OF THE TIMES IS HAVING A TENDENCY TO DRAW the churches together in practical and effective co-operation, whatever the future may have for organic unity. This tendency is very marked in the field of missions, both home and foreign, where the demand for efficient methods is more and more outweighing denominational preferences and ambitions. The most recent evidence of this is found in the newly launched Interchurch World Movement of North America. At the call of the Foreign Board of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, one hundred and thirty-five representatives of the home and foreign mission boards of the United States met in New York on December 17, 1918, to consider the question of a united campaign. A committee of twenty was appointed to outline a plan for submission to the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, the Home Missions Council, the Council of Church Boards of Education, the Sunday School Council, the Federation of Women's Boards of Foreign Missions, and the Council of Women for Home Missions.

This committee includes the names of some of the most noted missionary leaders in the Western Hemisphere. A leaflet presenting the report of the committee thus defines the purpose of the movement and the interests included:

"To present a unified program of Christian service and to unite the Protestant churches of North America in the performance of their common task, thus making available the values of spiritual power which come from unity and coordinated Christian effort and meeting the unique opportunities of the new era.

"While primarily a Home and Foreign Missionary Movement, the movement is to be broad enough to cover all those interests in the United States and Canada outside of the local church budget which are naturally related to the missionary enterprise through national agencies—denominational or interdenominational."

WITH THE IMMEDIATE OBJECT OF PROMOTING A CONFERENCE of all Christian churches of the world, a deputation from the Protestant Episcopal Church sailed from New York early in March. The movement for a World Conference of Faith and Order originated in the Protestant Episcopal Convention in 1910, and is designed to include all Christian denominations throughout the world. Bishop Weller of Fon du Lac, Wisconsin, a member of the deputation, stated in a newspaper interview before sailing that the Protestant Episcopal Church felt that it ought to take the lead in this matter, since it could serve better than any other church as the intermediary between the Roman and other churches claiming apostolic succession and the Protestant bodies not holding this view. The Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Eastern Church are the only ones that had not responded to the invitation to a world conference. It was expected, following correspondence between the Protestant Episcopal authorities and Rome, that this deputation would visit the Vatican. Archbishop Tihkon, Patriarch of Moscow, and head of the Russian Orthodox Church, will also be seen. As to further plans, Bishop Weller is reported as saying:

"We shall also, besides seeing him, visit the Metropolitan of Athens, head of the Greek Church, and the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria. Probably we shall go to Armenia, too. Then, with the whole of Christendom prepared to meet just as the diplomats of the world are meeting at Paris in the formation of the league of nations, we shall be ready to proceed. * * * We want to get all bodies together and say not what we disagree on but what we agree on. There are certain great principles on which we believe the Christian churches are more united today than most people realize. We believe that, joining together, looking eye to eye, we shall find these fundamental bases of agreement, and so lay the platform for a larger, more co-ordinated work. * * *

"We had to have some basis for organization, so we made it as wide as we practically could, making acceptance of the divinity of Christ the sole condition of a sect's entry."

Although Protestant commissions in this country have studied the plan and in general favor it, yet, to judge from several interviews with church leaders other than of the denomination taking the initiative, there is a disposition to proceed with caution. Apparently a Protestant deputation calling upon the Pope in the interest of church unity, even in these days of radical de-

partures from tradition, rather startles many who pray and labor for the visible union of all true Christians.

THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE PLACE AND FUNCTIONS of the church and the great interest in the Russian situation together give peculiar interest to this excerpt from an article in *The National Geographic Magazine*, by Thomas Whittemore, under the caption, *The Rebirth of Religion in Russia*:

"In the midst of the trials besetting the Russian people, mainly through their own guilt, the Church proves its vitality. It is now reconstructing its outer forms, which had greatly deteriorated during the past from Orthodox Church order. But outward forms are not vital; inner life is of far greater import. That source of inner life never ran dry in the Russian Church, in spite of the numerous defects of its outward forms, for the deficiency of which it often compensated.

"Let there be no misgiving; the Church has aided Russia in their crisis. The Church which even in the nineteenth century produced such shining lights as St. Seraphim of Sarov and Father John of Kronstadt, besides hosts of others, that Church is sure to foster and develop its inner life, now that better conditions of external organization are secured.

"In the present moment of contention in Russia the Church is the only institution which stands on its feet. May not the example of the Sobor [council] well pave the way in due time for a similar triumphant reconstruction of the Russian body politic?"

MINISTERS AND THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS WILL FIND OF INTEREST an outline of the subjects pursued in the education of the priests of the Greek Orthodox Church. From a current review of a little work on *The Greek Orthodox Church*, by Rev. Constantine Callinicos, we take the author's account of the studies pursued:

"The Science of Theology is not neglected. The Faculty of Theology in Athens University is steadily improving and keeping pace with the country's general regeneration. Students reading for it are required to have passed examinations in Greek, Latin, Greek and General History, Philosophy, and other ordinary subjects. Then follows a four-year course in Hebrew and Christian Archeology, Christian Art, Comparative Theology, History of Christian Doctrine, History of Missions, Biblical History, Modern Greek Theological Literature, Church History, Patristics, Old Testament Hebrew, Biblical Criticism and Exegesis, Dogmatics, Symbolics, Apologetics, Ethics, Catechetics, Pastoral Theology, Rhetoric, and Canon Law. The degree D.D.

is conferred on candidates who have specially distinguished themselves. The Board of the Faculty consists of twelve theologians, *i.e.* eight professors and four lecturers. Besides the Theological School of Athens there are the two Patriarchal Schools of Constantinople and Jerusalem. They are of equal merit, and their graduates enjoy exactly the same privileges as graduates of Athens."

A STRONG PLEA FOR DISESTABLISHMENT HAS COME FROM a clergyman of the Church of England, Father Paul Bull, of the high church. His reasons are not without significance when the church is closely scrutinizing everything pertaining to her relations to human society in both its organized and unorganized phases. His statement includes these points of objection to the present relations of the state to the established church in England:

"1. The nomination of her bishops by a prime minister who may be a Jew or an agnostic, bitterly hostile or contemptuously indifferent to the Christian faith and the Church's welfare and who, in spite of protest, has the legal power to compel chapters to elect them and bishops to consecrate them.

"2. The claim of a Parliament—a Noah's ark of varied religions—to exercise complete control over the doctrines and discipline, the formularies and the worship of the Church.

"3. The contemptuous refusal of Parliament to allow the Church to reform itself or to take steps which are vital to the full discharge of her Divine mission.

"4. The papal despotism of her bishops, who have absorbed every responsibility and right of the presbyter.

"5. The impossibility of readjusting the finances of the Church to meet new spiritual needs with the resulting misuse of its immense wealth, so that men who are not familiar with the legal entanglements of the Church regard her as a den of thieves, indifferent to the welfare of souls."

THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT, SENT OUT RECENTLY BY the American Bible Society, might have been regarded a few years ago as indicating an extremely progressive policy, but to-day it is quite in the regular order of things:

"The American Bible Society, at the last meeting of its Board, voted to propose to the British and Foreign Bible Society and other National Societies, a federation of the Bible Societies of the world.

"Mr. James Wood, President of the American Bible Society, announced to-day that the annual output of Bibles reached the

amazing number of 35,000,000, and that fully three-quarters of these are put out by non-commercial Bible Societies throughout the world. 'Even this large number of Bibles,' President Wood said, 'is entirely inadequate to meet the needs of the world and something must be done for more complete and efficient prosecution of the work of Bible supply. Some determination must be made of the most needy fields and the relative urgency of the work in each, so that the matter of Bible distribution may be wisely taken care of. A great many considerations have led us to believe that the time was ripe for a combination of the forces whose principal interest is the supply and distribution of the Christian Scriptures.' "

IT IS ONE OF THE INCONSISTENCIES OF OUR AMERICAN CIVILIZATION that the two professions from which it demands the most for its stability and progress it treats as least deserving of recompense—preaching and teaching. The disgracefully low average of ministerial salaries is nearly or quite matched by that of school teachers. Of late the evil fruits of this policy in public education are becoming so apparent that a warning is being sounded.

Few professional workers have greater demands laid upon them with respect to continued study and improvement than our present public school system places upon the teacher. Yet, even though a teacher have no one depending on him, he finds it exceedingly hard to save enough for the intended course at the university or for other cultural advantages. An investigation of the incomes, living conditions, and expense budgets of the teachers of one wealthy community in the East, which prides itself on its excellent school equipment, revealed the fact that about seventy-one per cent. of its school teachers required outside aid of some sort to meet their legitimate expenses.

As a result of this state of affairs men of ability and energy find the teaching profession a poor market for their talents, and turn to business or to the more lucrative professions, until in many sections men are gradually disappearing from the regular teaching ranks, which are largely filled by single women. And now the latter are beginning to find various occupations that give a better return. The women who teach in our schools deserve a tribute that has never yet been paid, but they themselves would be the quickest to agree that children and young people need the leadership of men as well as women during the years covered by their

school life. Calling public attention to the perils of this short-sighted policy, Dr. Claxton, United States Commissioner of Education, in advocating the policy of higher salaries, recently declared:

"Many of the better teachers are leaving the schools, and their places are taken by men and women of less native ability, less education and culture, and less training and experience. Many of the places are not filled at all. As an inevitable result the character of the schools is being lowered just at a time when it ought to be raised to a much higher standard. * * * It is not for the sake of the teachers that this policy is advocated. * * * It is for the sake of the schools, the children, the prosperity of the people, and the strength and safety of the nation."

THE ATTITUDE OF UNION LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES WITH respect to education may be gathered from a program drafted by the Committee on Reconstruction of the American Federation of Labor and recently published in the *American Federationist*. The section headed education reads:

"It is impossible to estimate the influence of education upon the world's civilization. Education must not stifle thought and inquiry, but must awaken the mind concerning the application of natural laws and to a conception of independence and progress.

"Education must not be for a few but for all our people. While there is an advanced form of public education in many states, there still remains a lack of adequate educational facilities in several states and communities. The welfare of the republic demands that public education should be elevated to the highest degree possible. The government should exercise advisory supervision over public education and where necessary maintain adequate public education through subsidies without giving to the government power to hamper or interfere with the free development of public education by the several states. It is essential that our system of public education should offer the wage-earners' children the opportunity for the fullest possible development. To attain this end state colleges and universities should be developed.

"It is also important that the industrial education which is being fostered and developed should have for its purpose not so much training for efficiency in industry as training for life in an industrial society. A full understanding must be had of those principles and activities that are the foundation of all productive efforts. Children should not only become familiar with tools and materials, but they should also receive a thorough knowledge of

the principles of human control, of force and matter underlying our industrial relations and sciences. The danger that certain commercial and industrial interests may dominate the character of education must be averted by insisting that the workers shall have equal representation on all boards of education or committees having control over vocational studies and training.

"To elevate and advance the interests of the teaching profession and to promote popular and democratic education, the right of the teachers to organize and to affiliate with the movement of the organized workers must be recognized."

A SINGLE ADVERTISEMENT BY A REPUTABLE PUBLISHING house recently contained the titles of seven new books on spiritualism and kindred subjects. The titles alone indicated their strong advocacy of this form of occultism. On this point we quote a couple of paragraphs from a recent clip sheet:

"There are multitudes of books and periodicals that present helpful and constructive answers to the great and ever-recurring spiritual questions. Are these to be found in the reading rooms of the public libraries of your home town or city? If not, whose fault is it?

"The propagandists of the various 'near religions' are keen on literature. You will find their publications, often under the most attractive guise, in every library and in many other places where men and women congregate. Are you and the other churchmen of your town equally alert and concerned to see that there is always at hand a true and helpful interpretation of the Christian message?"

WHEN THE CZAR PROHIBITED THE SALE OF ALCOHOLIC beverages in Russia at the beginning of the war, it was done as a military measure to cover the period of mobilization. Its wholesome effect, however, led him to keep it in force during the war, and he was later induced by popular demand to favor the banishment of the drink evil from Russia forever. Reports coming from that country are at present so confusing and contradictory that it is difficult to determine the true situation on any point. However, it would seem that, despite contrary rumors, the Bolsheviki have followed the example of the Czar in the effort to stamp out alcoholism throughout that country. A writer who uses only the initials M. S. on an article in *The Nation*, but is referred to by that weekly as a first hand student of

Russian affairs, describes the results of the Czar's ukase in this way:

"The interdiction of the sale of alcoholic beverages produced a veritable revolution in the life of the Russian people. Besides considerably improving their material and sanitary conditions, it greatly reduced crime, stamped out hooliganism, checked the growth of juvenile delinquency—for even boys and girls of ten were becoming addicted to the use of strong drink—and ushered in a new era in the domestic relations of millions of peasants and workmen. Some corroborative figures drawn from Simpson's 'Self-Discovery of Russia,' may prove suggestive. In one of the capitals, in July, 1915, one year after the issuance of the famous ukase, a prison containing 500 cells, always comfortably filled, had only 37 occupants. The number of suicides in that city decreased from two or three daily during the summer months to none at all for several weeks in succession. The city hospitals, with a capacity of 14,000 beds, which before prohibition had to put in from 1,000 to 2,000 additional cots, had 1,000 vacant beds. Fires in the empire decreased 47 per cent. during the first three months of the war, the driest and hottest season, when their number generally increased. In some provinces the decrease was even greater, from 50 to 60 per cent. The postal savings bank reported deposits for 1914 of some 85,000,000 rubles, against 35,000,000 in 1913, while the month of December, 1914, shows 29,000,000 rubles against 700,000 rubles in 1913. The productivity of the Russian factory workmen was estimated by the inspectors to have increased some 15 per cent., with a marked decrease in the number of accidents and in absenteeism. In reply to a questionnaire sent out by the Statistical Bureau of the Kostroma Zemstvo between November, 1914, and January, 1915, one peasant wrote: 'Many of the dark sides of life have disappeared—thefts, murders, quarrels, pauperism, immorality, and usury. All vices have disappeared. O God, let our Government understand the necessity of permanent prohibition, because from this hellish poison Russia was on the verge of ruin.' Another peasant said: 'With prohibition we do not meet with fights, murders, and bad language. Everybody feels himself safe now, because a sober man, even if he is still wild and rough, can not commit a crime.' A village priest replied: 'All crime has lessened by 90 per cent. The village is quite different.' "

IF OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE TROUBLED OVER THE PROBLEM of making effective the new prohibition amendment, they may learn something from China. In the face of a vigorous move to restore the outlawed opium traffic, President Hsu Shih Chan burned some five million dollars' worth of the drug, and the

four provinces in which the renewal of the business was sought adopted these measures of law enforcement:

"1. If the opium dealer be a shopkeeper all the banks and money shops shall refuse to have anything to do with him in money matters so that he will have to close his shop for lack of funds and banking facilities.

"2. If an employee of a shop deals in opium the shopkeeper shall dismiss the man. His name shall be published in the newspapers so that he will not be able to find employment elsewhere.

"3. If a wealthy man be discovered dealing in opium his name shall be given to the elder of his family with the request that he be cast out from the family (one of the greatest of disgraces) and he shall, without mercy, be opposed by all as an alien.

"4. Landlords shall not rent their houses to opium dealers. If they do they will be dealt with as if they were opium dealers themselves.

"5. If damage is done to opium dealers and their properties the Chambers of Commerce shall refuse to grant compensation."

THE PROBLEM OF DIVORCE IN THIS COUNTRY IS BECOMING MORE acute. In the light of the public influence of easy divorce and its effect upon the family as an institution, this evil now constitutes one of our most pressing moral issues. Only a glance at the statistics is needed to confirm this statement. A Washington dispatch to a leading daily paper says:

"About one marriage in every nine is terminated by divorce. The number of marriages in proportion to the population has increased since 1890, but the divorce rate has increased much more rapidly. The returns for 1916 show 1,050 marriages and 112 divorces per 100,000 population.

"These are features of a report on marriage and divorce, covering the calendar year 1916, soon to be issued by Sam L. Rogers, Director of the Census. This report was compiled under the supervision of William C. Hunt, Chief Statistician for Population.

"According to the returns, which covered 2,885 counties out of a total of 2,890—no data being available for the missing counties—the number of divorces granted in 1916 was 112,036, or 112 per 100,000 of population, as against 84 in 1906, 73 in 1900, and 53 in 1890.

"Excluding South Carolina, in which State all laws permitting divorce were repealed in 1878, the lowest three divorce rates in 1916 are shown for the District of Columbia, North Carolina, and New York—13, 31, and 32 per 100,000 of population, respectively; while the highest three rates are those for Nevada,

Montana, and Oregon—607, 323, and 255, respectively. The divorce rates were higher in 1916 than in 1906 for all the States, except eight—Maine, West Virginia, South Carolina (in which there were no divorces in either year), Alabama, Mississippi, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Colorado—and the District of Columbia. In 31.1 per cent. of the cases the divorce was granted to the husband and in 68.9 per cent. to the wife. The latter percentage compares with 67.5 for 1906 and 66.4 for 1896.

"The principal causes for divorce and the percentages contributed by them to the total were: Desertion, 36.8 per cent.; cruelty, 28.3 per cent.; infidelity, 11.5 per cent.; neglect to provide, 4.7 per cent.; drunkenness, 3.4 per cent.; combinations of preceding causes, 8.6 per cent.; all other causes, 6.7 per cent. Desertion was reported as the cause of 50 per cent. of the divorces granted to the husband and 30.8 per cent. of those granted to the wife.

"In only 37.7 per cent. of the divorce cases were children reported; in 52.1 per cent. no children were reported; and in 10.2 per cent. the records contained no data as to children. Children were reported in 27.8 per cent. of the cases in which divorces were granted to husbands; no children in 58.7 per cent. of the cases; and in the remaining 13.5 per cent. the records contained no data as to children. The corresponding percentages based upon divorces granted to wives were 42.2 per cent., 49.2 per cent., and 8.6 per cent., respectively."

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CHRISTIAN NATIONS ARE INTERESTED in Africa, for commercial reasons, is strikingly brought out by this summary taken from an article in *Collier's* by a writer upon the business opportunities in that continent:

"Africa contains 11,260,000 square miles, with a coast line of 18,400 miles. Estimates as to population differ materially. Every encyclopedia gives a different total. Sievers-Hahn's 'Afrika,' published in 1901, estimates the population at 125,000,000. The 'Encyclopaedia Britannica,' eleventh edition, and Nelson's, estimate the total at some five millions less.

"Africa has long been a bone of contention among European nations, each seeking to obtain as much territory as possible, and the native owners were forgotten in the division of spoils, or, if remembered, were mercifully butchered and thus relieved of lifelong anxiety. To-day, according to the *Statesman's Year Book*, France owns more African territory than any other nation, 3,940,000 square miles, with a population of 31,533,000. Next comes Great Britain, with 3,630,000 square miles and 49,497,000 population. Then follow: Congo Free State (Belgian), 920,000 square miles, 11,465,000 population; the German colonies, now in

Allied possession, 908,000 square miles, with 11,350,000 population; Portugal, 800,000 square miles and 6,864,000 population; Italy, 190,000 square miles, 730,000 population, and Spain, 82,000 square miles, 250,000 population. * * *

"In addition there are the three independent states, Abyssinia with 310,000 square miles and 8,330,000 population; Morocco, 176,000 square miles, 7,000,000 population, and Liberia, 36,840 square miles and 1,000,000 population."

BOOKS

THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF LIFE¹

To say all that one would like to say about this work, which is a noble product of American scientific scholarship and publishing enterprise, would require an extensive companion volume in itself. The Preface alone constitutes a considerable treatise and invites so constantly to comment and suggestion that the reviewer has found himself unable to do much more than reach a little, now and then, beyond that limit. Inasmuch as Professor Osborn outlines his scientific doctrine with considerable fullness of detail in this truly remarkable Preface, the failure to pass much beyond it is not so serious a limitation as at first thought might appear.

The discussion is divided into two sections entitled respectively: The Adaption of Energy, and The Evolution of Animal Form. The first part is concerned with the capture, storage, release, and reproduction of energy in its simplest and most elementary forms; the second, with the evolution of matter and form in plants and animals, interpreted in terms of energy and mechanics; the whole constituting initial steps away from the matter and form conceptions of evolution and heredity hitherto prevailing.

For the reviewer the discussion falls naturally into two parts, not altogether coinciding with the two-fold division planned and carried out by the author. For one who is interested primarily in ultimate questions, every scientific treatise, which is sufficiently ambitious to deal even tentatively with the origin and essential nature of things, has a two-fold appeal: The purely scientific, that is the objective description of animal life; and the philosophical, which attempts to evaluate the facts set forth.

¹The Origin and Evolution of Life, by Henry Fairfield Osborn, New York, 1918. Pp. XXXI+322.

The strictly scientific portion of Dr. Osborn's work is a matter both of wonder and delight. His vast knowledge not only of contemporary animal forms and those of the past, speaking from the viewpoint of the naturalist, but his mastery of vital processes involving a profound knowledge of comparative anatomy, embryology, physiology, and bio-chemistry, together with the ability to set forth his knowledge in lucid language which rises at times to the level of beauty, makes the reading of his book something very close to a liberal education in modern science. Indeed, the thought has occurred to the reviewer more than once during the perusal of this work—which at times, it must be confessed, has required a very strenuous girding up of the mental loins—whether or not we are not reverting to an older and really nobler type of scientist than we have been accustomed to of late in the rigidly confined specialist of a single narrow department.

Dr. Osborn, if we mistake not, is known primarily as geologist and palaeontologist, and in the present work classes himself as a palaeontologist (see p. XIII), but this discussion crosses the boundaries and attempts the synthesis of a full half-dozen departments of specialization. Evidently Dr. Osborn would not be content to spend his life in studying the parasites of the snail. Science, at any rate, however necessary minute sub-division of departments may be, ought to produce some men of sufficient caliber and versatility to synthesize these various departments and give us views of the world of life as a whole. This Dr. Osborn has attempted and the results are well worth while. If certain scientific specialists become peevish because one not of their own guild or sub-guild has occupied a field not peculiarly his own, we, whose interests lie in the region where the great unities dwell, will try to remove the curse by our heartfelt gratitude and approval. Concerning the logical structure of Dr. Osborn's system we shall have some things not so favorable to say, but to Dr. Osborn as a scientific interpreter we doff our hat in profound respect.

At the outset of our necessarily brief and summary discussion of the scientific doctrine set forth in this treatise, attention should be called to the sharp distinction which Dr. Osborn makes between what we know and do not know about the history of organic forms, between ascertained facts and theoretical speculations of greater or less value in the pursuit of science.

The reviewer's view of what we know and do not know about evolution does not coincide with the author's on several points to be treated later, but it is highly suggestive that the scientist makes that distinction so emphatically.

Science now-a-days rather plumes herself, and justly, upon acknowledging that there are things beyond her ken; as Dr. Osborn puts it, such admissions indicate "the essential honesty of scientific thought." In this same connection, it is important to note just what our author thinks that he has accomplished. He makes no claim to have solved "the riddle of the universe." He makes no attempt to offer "an explanation of the miracles of adaptations and of heredity," inasmuch as "the germ evolution is the most incomprehensible phenomenon which has yet been discovered in the universe." And furthermore, as the greater part of visible evolution is "the expression of the invisible evolution of the heredity-germ," we are not ready for a clearly developed energy conception of the origin of life, still less of evolution and heredity, "yet the theory of the actions, reactions and interactions of living energy will prove a step in the right direction."

With the spirit of this declaration, whatever he may think of the theory advanced, one can scarcely fail to find himself in sympathy. The work as a whole is conspicuously free from assertive dogmatism of any sort. The author holds that while the simpler organism is relatively manageable and can be effectively dealt with as "an arena for energy and matter," it remains "a complex of intricate actions." The heredity-germ, however, remains the seat of inconceivable mystery in each of its three powers.

Dr. Osborn believes that, while evolution is a universal law of which gravitation is one of many agents, "the causes of the evolution of life are as mysterious as the law of evolution is certain." Hence he confesses himself an "agnostic" on all theories of evolution and admits that "our search for causes has just begun." All this again, whether one agrees with Dr. Osborn on these various points or not, is entirely satisfactory. The cocksure period of modern science has passed away, and this book may be taken as its requiem.

Another important matter comes in at this point. Dr. Osborn is convinced that in the appearance of life, which reverses

the cosmic processes since it is "essentially constructive" and "is continually giving birth to an infinite variety of new forms and functions which never appeared in the universe before," we have yet a process which is "*still evolutionary rather than creative* because all the new characters and forms of life appear to arise out of new combinations of preëxisting matter" (*italics his*).

This statement is open to criticism at several angles. In the first place, it is quite clear that if life is simply "the *old* forms of energy transformations" taking "a *new* direction," the question at once arises why forms of energy already under law and working out their inherent qualities should, at a given point, take such a highly interesting turn. This really means that life is inherent in non-living matter and that, despite "the numerous contrasts between the living and the lifeless world," the distinction between the two must be abandoned. From the viewpoint of theism this conception is innocuous for it merely telescopes the problem of origins by the omission of one intervening step, but it would seem to be a rather violent supposition that seems to contradict the testimony of experience.

In the second place, it would seem to be a misstatement, or misleading understatement, to call a process which, so far as appears, "marks an actual reversal of the previous order of things," merely the taking of a "new" direction by energies already operating in the order which is reversed. If the known processes of what we are accustomed to call "inorganic matter" disclose the real nature in which it subsists or the true laws of its operation, then life is something totally different, because it reverses the previous order. Life does not branch off from the non-living; it moves in the opposite direction.

Again, in the third place, the statement involves a truly tremendous *non sequitur*. If all the known facts of life go to indicate that it arises out of new combinations of preëxisting matter, it by no means follows that life is not due to immediate creation in the only sense in which that term has meaning in this connection, namely, the release of new and original energy from whatever reservoir of power is behind the whole process. No one believes, or at any rate has adequate grounds for believing, that life was created *de novo*, without reference to preëxisting matter. On the other hand, what evidence is there that the new forms and

functions of living matter are due to forces resident in chemical atoms and native to them? That there is such a thing as biochemistry no one denies or has any interest in denying, but apart from all theories as to the nature of life, that biology is simply an extension of chemistry, rests on no sound basis of induction.

The very gist of the problem lies in the explanation of the new combinations which are so numerous and so various wherever life is. The idea that the phenomena of life can be explained on the physico-chemical basis is due to loose thinking—as can be shown from Dr. Osborn's own brilliant and fascinating pages. It is only necessary to point out a phrase omitted by the reviewer in a preceding summary. This life-process is "essentially constructive" and (here it comes) "*apparently though not actually creative.*" "*It is a continuous creation or creative evolution.*" Bergson's phrase has found a curious context here. My point is that "creative evolution" is all that the most devoted advocate of the uniqueness of life asks for, in his interpretation. Moreover attention should be called to the fact that what we really discover by actual experiment is that "the same physico-chemical laws continue in living as in lifeless matter," which does not go one step toward proving that physico-chemical agents *alone* are capable of producing life. Dr. Osborn's use of words indicates quite clearly that his conviction has run beyond his data, for he passes in a single page from a statement that vital evolution "*may arise through combinations of preëxisting energies*" to the conviction that it does so arise "*so far as we can observe.*" By what sort of observation we get behind a process that is "apparently creative" and discover that it really is not, is not made clear, for, he says very beautifully, "*to our senses it appears as if something new is breathed into the aging dust.*" What have we to go by, inductively speaking, but our senses? If we are to trust some deep-seated inward conviction that the process which appears to be creative is not what it seems by every physical test applicable thereto, where is our boasted inductive science?

That there is loose reasoning and logical gaps in this splendidly constructed book, may be seen elsewhere. Professor Osborn tabulates what we know and what we do not know about evolution. Among the things known occurs the following: "A more or less complete chain of beings from monad to man."

That "more or less" in a statement which is to form the basis of a fundamental conviction is terrifying. When I climb up or down a ladder I want to know whether it is *more* or *less* continuous. The inductive basis of the evolutionary hypothesis in its wider application turns on that dubious "more or less."

In that same list of things known appears also the following item: "Man has descended from an unknown ape-like form somewhere in the Tertiary." This is a curious statement coming from a careful inductive scientist. How is it possible to know anything about an *unknown* ancestor, even to be sure that he is ape-like? Moreover, a fine ambiguity nests in the very wording of the statement itself. What is meant by the term *ape-like*? Physiologically, they tell us, man himself is ape-like, classifiable among the primates, and differing from other members of the same group chiefly in his psychic constitution. Was this hypothetical ancestor, about whom we are so certain, an animal or man or half-animal, half man? It is safe to say that no man who has really thought through the problems, psychological and otherwise, involved in the hypothesis of man's animal origin ever stated it baldly as one of the things we know. Besides, the identification of this mythical ancestor as *ape-like* leaves the whole matter in a fog of question-begging ambiguity. That Dr. Osborn lacks definite evidence for his hypothesis as to what we know is shown near the end of his book (p. 274). The missing links in the chain of mammals (whose genealogy, by the way, is very dubious, several lines of derivation having been suggested) including the ancestors of man "are probably destined to be found" in Asia. "Fossil records of the descent of man * * * may be discovered in Asia, most probably in the region lying south of the Himalayas." Meanwhile, do we *know* what these undiscovered records will disclose?

May the reviewer point out what he considers the main defect of the whole treatise considered as a statement of scientific doctrine as regards the ultimate, and then end with a quotation which will serve to recall the many excellencies of a noble book. The defect is that the whole theoretical structure of the discussion rests upon a term which never receives careful definition. What does the author mean by energy? For example, in this crucial sentence: "We may express as our own opinion, based upon the application of uniformitarian evolutionary principles,

that when life appeared on the earth some energies preëxisting in the cosmos were brought into relation with the chemical elements already existing" (p. 2). I am not quarreling with the hypothesis; I am merely asking, just what does this statement mean? What is the distinction between "some energies preëxisting" and "the chemical elements already existing" with which the energies enter into combination?

I had supposed that *by hypothesis*, chemical elements are forms of energy. If so, that statement reduces itself to this, that certain energies hitherto sundered in the cosmic process are brought together and in combination produce life. This, at least, whether true or not, means something, but the combination of energies and chemical elements, which are supposedly also energies, conveys no definite idea to my mind. That this is not altogether due to my own stupidity will appear from the following: Dr. Osborn injects uncertainty into his discussion in the very first stage of it (Preface VII) by adding without comment or explanation the participial adjective "living" to the term "energy" which he uses elsewhere.

The very heart of the question as to the origin of life turns on the distinction, maintained by vitalists of all types, between physical or chemical and "living" energy, and Dr. Osborn cannot be allowed to solve the problem by the simple device of vitalizing chemical energy by the use of an unauthorized adjective. From this initial dubiety his discussion of ultimate questions never escapes. We are never sure that we know exactly what is meant by energy, and hence do not know exactly whether we agree with the author's main conclusion or not.

To indicate that these strictures are not due to any theological bias, let me close this review by quoting a sentence which clears the way for a study of Dr. Osborn's discussion on a purely scientific basis: "Without being either a *mechanist* or a *materialist*, one may hold the opinion that life is a continuation of the evolutionary process rather than an exception to the rest of the cosmos, because both mechanism and materialism are words borrowed from other sources which do not in the least convey the impression which the activities of the cosmos make upon us. This impression is that of limitless and ordered energy" (p. 3).

LOUIS MATTHEWS SWEET.

A NEW TREATISE ON ETHICS²

The distinctive purpose of this book is, as stated in the Preface, "to present a system of stalwart ethics, to inculcate virile moral principles, to produce robust moral character, and to lead to the practice of uncompromising virtue."

Most surely that is a noble purpose; and faithfully and well does the author carry out his project. Dr. Keyser is professor of systematic theology and ethics in Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, and is already widely known as the author of various other books on morality and religion. Besides being a profound thinker, he is a widely informed scholar, versed not only in science, philosophy, theology, general literature, and human history, but also, and more to the purpose, in all special lines of study that have to do with the subject of ethics. Moreover, he is a man who knows how to put even the most erudite thoughts into simple, clear, and attractive English; in which respect he is much like Professor William James, of whom it has been said that he could write on any psychological subject, no matter how abstruse and difficult it might be, with as much interest to the reader as if he were composing fiction. And then, too, in Dr. Keyser's case there is always shown a really practical interest in the subject of morals, very different from the merely speculative or academic regard manifested too often by writers on ethics.

Such, therefore, being the qualifications of our author, it was to be expected that any book written by him upon the subject of general ethics would be, as this last production from his pen really is, a production of superior value, of no little interest to the public in general.

The work is divided into two parts. Part I, after presenting a suitable introduction, discusses, to begin with, the ultimate ground of right. This Dr. Keyser finds, not in utility, Epicurean pleasure, Stoical indifference, pragmatism, or any other of those defective bases upon which many ethicists, ancient and modern, have been accustomed to build their theories, but rather in what he terms the rational personality of God, or, more particularly, in the divine nature and the divine free-will; his conception being that, since all true morality must be both free and

²A System of General Ethics, by Leander S. Keyser, D.D., Burlington, Iowa, 1918. Pp. 286.

unchangeable, the basis on which such morality rests must be both the essential nature of God and His free choice.

The ultimate ground of right having been discovered, the next thing considered is the great universal law of right. This is a reflection of the divine nature, manifested first in all the lower orders of creation surrounding man, and then more fully in the moral constitution of man himself. Both the law of right and the ultimate ground of right being thus apprehended, there remains to be noticed yet, in this first part of the book, only the great and terrible fact of *sin*. This fact our author, with his usual earnestness and thoroughness, discusses under three heads: First, sin as a universally acknowledged fact; second, sin in its genesis; and third, its possible cure, the last-named particular being viewed, of course, in the light of Christian theology.

Part II makes a far-reaching and earnest application of the general ethical principles, established by Part I, to human life in all its different relations. That is to say, human duty comes here to view, and all the duties of man are discussed: First, his duties to himself; second, his duties to nature; third, his duties to his fellow men; and lastly, his duties to God. Each and all of these duties are fully explained and strongly enforced by Dr. Keyser.

Another thing needs to be mentioned in order to have this book fully understood. It is that the entire system of morals presented by this volume is based solidly and squarely on the old orthodox conception of true Christianity, which has come down through all the ages, and which has built up the only true or real civilization that our world has ever known. This fact accounts not only for much of the lofty and uncompromising nature of the moral teachings set forth in this book, but also for those teachings themselves as exceedingly appropriate to this age; for if there ever was a time when the whole realm of human life needed to be lifted to a higher and better plane of moral living, it would seem to be just now.

Such being the general character of this production, we do not hesitate to commend it as a volume of great worth. In some respects this work would seem to outrank all others. For instance, the lofty moral character of the teaching of this book, to which we have already referred, would seem to lift it out of the

category of ordinary productions; and when one considers its beauty of style, the attractive manner in which it has been written, one will be sure to rank it as especially high. There are no dull pages, and therefore the reader will do well to dismiss at once all concern about any "dry as dust" matter connected with it.

As a text book to be used in our colleges, universities, and various other institutions of higher learning, no treatise on the subject of general ethics that has yet appeared could be more serviceable; and for the general reader there is much that he will appreciate if he is in any wise concerned with the subject of morals.

The following, taken from Dr. Keyser's discussion of man's duties to God, is a very good illustration of his mode of reasoning and of his style of expression:

"Is there a goal for all our striving? Or, after all our seeking and marvelling and aspiring, are we doomed to sink into eternal oblivion? If we must choose the latter alternative, we may well ask pessimistically, *Cui bono*? Life would then be full of mystery; nay, the mystery would be so appalling, that even the noble science of Ethics could scarcely say that life is worth living, or that all our moral striving and discipline are worth the effort.

"On the other hand, if Ethics may teach that God is good, that He desires us to serve Him in righteousness, to promote His cause in the world, and so to discipline our moral and spiritual faculties that we may be fitted for eternal fellowship with Him in a state of purity and felicity—then, indeed, our science has an exalted mission, and may confidently urge men to continue their moral striving, finish their life's purpose, and anticipate a destiny that will be in accord with all their highest aspiration.

"Historically considered, the best ethical results have accompanied belief in immortality. Very few men who have believed in the annihilation of the individual at death have achieved true nobility of character, or accomplished much for the moral uplift and betterment of the world. As a rule, they have sooner or later fallen into a cynical frame of mind, and *nil admirari* has been their motto. However, the men who have had a sure, undaunted hope of personal immortality, an immortality of purity as well as of bliss, have been the men of greatest moral and spiritual service to the world.

"Therefore we maintain that a truly virile and earnest system of rational ethics demands that man shall so conduct himself in the present life as to be able to anticipate with joy an eternal fellowship of blessedness with God."

DAVID HEAGLE.

RELIGION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF OPPRESSION*

To the question: "Are you a socialist?" a distinguished American university professor is said to have replied: "Yes—if you will let me define socialism."

The term is so elastic that its content cannot in general be very closely delimited. Still it is correctly understood to imply a social and economic system still further removed from autocracy than is the democratic form of government now so widely prevailing. In its most extreme manifestation it comes close to actual anarchy, while on the other hand we have a qualified and moderate kind in social democracy. We even hear of Christian socialism, though in general socialism has not been friendly to settled religious creeds. Just now its hostility to established religion is explained by the fact that socialism was "made in Germany." However that may be, it would seem that socialism, by its very nature, appeals most strongly to inherently insurgent minds, which, fretted by delay in achieving an economic revolution, find relief in moral and intellectual revolt. The more radical the mind the more rabid is the attack on established beliefs and forms.

Several reasons suggest themselves for considering in these pages Mr. Upton Sinclair's recent book, *The Profits of Religion*. For one thing, it discusses religion, more especially Christianity, and deals largely with the Bible and the church. But the most important reason is that this is the kind of writing that is read to-day by thousands of men who are out of touch and sympathy with the church, and who are in a mood to welcome any production that would appear to justify their attitude. In order to meet such a situation, our ministers and others in positions of Christian leadership should make themselves familiar with what the great, restless laboring class is being fed upon. The church should not ignore what its opponents are doing, nor should it be indifferent to any just criticisms their attacks may contain.

The author is a well known socialist of the more radical type, and a writer of extreme views expressed with a vigorous assurance that is pretty sure of a hearing any time, whatever the theme. His most noteworthy book, *The Jungle*, dealing with conditions of labor in the great Chicago meat packing

**The Profits of Religion*, by Upton Sinclair. 1918. Pp. 315.

plants, raised such a commotion about twelve years ago that Congress was moved to take some action for the protection of the public meat supply. A comparison of that book with this would indicate that Mr. Sinclair is much more at home as an investigator of material conditions than as a student of religion. Here is one of his assertions: "The supreme crime of the church to-day is that everywhere and in all its operations and influences it is on the side of sloth of mind; that it banishes brains, it sanctifies stupidity, it canonizes incompetence." There would appear to be a good bit of unsanctified stupidity in such a statement, when one ponders the tremendous outlay of the church for schools, colleges, and universities, not only at home, but in lands throughout the world whose peoples lived in ignorance, superstition, and misery until the church came.

But, like all explosive forces, radicalism tends to exert itself equally in every direction, and so we are not surprised at a production like this any more than we are at the author's announcement that it is to be followed by others which will deal similarly with Education, Journalism, and Literature, "the four volumes making a work of revolutionary criticism, an Economic Interpretation of Culture under the general title of 'The Dead Hand.'"

To quote again: "This book is a study of Supernaturalism from a new point of view—as a Source of Income and a Shield to Privilege." Its pages would seem to bear out Mr. Sinclair's statement that he has "searched the libraries through," for they are replete with quotations from many sources, ancient and modern. In spite of the fact that "it has meant twenty-five years of thought," one is apt to feel that this writer belongs to the large class of zealous souls who are more successful in unearthing facts than in interpreting them. We hear of "philosophic anarchists," but are yet to learn of a recognized class of judicial socialists. Having indicated the scope and character of his undertaking, the writer proceeds to his task of showing us that religion, in its usual forms and institutions, "is a source of income to parasites, and the natural ally of every form of oppression and exploitation."

Mr. Sinclair makes a very comprehensive use of the word "religion," and, to do him justice, he does not single out any

particular faith, but begins with the vague fears and superstitions of the savage trembling at the lightning, and covers almost every system of belief ancient or modern that can by any stretch of meaning be called religious. Primitive superstition, Babylonianism, Judaism, Christianity—Roman, Greek, and Protestant, Spiritualism, Theosophy, Mormonism, Christian Science, New Thought, and various little cults and cultlets are treated with unsparing hand. Any faith, creed or cult desirous of attacking almost any other might find here a most convenient ammunition dump.

With respect to the Scriptures and the essentials of Christian theology the author is simply the thoroughgoing iconoclast. Some of his expressions are blasphemous as well as crude, and the supernatural elements of Christianity are, as a matter of course, made mere objects of ridicule. As is most always the case with religious and social radicals, Christ is referred to with respect, even reverence. Unconsciously they would seem to come under the power of the Incarnation they deny. It is shown by numerous quotations how oppression, fraud, corruption, extortion, and all their train have been fostered and protected by the appeal to man's fear of the supernatural, and by the dread of punishment, or desire for reward, that could supposedly be visited or bestowed by the intervention of a priestly caste.

Now, no institution in this world is free from human weakness or wickedness. Christ foresaw that the tares would mingle with the wheat, and was betrayed for money by one of His own disciples. That Judas has had his own moral succession all through the church's history needs no argument. That the church of history has at times been guilty of standing for oppression and of opposing enlightening and uplifting influences will not be denied. Not only so, but such wrong doing cannot always be explained by ignorance, stupidity or the force of tradition; admittedly the lust for power and wealth, coupled with a most un-Christlike indifference to human rights and suffering, must bear its share of the responsibility. Even in our own times the church as an organization has not always been found on the side of righteousness or of moral reforms, any more than have many of its individual members. The

support of the hideous Prussian military system by the German state church is fresh in our minds.

On the other hand, only the most superficial study of religious history will indiscriminately condemn types of religion carrying no moral obligations toward one's fellows with that one which has a highly developed ethical system; and only blind prejudice fails to distinguish between the spiritual and moral grandeur of a religion as such and the imperfections and often tragical inconsistencies of a portion of its professed followers.

It would not be fair to say that this book, with all its crudities, insufficiencies, and amateurish scholarship, contains nothing which both ministry and laity might well lay to heart. An enemy may say many unjust things, and yet for all that he may mirror one's faults in a way to commend their correction.

Naturally, the Protestant and Catholic churches both come in for rough treatment, with this distinction, doubtless unpremeditated by the author, that, whereas particular churches or groups of churches and individual persons are dealt with more especially in the section devoted to Protestantism, in that given to the Roman Church the organization as a whole would seem to be the chief object of attack. The historical and other quotations in the Protestant section are sufficient to give any devout Protestant a feeling of humility as he contemplates the frequent shortcomings of the church in the presence of human need. In the part devoted to Romanism, if half the author says and quotes is true as to the relation of that church to business, politics, and the press, it should call forth a patriotic demonstration as intense as that evoked by the war.

Altogether, not only is this book a product of radical socialism, distinctly anti-Christian, but it is peculiarly dangerous in these times. It appeals to the class hatred of the many who never think beneath the surface, although thoughtful and informed individuals may rightly judge it. It is well adapted to fan the flames of lawlessness among masses of men who will make no distinction between the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the inconsistencies of many among His organized disciples. The popular reader will not likely stop to consider that this author has failed to give due attention to the vast army of Christian men and women who have made the utmost sacrifices, not only for

their faith, but because that faith has inspired them to love, defend, and help the downtrodden and afflicted, and, to give up ease and comfort that they may devote their lives to the warfare against unrighteousness, ignorance, and superstition. Nor will such a reader realize that never since apostolic times has the church been so deeply concerned as she is now over the welfare of men and the removal of whatever hinders their development, and also that down through all the ages the organized and effective agencies for philanthropic work have found their ultimate motive in the Christian faith.

There is a type of spotlight mind, which focusses so intensely upon a limited area as almost to distort the appearance of things therein, while beyond its circle of light there is no illumination, hence no vision of relationships, no grasp of proportions. If it be turned upon a flaw in any structure the beholder is misled to the conclusion that he perceives the character of the whole edifice. He forgets that the full truth requires the broad light of day. And so, while this book may contain evidence of sins of omission and commission on the part of the church, it fails utterly and foolishly as an estimate of the religion of Jesus Christ. Its discerning reader will be led to recall the dictum, that error is apt to be true in what it reveals or affirms, and false in what it conceals or denies.

ROBERT M. KURTZ.

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